

F I V E
DISSERTATIONS
ON THE
SCRIPTURE ACCOUNT
OF THE
FALL; AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

BY

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CHARLES CHAUNCY, D.D.

Minister of the First Church in Boston, New England.

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MDCCLXXV.

CONFIDENTIAL
DISSEMINATIONS

ON THE

SCOTTISH ACCOUNT

OF THE

FAITH AND ITS CONSEQUENCES



CHARLES CHURCH, D.D.

Minister of the First Church in Boston, New England.

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DISSERTATION I

On the one man, Adam, in his innocent state.

MOSES, in his book of Genesis, gives us a plain, though concise, account of the creation of the first man: and it is from this account, together with some Scripture-passages which may seem to allude to it, and not from the principles of mere reason, that we become capable of conceiving justly of the state in which he was originally created.

The Mosaic account of man, and his original state, I shall place before the reader in its full view once for all, that he may be able the more readily to judge of the pertinency of what may be offered as representing its just contents. It is in these words:

GENESIS, Chap. I.

26. "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let him have dominion

dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth."

27. "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him: male and female created he them."

28. "And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."

29. "And God said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed: to you it shall be for meat."

GENESIS, Chap. II.

7. "And the Lord formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life: And man became a living soul."

8. "And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there put he the man whom he had formed."

9. "And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food: the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil."

15. "And

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15. "And the Lord God took the man, and put him into the garden to dress it, and to keep it."

16. "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat:"

17. "But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."

18. "And the Lord God said, It is not good that the man should be alone: I will make him an help meet for him."

19. "And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof."

20. "And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field: but for Adam there was not found an help meet for him."

21. "And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept: And he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof."

22. "And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man."

B 2

23. "And

23. "And Adam said, this is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man."

24. "Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh."

25. "And they were both naked, the man and his wife; and were not ashamed."

From these words of Moses, the following things easily present themselves to observation.

1. The "distinguishing language," in which God is introduced, as speaking about the creation of man. He only said, relative to the other creatures, "let the waters and the earth bring them forth after their kind:" But, when he was about to make man, he is represented as speaking in a quite different style, "Let us make man." The other creatures, as truly as man, were made by God. His almighty word, and not any virtue there was in "in the waters," or in "the earth," called them into being. "The waters," and "the earth," are mentioned to point out the elements respectively proper to those living creatures; or to signify, that those of them who were to live in the waters, were formed by the creating hand of God out of this element, as those, who were to live on the earth, were made out of that: or, could any other reason be given of the command to "the waters," and to "the

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“the earth,” to bring forth those living creatures, it cannot be supposed, that they were the producers of them. God only was the “agent” in their production, whatever use he might make of these elements in bringing them into existence.

The peculiar manner, therefore, in which God is introduced as speaking concerning the creation of man, cannot be designed to lead us into the thought, as though he was the maker of man, but not of the other creatures; for he was as truly the Creator of them, as of him: but this distinguishing form of speech was rather intended to point out the “superior excellency,” of the workmanship God was now about to form. He advises, takes counsel, as it were, with himself; having it in view to make a creature of the highest dignity and importance in this lower world, “Let us make man.”

Some suppose there is, in these words, an application from the “Father” to the “Son,” and to the “Spirit:” as it is said of the “Son,” that “all things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made;” and of the “Spirit,” that “he moved upon the face of the waters,” in the beginning of the creation. I will not affirm, there is no foundation for this thought in this mode of diction: neither would I say, those are mistaken who suppose it only a more aggrandised manner of speak-

ing, suited to the greater excellency of the work that was now in hand.

II. Another thing obviously contained in the Mosaic account of man is, his "actual production." Concerning this it is said, in general, "God created man;"—"Male and female created he them *." If, by the term "created," we understand that "power," either as to its nature, or manner of exertion, which gave man his existence, we can have no idea of it, nor are capable of having any, in the present state of human faculties. The meaning of it, therefore, as to us, can be only this, that God now brought man into being, not by the instrumentality of second causes, operating according to established laws; but by an immediate act of his own almighty power.

The inspired Moses, having spoken in a general way concerning the "creation of man,"

* Some have ventured to suggest, from the manner of speaking here used, that the body of man, upon his first creation, was so formed as to be both of the "male" and "female" kind; though afterwards an alteration was effected, dividing the sexes, and assigning to each a separate body. But this is a notion that took rise from fancy only, not from any thing Moses has said. It is true, he affirms, in this place, that "God created man male and female;" giving only this general account of the matter. But when he resumes the subject in the next chapter, he particularly informs us of the "separate creation," both of the man and of the woman: of the man, "out of the dust of the ground;" of the woman, out of "a rib of the man." So that, from the beginning, they existed with separate bodies, properly distinguishing their sex.

and

and his being created "male and female," after some interruption resumes the subject, and informs us more particularly of what man was formed, separately considered as "male" and "female."

Of man, that is, the first man, Adam, he says, "God formed him of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." It is, beyond all dispute, evident from these words, that man, the body of man, was made of pre-existing matter, here called, "the dust of the ground." This, by the wisdom and power of God, was formed into an exquisitely curious compound of organised parts. But after this formation of "dust" into so wonderful a machine, it was still dead inactive matter; and so it remained, till "God breathed into it the breath of life." It was upon this, that "man became a living soul."

It may be worthy of remark here, our Saviour Jesus Christ, in a discourse of his about whom we should fear, particularly distinguishes between the "soul" and "body" of man. Agreeably, the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews speaks of God in that style, "the Father of our spirits." And Solomon, in his book, called Ecclesiastes, uses that mode of expression, "the spirit of man returneth to God who gave it." If now, by "the breath of life," we understand, as it seems reasonable we should, the "soul," or "spirit;" then, by "God's breathing it" into the body of

man, it is natural to understand his uniting it, having first given it existence by his creating power, to the "dust" he had before organised into a suitably adapted body for its reception, in order to its acting, and being acted upon, by it. But, in whatever sense we take God's "breathing into man the breath of life," it was this exertion of his almighty power that gave him "life;" that is, constituted him a being capable of having communication with himself, and the world he had made, in the way of perception and enjoyment.

Of the formation of the "woman," the first of the kind, the account is in these words: "And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept: and he took one of his ribs, and closed the flesh thereof. And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man." It appears from hence, that the woman, as truly as the man, was made of previously existing matter, though not of the same form. It pleased God, no doubt for wise ends*, to take a "rib" out of the

* Most commentators and practical writers upon this subject, appear to be of the opinion, and I am ready to think upon just grounds, that God might chuse to form the woman out of "a rib" of the "man," to make way for the observation that immediately follows upon her being thus formed; viz, that she was "bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh." Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and cleave to his wife; and they shall be one flesh." Herefrom recommending marriage

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the man's body, and to work it into a like curiously organised machine. It is not added, that he then "breathed into it the breath of life;" but this ought, in reason, to be supposed: otherwise it would have been an unperceptive useless figure.

It is here particularly signified, that while this "rib was taking out of the man," and the "flesh closing again," he was thrown into a "deep sleep;" probably, that he might be insensible of any pain: though God might bring it on him as he caused a "deep sleep" (Dan. viii. 19—26,) to fall on Daniel and Abraham, when, in a signal manner, he revealed himself to them. Perhaps, in this "deep sleep," God conveyed to Adam as clear a perception of what was now transacting, as if he had seen it with his eyes; at the same time, giving him the proper instructions relative hereto: insomuch that, upon awaking out of this "sound sleep," he was able

to all, as founded in nature; being the re-union of man and woman: intimating also what tender affection ought to subsist between man and wife; as they are no longer "twain, but one flesh." To this purpose is that reasoning of the Apostle Paul, Eph. v. 28. 31. "So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies: he that loveth his wife, loveth himself.—For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother, and cleave to his wife; and they two shall be one flesh." And as it was but one woman that God made out of the man to be his wife, he might herefrom design to lead us into this further thought, that, in this way, it was fit and proper, and in this way only, that mankind should be propagated. To be sure, this is what our Saviour has collected herefrom, and plainly taught us; as may be seen at large, Matt. xix. 4—6. Mark x, 5—12.

to

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to say of the woman, now brought into being, "This is bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man." Ver. 23. And the words that immediately follow, he might speak in consequence of a "revelation" he now received from God; "therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they shall be one flesh." In this way it will be easy, though extremely difficult in any other, to reconcile what seems evidently to be here spoken by Adam, with our Saviour's declaration, which is express, that it was God that thus spoke. His words to this purpose are these: "Have ye not read, that He which made them at the beginning, made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh." Matt. xix. 4, 5. Though Adam spake these words, yet God might, with strict propriety and truth, be said to speak them also, if Adam spake them as communicated to him by "revelation" from God.—But as these are matters of comparatively smaller importance, I go on to say:

III. It is further observable, that man, in his original state, was made in the "image of God." So the proposal runs, when God was in consultation about making him: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." And agreeable
hereto

DISSERTATION I. 11

hereto is the account given of the matter, after man was actually made: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him."

Some are so nice as to distinguish between "image" and "likeness;" taking more into the meaning of the latter than the former. But there does not appear to me to be any just reason for making this difference. "Image" and "likeness," as here used, seem very evidently to import one and the same thing. The latter is explanatory of the former. Being a word of similar meaning, it might be added, and with strict propriety, the more clearly and fully to ascertain the sense intended to be communicated. This use of synonymous words is common in all languages, particularly in the Hebrew; multiplied instances whereof might easily be given, was there any need of it. I shall add here, we may the rather think, that these words were designed to convey the same sense; as in the following verse, where we have the account of man's creation, the language is this; "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." If more had been contained in the word "likeness," than in the word "image," it cannot reasonably be supposed that Moses would have said "So," that is, agreeably to the above determination, "God created man in his own image," wholly leaving out the "likeness" he had before mentioned,

But

But the great question here is, what are we to understand by this "image of God," in which man was created?

Whether this is a question in itself difficult to be answered or not, it has occasioned various opposite opinions; which have been maintained with warmth, not unmixed with bitterness and wrath.

Some make this "image of God" on man to consist in his "outward form;" his being made, not like the other creatures, but after a model far exceeding theirs. To this purpose are the following words of a considerable writer:

"It cannot, I think, be disputed, but that, in a most obvious sense of the words, *man's being created in the image of God*, may refer to the make of his body; and intimate, that he was formed, not after the fashion of any other of the living creatures, but was made in a pattern higher than they. A more excellent form than theirs, was given to him.—It is an expression not unfrequent in the Hebrew scriptures, to say of things, that they are "of God," if they are in quality eminent above others, which have no more than common perfections. In this manner of speaking, trees of a prodigious growth are called, "trees of God," or "the trees of the Lord." Such were the Cedars of Lebanon," and for that reason called "the trees of the Lord," trees which "he had planted." And thus man might be said

" to

“to be made, in “the image of God.” His
 “outward form” was of a different make, far
 “more respectable, superior to the make of all
 “the other creatures of the world, and accord-
 “ingly, to speak suitably of it, the expression is
 “used, which, in the language of Moses’s times,
 “was commonly said of any thing that was so
 “superlatively excellent, as to have nothing like
 “to, or to be compared with it. No “image”
 “of any thing in the world was equal to, or
 “like, that of man; and therefore man was said
 “to be created in “the image of God.”

These are the words of Dr. Shuckford*, which I cannot but wonder at, as he has justly merited the character of a learned and really good writer. The mode of diction he has mentioned, “trees of God,” and “trees of the Lord,” as used to point out a peculiar excellency in the things spoken of, do not appear analogous to this, in which it is said, “in the image of God created he man.” Most certainly the analogy can be carried no further than this, that it was an excellent creature, singularly so, that God now made: not that he was this excellent creature, pointing at his “external form,” or figure. It would indeed be highly absurd to give the phrase this meaning; there can be no “corporeal” likeness to that God, who is a pure Spirit. A

* Vide his History of the Creation and Fall of Man. p. 74.

resemblance of him in this sense, is impossible in the nature of the thing itself. Accordingly, when "bodily" parts, figure, or motion are ascribed to God in Scripture, as they sometimes are, they are ever understood, by all writers of any value, as descriptions accommodated to human weakness, and interpreted so as to consist with that "spirituality" of the Divine Being, which is essential to him.

Others, by this "image of God," suppose nothing more is meant than a "likeness" of man to God in respect of "dominion." It accordingly follows, say they, immediately after the consultation about making man in "the image of God," and "let him have DOMINION over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." Gen. i. 26. In like manner, man's actual creation in "God's image," and the grant of "DOMINION," are connected with each other. "God created man in his own image; and God said unto him, have DOMINION."—The Apostle Paul's arguing is also referred to, in illustration of this sense of "God's image." He declares, that "a man ought not to cover his head;" 1 Cor. xi. 7. and for this reason, "inasmuch as he is the image of God." The propriety of his inference is grounded on this, that man is the image of God in point of "dominion," or "authority."

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But neither of these proofs carry conviction with them. Man, it is true, was no sooner made than vested with "dominion" over the inferior creatures; but then, this "dominion" was granted to him in consequence of his having been first created in "God's image," and in this way fitted for this honour. So the order of the words import. We are obviously herefrom led to think, that God first impressed "his image" on man, and, upon thus dignifying his nature, made him the grant of sovereignty and dominion over the other creatures. It is acknowledged, man, in having "dominion," is "like God," and may properly be said, in this respect, to bear his "image" in part. But, surely, this is not the whole of that "likeness to God," in which man was created; nor is it reasonable to think, that God would have given him "dominion" over the other creatures, making him, in a sense, his visible image and representative, if he had not previously made him in "his image," in some higher and more noble sense. He could not indeed, in a moral view, have resembled God at all, had he not been made after "his image," so as that he could have been qualified for that government, which had been put into his hands.—And, as to man's being considered by the Apostle Paul as "the image of God," on account of his dominion, no more can be justly argued from it, than that he resembled him in this respect; not that he did not in any other.

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The Apostle had occasion, at this time, to mention his participation of "God's image" in this view of it only. His words therefore ought not to be, as they reasonably cannot be, interpreted as an intimation that man was created in "God's image," in no other sense than that of his having "dominion."

Others still make this "image of God" on man to consist principally, if not wholly, in his present, actual, perfect likeness to him in "holiness;" meaning hereby, an assemblage of all morally good qualities, which they suppose to be adventitious only, not essential to his nature: insomuch that, had he been made without this likeness to God, he would notwithstanding have existed a man, a creature of the first or highest rank in this lower creation. They accordingly speak of this holiness as a "super-induced" quality, which, if lost, or taken away from man, would not destroy his proper nature as such; though it would his character in this special view of it.

It is readily acknowledged, "holiness" was principally, though not wholly, that which constituted the "image of God" in which man was created. It is conceded also, if this holiness was a mere "super-induction" upon man's nature, which would have been complete as such without it, it was no ways essential to his proper character as man. He might, though destitute

of it, have retained his rank among the creatures. But it must be said, at the same time, that the "image of God" on man, whatever it may be placed in, whether holiness, or any thing else, must be interpreted in a sense that will make it, not merely a quality annexed to his nature, but an essential property; as, without this, he could not have existed that kind or sort of creature it was intended he should be, in distinction from the other creatures; or have transmitted this kind to any of the individuals that should proceed from him. These things will be set in an easy clear light in what we shall have occasion to say hereafter, in its proper place. To proceed, therefore,

There are yet others who suppose, and, as I imagine, upon just grounds, that "the image of God" on man, in his creation, consisted in his being endowed with intellectual and moral powers, rendering him capable of attaining to a resemblance of the Deity in knowledge, wisdom, holiness, and happiness; and of growing perpetually in this resemblance to the highest degrees that may be thought attainable by a creature of such an order in the scale of being.

It is conceivable, God might have so made man in "his image," as that, the first moment he was brought into existence, he should have been as "perfect" in actual knowledge, holiness, and happiness, as he ever could have been. And some seem to think, this was the case in fact;

at least that man, as he came out of the creating hands of God, was "perfect" in all intellectual and moral qualities.

If, by his being "perfect" in these qualities, is meant, his having communicated to him a constitution of nature that would, under God, have enabled him gradually to have attained to perfection in them, and in the highest degree a creature of his make was capable of: This, I say, if nothing more is meant, is, without all doubt, the real truth of the matter. It is true, likewise, his faculties, when created, were in a state of "perfect rectitude;" that is, he had no wrong bias in his nature, no irregular propensity, no undue tendency to any immoral thought, word, or action. He was not indeed made "impeccable;" yet his endowments were such, that he might have turned out an intelligent, righteous, holy, and happy being, in the highest degree of perfection he was originally formed with a capacity for.

But for any to say, that man, upon his first existing, was endowed with knowledge, holiness, or any other attainable qualities, so as that it might be proper to affirm that he was "perfect" in them, in any other sense than that which has been specified, would be to speak beside the truth. And yet, how common has it been to speak thus! Many, who have professedly wrote upon this subject, have represented the first parents of the human race as created, not simply with the capacities

pacities for intellectual and moral attainments even to the highest perfection, but with the very qualities themselves; insomuch that, upon their first commencing "living souls," they possessed, not only more knowledge of God, themselves, and the world they were placed in, and a far higher degree of actual present holiness than any of their posterity have ever done since, after their highest attainments; but that they were "perfect" in those qualities, in a sense analogous to that in which good men, upon the Gospel-plan of grace, shall be "perfect" in them in the other world.

But, surely, such an account of "the image of God" on man is the transcript of fancy, and not of what is contained in the sacred history of his creation. It is indeed utterly irreconcilable with a variety of facts; Moses has mentioned relative to Adam and Eve in their original state.

If, instantly upon their creation, they had been the subjects of "actual understanding" in the "perfection" that is pretended, it may be asked, How it came to pass that Eve was so ignorant of the faculties proper to the beasts, as to imagine that a serpent might be naturally able to "speak?" And yet she must have been thus ignorant, or it will be difficult, if possible, to account for her not being struck with surprise, when he conversed with her in human voice. We, who are acquainted with the inability of the inferior creatures to make use of words,

should be in danger of being put beside ourselves, if spoke to by one of them in the manner she was. And why was our mother Eve unmoved with fear, or astonishment, upon such an occasion? Perhaps, no good account can be given of the matter but this, that she had not as yet attained to so much understanding relative to the the inferior creatures, as to know it was unnatural for them to speak. This is an obvious solution of any pretended difficulty *.

* It may be said, in answer to what has been offered above, and in support of the actual perfect knowledge of the first of our race, that the inferior living creatures were "all brought by God to Adam to see what he would call them;" and that "he gave names to them all." Gen. ii. 19, 20. And what is the inference herefrom? Not that, surely, which has commonly been made, viz. that Adam must have been endowed with "perfect" understanding. For a small degree of knowledge would have served for all he was now called to, or is said to have done. Indeed, if he had "given names" to the several species of creatures, perfectly adjusted to their distinguishing nature and properties, and had done it from his own knowledge relative to them, he must have been endowed with it in a considerable degree. But it is nowhere said in the Bible, though it has been said in other books, that he thus gave them names according to their natures. And barely his "giving them names," is what he might have done, though he had as yet made but small advances in his knowledge with reference to them, or any thing else. Perhaps, the chief thing intended by God in bringing the creatures to Adam to "have names given to them," was to teach him the use and meaning of words. And it is probable, the most of what he did in this matter, was by instruction from God, and not from any innate or acquired knowledge of his own.

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It may be again asked, does it argue any high degree of understanding to know, that "the fruit of a tree" is not, in its nature, adapted to "make one wise," and that it could not be "desirable to eat" of it to this end? And yet, our first mother was deceived into the belief, that "the fruit" she saw growing in Eden upon a certain "tree," was proper food for her understanding, and "desirable" to be eat of, that she might thereby be "made wise," so as to "like God." Surely, she had not as yet made be any great proficiency in the knowledge either of God or of nature! These are sentiments not capable of being entertained by any that have.

It may be further asked, was it possible the "serpent," or "the Devil," using him as his instrument, could have seduced "Eve" in the way he did it, if she had had implanted in her that innate knowledge which has often been attributed to her? Upon the supposition of such knowledge, her being told, that her "eating" of the forbidden tree would "open her eyes," and make her, "like God, knowing good and evil," must have appeared to her at once, without time for any laboured reflection, absolutely a ridiculous thing: nor can it be imagined she could have been led aside by so gross and glaring an absurdity. And yet, this was the way, in which she was overcome, to take, and eat of the "tree," concerning which God had said, "Thou

"thalt not eat of it;" if we may give credit to her own account of the matter, or to that the inspired Paul has given of it. Says the woman, "the serpent beguiled me, and I did eat." Gen. iii. 13. Says the Apostle Paul, the "serpent beguiled Eve through his subtilty." 2 Cor. xii. 2. It was not so much any supposed agreeableness of the forbidden fruit to her "bodily taste," as its imagined aptitude to "make her wise like God," that gave occasion to her lapse. And could this have been the case, if she had been the subject of knowledge in that advanced height that is pretended? May it not rather be justly collected from hence, that she had attained, as yet, to understanding but in a small degree?

In fine, it may be asked, Must not the "one offence" of the first parents of mankind appear unaccountably strange, if they were made in a state of perfectly advanced holiness as well as knowledge? By the representation Moses has given us of the "trial" they were put to, it was, so far as we are able to judge of it, a much less difficult one than that of Abraham, when God called him to "take his only son Isaac, and offer him a burnt-offering to the Lord;" or that of Noah, the salvation of whose person and family, when the rest of the world were destroyed by a universal flood, was dependent on such a "faith in God," forewarning him of this judgment while yet in distant futurity, as moved him to begin, and go on for an hundred years together, with
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the work of "preparing an ark" for safety, according to the Divine appointment, and in opposition to the contemptuous sneers, and mocking ridicule, with which he was, doubtless, often tempted by the unbelieving world in that day. And how came it about, that those "imperfectly" holy men should so honourably pass through those difficult trials, while the first of our race, who are represented to have been holy even to "perfection," should fail under one that was far more easy? It most evidently appears from hence, that man was not in an advanced state of holiness when he fell. Upon this supposition, it would be inconceivable, that he should have eat of the forbidden tree, when he might so easily have refrained herefrom, and secured himself from the threatened death.

The plain truth is, the first man, Adam, as he came out of his Maker's hands, was endowed with nothing more than those capacities which are proper to a being of that order in which he was created. The use of these powers, conformably to the method settled by the wisdom of God, was the way, and the only way, in which he could attain to that "perfection" in resembling the Deity he was originally formed and designed for.

We, the posterity of the first man, Adam, certainly come into existence with nothing more than "naked capacities." And whatever these capacities now are, whether strong or weak, whe-

ther in a state of rectitude or moral disorder, which may be hereafter considered; I say, whatever these capacities are, it is by time, exercise, observation, instruction, and, in short, a due use of the advantages we are favoured with, that we "gradually" rise to those attainments our capacities were planted in our nature that we might acquire. The same seems to have been the case with our first father, only with this difference, we come into the world "infants." And it is so ordered by our Maker, undoubtedly for wise and good ends, that the faculties of our minds, as well as the members of our bodies, are naturally weak and feeble at first; as also that they can advance in a slow and gradual way only to a state of maturity. The powers of our souls, no more than the members of our bodies, come to their proper height till they have for years been gradually growing up to it. But Adam was made with all his faculties in full strength. God created him at once a man; that is, with the powers of a man, not a child, in regard both of his soul and body. But still it should be remembered, time, exercise, experience, and observation, were necessary in order to the proper use of these powers to the noble ends for which they were given: nor could he indeed have made any use of the powers of his mind, till it had been furnished with the materials herefor; which could be done in no way but by "immediate" communication from God, or in that method conformably

formably to which we his children become possessed of them.

In regard of us, our minds at first are not only feeble, but void of all the objects of knowledge; and it is by the intervention of our bodily organs, adapted hereto by the wisdom and power of God, that impressions from the material world are gradually made on our senses, so as to occasion sensations in our minds as objects to employ their exercise; and these objects, with the reflections of our minds on them, and their manner of operation herein, are the inlets to our knowledge, and the original source of all our attainments in it: though these will be greater or less, in proportion to the means, helps, and advantages, we are favoured with in the providence of God, and the good or bad use we make of them. In this same way, it is reasonable to think, ideas were let gradually into the mind of the first man, in consequence of which he was enabled gradually to make advances in knowledge, wisdom, holiness, and all other desirable qualities.

Only it should be minded here, as man was, upon his first coming out of the creating hands of God, in a state of total ignorance, and, upon this account, incapable of the use of any thing, it is reasonable to suppose, that God was his instructor and guide, in some sense analogous to that in which parents are guardians to their children*: and it was

* It is in fact true, that Adam, soon after his creation, before there had been time for a multiplied exertion of his faculties, either

was owing partly to "immediate instruction from God," and partly to the introduction of ideas into his mind by the medium of his senses, and the exercise of his mind with reference to these objects, that he made all those acquirements in knowledge and goodness he was the subject of:

either in thinking or doing, was taken under the immediate guidance of his Maker. His going into the garden of Eden was the effect, not of the mere exercise of his reason, but by direction from God: His Creator "put him there." And the design of his being placed there, namely, "to dress it, and to keep it," was discovered to him not by ratiocination, but Divine instruction. It was "the voice of the Lord" also, and not human investigation, that informed him it was the will of his Maker that he should not eat of such a particular tree in the garden, upon pain of death. It was, moreover, by immediate revelation, and not the sole exercise of his own powers, that he came to know that the woman was formed of part of his body; and therefore that "man and wife should not be twain, but one flesh," and in this re-union propagate the human species. In fine, it was by immediate Divine instruction, and not the innate force of his own abilities, that he was at first taught the use of words, at least in those instances wherein his Maker spake to him. And if man had been obedient in the special article wherein he was tried, he would, in like manner, without all doubt, and in virtue of this rule too which God had settled as the measure of his conduct towards him, have received from his Creator still other instructions, as occasions might call for them, without which he might, through his present inexperience and want of improvement, have been led into horrid errors, both in his thoughts and actions. All which evidently shews, that, being newly brought into existence, he was in a kind of "infantile state," needing the guidance of his Maker, under which it was intended that he should grow up, in a progressive way, to the actual perfection he was designed for.

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though, as it was soon after his creation that he sinned against God, he had probably made but small attainments in comparison with what he might and would have done, had he continued in his innocent state for any long series of time. And this, by the way, will, in a good measure, account for the easy trial he was called to; as also for the manner in which he was tempted, and his being actually seduced upon being thus tempted. The trial was adapted to one that had made no greater attainments than it may be supposed he had done; so was the manner of temptation also; and it is far from being incredible, that he should be overcome by it: whereas, if men, from their own imagination, will characterise our first father at the time when he was tried, tempted, and led into sin, as in a state of advanced perfection, they will make the whole account of this matter really unintelligible.

From what has been above offered, it is easy to perceive, that the way of arguing Dr. Taylor has gone into to show, that "the faculties of the first man, Adam, were not superior in his innocent state to what they were afterwards, or that they did not exceed the faculties his posterity have been endowed with since," is an insufficient one, whether the fact itself be true or false, as not carrying with it reasonable grounds of conviction. He has been at the pains particularly to compare the acts which Adam performed in his innocent state, with those men are capable of perform-

performing since ; and supposes, " that any one, " who soberly weighs what he has offered, will " judge, that there is really no ground in revelation for exalting his nature to a superiority " beyond that of his posterity." But this valuable writer seems not to have sufficiently considered, that the acts of Adam, in his innocent state, might be below what his posterity, arrived at maturity of judgment and understanding, are capable of ; while yet he might have been endowed with faculties vastly superior to theirs. There is no reason to think that the mind of Adam, immediately upon his creation, was filled with all the ideas it was endowed with a capacity to admit ; or that he was, at once, able to apply them to all the uses they were adapted to serve, whether in reason or morality. Without all doubt, ideas were to be gradually let into his mind, in a way analogous to that which now takes place ; that is to say, by the intervention of external nature, and his attending to the operations of his inner man. And if he had been created with the capacity of an Angel, it would, in this way, have required time, use, and experience, before he could have attained to any considerable degrees of actual knowledge.

Should it therefore be supposed, that nothing is recorded to have been said or done by our first progenitor in his innocent state, that exceeds the measure of understanding that is common to his posterity since the lapse ; nay, should it be
allowed

allowed that his actual knowledge, even before his fall, was much less than ours is since, upon our arrival at maturity of age; it will not follow from hence, that his faculties were not larger and better than ours. For it is to be remembered, it was not a great while before he fell by transgression. The precise time cannot, as I imagine, be punctually ascertained; but in general it is evident, from the whole series of the Mosaic history, that it was before he could, conformably to the established laws of nature, have made any considerable acquirements either intellectual or moral. The powers of his nature might therefore have been vastly superior to ours, though this did not appear by the "actual exercise of them;" inasmuch that, had he continued in innocence, he might have exceeded the measure of our present attainments, in proportion to the superiority of "Paradise" beyond the "earth," as it now lies under the "curse of God." It is quite easy to conceive that Adam, before the fall, might be endowed with faculties far more quick and lively, far more strong and penetrating, than ours are since the lapse; and yet, that his "actual knowledge" might be less, as few ideas had been let into his mind, and his opportunity to acquire the habit of making the proper use of them had been but of short continuance. For this reason, the acts performed by him, in his innocent state, might not be beyond the capacity of those of his posterity, who have attained to a moderate share of

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of understanding; while, at the same time, he might have possessed faculties that would have enabled him, by use and exercise, in due time to have arrived to vastly more exalted degrees, both of understanding and holiness, than any of his posterity are capable of in their present state.

But, whatever may be the truth respecting the first man's faculties in his innocent state, whether they were superior to the faculties of his posterity since the lapse, and in consequence of it, or not (which may be considered afterwards), it is certainly more reasonable, as we have seen it to be more agreeable to the Mosaic history, to suppose that he was made, at first, rather with the capacities only for the attainment of intellectual and moral perfection, than with this perfection, as an "absolute gift" bestowed on him at once.

The supposition, that man was made at first with capacities only, is analogous to what has taken place, in fact, with respect to every individual of the human species since the creation of Adam. They have all come into existence with faculties only, not faculties endowed as they may be in time by due use and exercise; yea, this analogy holds in regard of the "gift of grace" that makes men "new creatures." They are first "new-born babes," and gradually grow up to "the fullness of the stature of perfect men in Christ Jesus." And the like analogy extends to all the creatures of God in this lower world that have life, though it is only a vegetative one. It would therefore be
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strange, if the first man had been a contradiction, in his make, to that order which was established in the beginning of the world, and has been uniformly continued to this day.

It will, perhaps, be said here, might it not have been better in God to have formed man at once in the same degree of perfection, it would have taken him a long time to have acquired in the use of implanted faculties only? Would it not have argued much greater goodness, if this perfection had been an "absolute gift," and not be trusted with man, so as, in any measure, to have been dependent on his care or fidelity in the use of the powers he was endowed with? In short, what need was there of this round-about-way to perfection, when it might have been communicated at once without so much ado?

To all which the answer is, these questions can, in reason, be looked upon as nothing more than the result of mere random conjecture; notwithstanding which, man's being made so as that he might, in a gradual progressive way, rise to the perfection he was formed capable of attaining to, may be in itself the wisest and best way in which this perfection could have been communicated.

Had man been made in as high a degree of intellectual and moral glory at once, as he was made capable of attaining gradually to in time, this absolute gift of God could not have been the source of that pleasure, at least that sort of pleasure, which might have resulted from it, had it been,

been, in a reasonable measure, an acquisition of his own. Pleasure is naturally connected, by a Divine establishment, with the idea of any valuable quality, as the effect of a due use of the faculties we are endowed with. We need only attend to what we perceive within ourselves to be convinced of this. And it is indeed one of the highest and noblest pleasures we are capable of enjoying. But it is certain man could have had no perception of this pleasure, there would have been no foundation for it in his nature, if he had been made at once that perfect creature he might have been by a wise and good improvement of his implanted powers. If perfection, in all desirable mental qualities, had been the grant of God to man independently of himself, he would have had no reason for "self-approbation" on this account; nor could he have enjoyed that noble pleasure, which is the natural result therefrom. For this can arise only from a conscious reflection on his own activity in the procurement of them.

Besides, this method of man's attaining to the perfection he was made for, affords not only the most natural occasion for the various exercise of his implanted powers, but constantly presents the most reasonable call for this exercise. There is, upon this plan, not only full room, but the highest reason for a uniform, steady, and vigorous exertion of every faculty of his nature.

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In this way also there is a natural and close connection between intellectual and moral improvements in every degree, and the proper reward of them. For these improvements, in all their degrees, in the present view of them, are at once the result of the due use of implanted powers, and the reward of this use of them. And, in truth, if man could have been rewarded for the right use of his faculties, had he been made in that state of actual perfection it is here supposed he might gradually have attained to, it is not conceivable, if possible, that it could have been by any "increase" of his happiness. A capacity of rising in glory, by degrees naturally connected with, and preparatory to, each other, seems to be not only the most suitable excitement to a good use of implanted faculties, but the most fit and congruous, if not the only basis, upon which this use of them can be rewarded; especially, if we take into our idea of this reward an "increase" of real happiness. It is in consequence of this progressive capacity, that we suppose, and, as I think, upon just and solid grounds, that all intelligent moral beings, in all worlds, are continually going on, while they suitably employ and improve their original faculties, from one degree of attainment to another; and, hereupon, from one degree of happiness to another, without end.

IV. The next thing observable is, an account of the "constitution," rule or order, conformably to

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which

which the rest of mankind were to be brought into existence. God "blessed" the man and the woman whom he had created, and said, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth." The words very evidently contain the establishment of a law of nature, in agreement with which God would act in the production of all the after-individuals of the human species. They were not to be made, as Adam was, by an unrelated exertion of Divine power; but in a mediate way, in consequence of the intervention of those "second causes" that were now constituted and specified. Adam and Eve, by the word of blessing which God here spake, were made capable of becoming "many" by a multiplication of the species, or by transmitting existence to other individuals in their own likeness. Not that they could do this in virtue of any skill, will, or power of their own, simply considered; but they were the "secondary causes," in concurrence with which, God would exert his efficiency to the production of other creatures of the same kind.

As the words, constituting Adam and Eve instruments, under God, in the multiplication of the human race, were directed to them in their own persons, it may seem as tho' it was, by their instrumentality only, that human existence could be communicated. But it is the truth of fact, that those who proceeded from them were, in the same way, instrumental in conveying existence

to others: and so it has been ever since. These words of blessing, therefore, were spoken not only to Adam and Eve, but virtually, and in reality of construction, to their children, and children's children, and so on throughout all generations. They contain, in short, the established law, or method, conformably to which the individuals of the human kind should be brought into being, even to the end of time.

It may be worthy of special notice here, the creation of the first man and woman in "the image of God," that is, their being made intelligent moral beings, capable, in consequence of a right use of their implanted powers, of resembling the Deity in knowledge, holiness and happiness, was the **GRAND CHARACTERISTIC** of their rank or order. This pointed out the "distinction" between them and the other creatures God had made. They were denominated "man" and "woman" on this account. It marked out their proper "discriminating" kind of existence. Accordingly, the word of blessing, upon which they were enabled to "multiply," must be interpreted to mean a multiplication of beings of the "same kind" or "nature" with themselves; that is, they were now constituted the mediate instrumental conveyers of existence to creatures that should be, as they themselves were, intelligent moral agents, having in their nature a "capacity" of becoming "visible images of God:" otherwise, the creatures to whom they conveyed existence,

istence, could not have been of the "same rank" or order with themselves.

It is observable, God "said" to the inferior creatures of every sort, "Be fruitful and multiply;" hereby establishing a "general law," agreeably to which, creatures of the same class with those that were at first created, might come into being. No provision was made for their having existence in any other way; and, in this way, their existence would be of the same kind with theirs from whom they should proceed. The distinction of kinds, that took place at first, has, in this way, and in this way only, been all along upheld, and continues to this day. The first man and woman, in common with the other creatures of every sort, were, in like manner, constituted by God the instrumental transmitters of being; but it was their own in kind. It could be that sort of nature only, they had themselves received from God, as the specification of their rank or order among the creatures; that is to say, the individuals that should proceed from them must be endowed, as they were, with intellectual and moral faculties, and such too as would infer a "capacity" in their nature of attaining to a resemblance of the Divine Being, so as to be "images" of him.

It will, perhaps, be said here, our first father sinned before there had been any "multiplication" of the species; and having, by sin, lost the

the image of God, he could not transmit it to others, not being himself the subject of it.

The answer is, if by "God's image" on the first man is meant, as the objection seems to suppose, not simply the implantation of faculties in his nature fitting him to acquire, in a gradual way, an actual perfect likeness to the Deity in knowledge, righteousness, and other desirable qualities; but the super-induction of these qualities themselves, so as that he possessed them in the same manner he would have done, if he had acquired them: I say, if this is what is meant by "the image of God" on Adam, it is indisputably true, that it is not communicated to his posterity, in the way of natural descent: nor was it ever intended that it should. In this view of this "image," it is an adventitious quality, not an essential property. But "the image of God," in this sense, is not that which Moses speaks of. He considers it as THE VERY THING that constitutes the "distinction" between man and the other living creatures*. It was this ESSENTIALLY that

* I have said, and, I think, upon good grounds, that the GRAND DISCRIMINATION of man from the other creatures, in all their kinds, lies in this, that he was made with powers so far exalted above theirs, as that he is, in his nature, capable of resembling the Deity, more especially in his moral glory: whereas their natures are void of this capacity. The ESSENTIAL difference does not consist merely, or only, in his being a "thinking" animal, or a thinking one so as to "reason" and "argue." For the other animals, at least some of them,

that put the difference between him and them; nor could the first man, either before or after his fall,

give such evident proofs of a capacity to think, yea, and to reason too, that it cannot be denied upon any other foundation than this, that, as they do not exist in human shape, they must of course be considered as destitute of thought; to be sure, of the power of ranging and connecting their thoughts so, as in any measure to reason from them. But though they should be supposed to possess this power, it must, at the same time, be affirmed, that they do it in so low a degree, even in regard of the highest species of them, that they are naturally incapable of distinguishing between moral good and evil, or of attaining a "likeness to God" in any of his "moral" attributes, wherein principally consists that "likeness to him" man was made with a capacity of rising to, and in a noble degree of perfection. It should therefore seem reasonable to place the ESSENTIAL distinction between him and them in "this capacity," which they are totally destitute of; especially as Moses, when he would distinguish man from the other creatures in all their various kinds, makes no mention of any thing but this, that "God created *him* in his own image," while he did not do the like by *them*. It is observable, he nowhere intimates that God made the other creatures absolutely without the "power of thought;" though he does, that he made them without this power, so as in the exercise of it to attain to a "likeness to God," and therefore that the GRAND MARK of distinction between them lay in this.

It is, perhaps, the "power of thinking that ESSENTIALLY constitutes the difference between the creatures that have "animal" and "vegetative" life. This power may begin in so low a degree, that the "highest" of the latter, though totally incapable of thought, may yet approach so near to the "lowest" of the former, that the difference between them, though real in nature, may not by us be discernible: And it may go on gradually rising in these animals, through an admirable variety of species, till the "highest," in regard at least of some of the

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fall, have begot children that would have been of the same rank or order with himself, in distinction from the other creatures, if he had not begot them in the "image of God," as this was the original GRAND MARK of discriminating their kind. And this he was capable of doing after his lapse, as truly as before it, if by "the image of God, as has been explained, is under-

individuals, may so nearly resemble the "lowest" of the human kind, that the difference, in point of mere reason, may scarce be perceived; though still they *ESSENTIALLY* differ in this, that the "lowest" among men are so possess of the power of reason, as to be capable subjects of a "moral likeness to the Deity;" which the "highest" among the brutes are not. In like manner, the proper ground of distinction between man, and the next order of beings in the line of ascent (say the angels) may lie in this; that the capacity of men, as "moral agents," is limited within such a certain sphere; while that of Angels, though limited too, is, in such a special degree, extended beyond theirs; though in such a manner that the "highest" among men may come so near to the "lowest" among the angels, that there may be no other difference than that which is *essential* to the distinction of their order. And, in this way, the wisdom of God may have contrived, that the "power of thought" should rise from the "lowest" degree, through a vast variety of inferior species of beings, to a more noble rank, so endowed with this power as to be capable of attaining to a "moral likeness to the Deity," but still in the "lowest" degree. We men may be supposed to be this "lowest" order of intelligent moral beings. And from us, in the ascending line, orders of beings may still go on rising in their superiority beyond all imagination. It is, perhaps, this rising of the creatures, and by the most nicely adjusted subordination, that constitutes that "fullness" in the universe, which leaves no room for gap or chasm.

stood, not a present actual perfect "likeness to the Deity" in intellectual and moral qualities, but a "capacity" planted in his nature, making this attainable. In this sense, it is the real truth of fact, that the posterity of Adam come into existence with "the image of God;" that is, they are born creatures endowed with intellectual and moral powers, in consequence of which they are, in their nature, creatures capable of being formed to an "actual resemblance of God," both in his intellectual and moral glory; which the other living creatures are not. It is upon this "capacity of nature," which the human kind, in distinction from all the other kinds in this lower world, come into existence with, that the GOSPEL SCHEME to effect in them an "actual likeness to God" is ESSENTIALLY grounded. It implants no "new faculty" in them. Whatever it does, it does upon faculties that have already been communicated to them, according to the established laws of nature. And these faculties, let it be remembered here, were thus communicated "nakedly as such," without their acquired improvements. Parents do not transmit to their children their "attained qualities," either intellectual or moral *, but like essential capacities only, in consequence

* It may be worthy of special notice here, though human faculties only, not their attained qualities, are transmitted from parents to children; yet those faculties, in virtue of the close union or connection, or whatever else any may please to call it, there is between the soul and body, may be transmitted with advantage or disadvantage to the purposes of intellectual and moral

sequence of which their children exist beings of the same kind with themselves. This is the settled course of nature; and found to be so by daily experience. Adam, therefore, could have communicated only his kind or rank in the creation. And as he was in kind, by nature, a being capable of attaining to an actual "resemblance of God" in knowledge, wisdom, and goodness, in which capacity lay ESSENTIALLY the difference between him and the other creatures, his posterity, as proceeding from him in the way of generation, must, in some proper sense, possess, as he did, this original capacity, or they could

moral attainments. It is an indisputable fact, whether we can conceive of the modus of it, or not, that "bodily disorders, especially bodily temperature," may have a strange influence upon our mental faculties; insomuch that we shall be apt to think, judge, and act, very much as we are prompted hereto by our "constitutional turns." And these "bodily complexions" may be contracted by parents, and propagated from them to children; and when they are bad, as they too commonly are, it is an unhappy disadvantage to children, as their tendencies are with difficulty restrained, and kept within due government: Though they ought to be so; and in this good government of them consists a great part of our duty in this present state of trial; in which, if we carelessly suffer them to operate in an unbounded manner, we shall be justly chargeable with all the mischief that arises from our folly, in not acting up to our proper character as beings of such an order in the creation. But notwithstanding the disadvantage we may be under on account of "constitutional turns" transmitted to us from our parents, they convey existence to us with faculties, in consequence of which we are capable of attaining to a "likeness to God," in his "moral" glory; otherwise we should not be of the human kind,

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not be of the same rank or order among the creatures that he was. It is accordingly assigned as the reason, why murder should be punished with death throughout all generations, "that in the image of God he made man," not the first man only, but mankind in all ages; and in this view of the reason given for this punishment, it all along has been, now is, and always will be, a just and solid one; because it all along has been, now is, and always will be true, that men are made "in the image of God," meaning hereby, not an actual present "likeness to him," but a "capacity" in their nature for this likeness: otherwise it would not be possible they should ever attain to it; which yet, some of lapsed Adam's posterity certainly have; and that others have not done so too is owing, not to the want of a "capacity" in their nature heretofore, but to other causes, which it would be needless, as well as tedious, to mention here.

V. The last thing observable, though not the least important, is "the law of trial" man was placed under in his innocent state, or that "rule of government," conformably to which God would deal with him in regard of the great affair of his "living," or "dying."

Only, before the sacred historian comes to record this, he previously inserts the following words: Gen. i. 8, 9. "And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there he put the man whom he had formed. And out of the ground

ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food: the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil." And having, in several verses, described the situation of Eden, he adds, ver. 15. "And the Lord God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it, and to keep it."

The situation of Eden, in which God was pleased to make this garden for the use and benefit of the first man and woman, notwithstanding what Moses has said in order to describe it, cannot, perhaps, at this day be precisely ascertained; the earth, since that time, having undergone so many and such great changes. But wherever it was, it was probably the most agreeable part of this lower world: though the spot pitched upon for the garden might be still more pleasant and delightful; and the rather, as God had caused every kind of growth to spring up there that was suited either for nutriment to the body, or to please the taste, or gratify the sight.

But two "trees," in special, are mentioned by their names, which may therefore call for particular notice, "the tree of life in the midst of the garden," and "the tree of knowledge of good and evil."

The "tree of life" is universally supposed, by those who pay a sacred regard to the Mosaic history, to have had this name applied to it, because it was that by which man might have been

been for ever preserved in life without being hurt by death. But "how" this immortality would have been effected by it, is matter of dispute.

Some are of opinion, that the "fruit" of this tree was adapted, by the wisdom and power of God, not only to afford proper food for the first pair, but to preserve their bodies, naturally corruptible, in the same equal temper and state in which they were created, without decay, even to immortality. They justify this opinion from such considerations as these. From the "name itself" given to the tree; which, they imagine, is obviously expressive of its proper nature, and intended to point it out as a tree that had "virtue in it" to perpetuate life for ever.—From what God says, Gen. iii. 22, 23. with reference to man's eating of it after his lapse; "And now lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever; therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden:" and his thereupon barring the passage to this tree, that he might not approach to eat of it; "So he drove out the man; and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden Cherubims, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life;" ver. 24.—From the allusions to this tree in the sacred books, particularly in the book of Revelation, Rev. ii. 7. where it is said, "To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which

which is in the midst of the paradise of God." In fine, from its better agreement with the other parts of Moses's history, which contains a narrative of real facts, and not figurative representations.

But the opinion of others, who rather apprehend this tree took its name from its being an appointed standing sign, or visible assurance to man, that he should live on without dying, if he continued innocent, appears to me to be better grounded, and less liable to exception.

It might, perhaps, be arrogant to affirm, that this tree could not have been made so as to be "naturally" capable of rendering man immortal; but it would be no trespass upon modesty to say, it was highly improbable this should have been the case: especially, as there is no real need to suppose it was from any thing Moses has said upon the matter.

We are obviously led by him into such a train of thought as this: Had man continued innocent, he would have been immortal. The "threatened death," in case of disobedience, an account of which we have Gen. i. 23. would have no meaning, to be sure none of any force, unless construed so as to involve in it this sense, that our first father should not die, so long as he kept within the restraint God was pleased to lay upon him; and if he should not die, he must then be immortal. But how should one of a corruptible mortal frame be preserved in life without end?

end? The "tree of life" was planted in the midst of the garden of Eden on purpose to effect this: but how? Either by its own "natural virtue," or by "God's interposition," of which it was the standing visible sign or pledge to the first man. It would be incongruous, to an high degree, to ground the reason of this name on any supposed "natural" connection between things so remote from each other, as the "fruit of a tree," and "living eternally:" whereas, it perfectly accords with one's sentiments of what is fit and reasonable to suppose, that this tree might be called "the tree of life," as being a visible sign, pledge, or assurance, given to man by the "only immortal" being who has "life in himself," that he also, if obedient, should "live for ever." There is nothing incredible in it, that the incorruptible God should, by his almighty word, bring it into effect, that the first man's "corruptible should put on incorruption, and his mortal put on immortality:" nor would it be at all strange, should he give a sign or pledge of what he thus intended to do: though it would be greatly so, should it be said, that the "fruit of a tree," absolutely "corruptible in its own nature," should yet have a "natural virtue" in it, to make that incorruptible, which before, like itself, was naturally corruptible also.

And this reason of the name perfectly agrees with the strict "letter" of Moses's history. For, let it be minded, the "literal fact" related by him

him is only this; there was in paradise a tree called the tree of life. He does not go on, and give the reason of this name. This he leaves to his readers. It makes, therefore, no alteration in the fact related, whether the reason of it be, the "natural virtue" of the tree to immortalize, or its being an appointed sign or token that God would do it. The latter, as truly as the former, agrees with the truth literally related.

Nor will it at all effect the propriety, beauty, or force of the scripture allusions to this tree, should the reason of its name be taken from its being a "pledge" of immortality, and not its "natural virtue" to make immortal.

And the same may be said of man's being driven out of the garden after his lapse, and not suffered to come near the "tree of life." It was as proper he should be expelled, and barred an approach to this tree, upon supposition of its being an appointed sign of immortality, as if it could, in its own virtue, in any consistent sense, have communicated it. Surely, it could not be the design of this conduct in God to guard against man's defeating his pleasure, by making it impossible, in consequence of his eating of this tree, that he should die, when God had declared that he should die. It would be ridiculously absurd to suppose, that the tree of life could have disannulled "the threatening of God," had man, after his offence, actually eat of it. But as by sin he had forfeited that im-

mortality

mortality which was the free grant of God upon his continuing obedient, it was highly fit, in the reason of the thing, that he should not now be permitted to "eat of the tree of life," whether it was thus called from its own virtue to immortalize, or as an appointed sign or pledge that God would do it: though the latter, as I imagine, appears to be the most natural and congruous reason to ground this name upon.

The other tree, mentioned by its name, is "the tree of knowledge of good and evil;" so called, doubtless, as it was "this tree," in distinction from all the rest in the garden, which could have given the first man and woman an "experimental knowledge" of what was good, and what was evil.

Some interpreters think, that this tree "naturally" produced fruit that was noxious and deadly; such as, upon eating of it, would infect the blood, transmitting a poison into it that would certainly, however slowly, bring on death. But it must be a strange sort of poison, strange in its nature, and as strangely slow in its operation, that would permit a man, after he had taken of it, to live on nine hundred and thirty years, which the Scripture says, Gen. v. 3. Adam did.—Besides, it does not seem likely, that any herb, or the fruit of any tree God had made, should, in its proper sense, be hurtful and deadly, till after the introduction of sin, and "the curse of the ground" thereupon. To be sure, Moses
says.

says nothing from whence it may be collected, that the fruit of this tree was of the baneful kind that is pretended. He rather gives us to understand, that man was "made of the dust," to which "naturally" he would again return, unless God should please to prevent it. This he would have done, had man been obedient; and he gave him "the tree of life" as a standing pledge or assurance of it. But man, having sinned, forfeited all right to this favour of God, and of course became liable to die. So that there was no need of this "deadly fruit" to poison his body. It was made of corruptible materials, and would, according to the laws of nature, fall to pieces sooner or later.

God's "putting Adam into the garden" is now mentioned a second time; but with this addition, that he was put there "to dress it, and to keep it." So that he would have had "work to do," had he abode in innocency; though his work would have been nothing more than a recreating exercise. It is sin, and the "curse" thereupon, that has changed what, at first, was only a pleasant amusement, into labour so heightened as to deserve the name of "toil" mixed with "sorrow." — But to proceed:

The sacred penman, having recorded the above facts, now comes to give an account of the "rule," or "law of trial," man was placed under in his innocent state. This is contained in those words, Gen. ii. 16, 17, "And the Lord

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God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."

One would think, the "law of trial" here made known to Adam was so plainly expressed, at least as to its general nature, that there could be no reasonable room for mistake. And yet, so it has happened, that multitudes have been led to judge and speak upon the matter, as though they did not at all understand what Moses has handed to us, in the most easy and significative language.

It is indeed the common opinion, that man, in his original state, was under a "covenant of works," requiring "perfect obedience" to the whole moral or natural law of God, as the "condition of life;" insomuch, that he would have been subjected to death, in case of a failure, in any instance, or the least iota of that instance. I need not cite authorities to prove this to be the common sentiment. It is too well known to be so, by all who are, in any measure, versed in the writings of expositors and divines. But how it came to pass, that so gross a mistake should generally prevail, cannot easily be accounted for, unless we should suppose a general undue attachment to what at first took rise, not from the sacred books of scripture, but the imagination of some highly celebrated, however fallible, man, when thinking and writing upon the subject. Not but that this is an easy

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and natural mistake; if considered in connection with another that was equally the fruit of fancy, in those who first fell into it; and this is, that the man Adam came out of the creating hands of God with such "perfection" of actual knowledge, wisdom and holiness, that he was at once "perfectly" able to understand the requirements of the law of nature in every instance, and "perfectly" to comply with them. And, it is readily owned, if this had been the case in fact, it would be no ways unreasonable to think, that man might have been put under a "covenant of works," in the sense he is represented to have been. But how unnatural would it be, upon man's being made with faculties fitted for improvement to "perfection," to bring him in this "perfect creature" all at once, before there had been time for his making any considerable advances towards it. We should, in this way, give him a character which, according to the constitution of his nature, could not, at present, be justly applied to him. Besides, Moses has given us no such account of the first man. On the contrary, he has related many facts, as has been already observed, in consequence of which it most evidently appears, that, whatever his implanted powers were, his actual knowledge and holiness were comparatively small.

And it is remarkable, the "law of trial" he represents the man Adam to have been placed under, is exactly suited to the idea he has led

us to entertain of him. It was not a "perfect" conformity to the "natural moral law of God;" for as yet he knew but very little of this law; and the original implantation of a disposition, or tendency in his nature, to yield obedience to it, had not, in any considerable degree, been confirmed and strengthened by time and exercise. It might therefore be improper in itself, an unfit unsuitable thing, that he should, in his present situation, be placed under "such a covenant of works" as some have been pleased to contrive for him. God might know, that a trial of this kind would have been too hard and severe. And, in truth, had he been put to it, there would have been scarce any reason to hope, if we may judge by what afterwards came into fact, that he would have acquitted himself with honour. For, as he failed when tried in one instance only, easy in itself, and so plainly pointed out, that he could not well misunderstand it; what but death must have been the consequence, had this rule been enlarged so as to take in the law of nature in every instance, to be first investigated, and then practised, by the sole strength of his own powers? It would have been morally impossible for one, in his inexperienced state, to have stood a trial so very difficult and dangerous.

His Creator was more kind to him, than many of his posterity have been since. So Moles has informed us, and in words as plain and explicit as he could well have used. According to his account,

account, the rule of God's conduct towards man was, not what he might have collected from the exercise of his reason, however exalted in its measure; but what could be known by "revelation" only. He was to stand or fall, to live or die—How? By what law? Not by "the law of works," as requiring perfect, actual, indefectable obedience; not by this law, in regard of any one of its precepts: No; but by a "positive law," in a "single instance," that is, a law that was discoverable, not by human faculties, though exercised in the most perfect manner; but by "immediate revelation" from heaven. So speaks the sacred history, Gen. ii. 16, 17, "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." The language here is too express to need any comment, or to admit of dispute.

And it is from hence obvious, at the first glance, that "faith in God," and not a "principle of mere reason," must have given rise to the obedience here required. Adam indeed could not have obeyed, it would have been an impossibility in nature, but from "faith" in the "revelation" God had made of his mind in this matter. This must have been the governing principle in his heart. And it was "essentially" owing to the want of this principle, either wholly, or in a sufficient degree, however it came about,

that he "eat of the tree," concerning which God had said to him, "thou shalt not eat of it."

It would therefore be the truth, strictly and properly speaking, should it be affirmed, that our first father, no more than his posterity, could have "pleased God" without the real being and exercise of "faith;" and that he could no more, before his lapse, than after it, have secured the possession and enjoyment of life, in any way but by "grace through faith." It is acknowledged, there is an enlargement of grace, and of the object faith, since the lapse; but still, man, in his innocent state, would have been "saved by grace," if saved at all, and through the exercise of "faith," as truly in his innocent state, as his posterity are in their lapsed one. So that "the law of faith" took place from the beginning of the world, and was the "rule" or measure of God's conduct towards even innocent man, and not a "covenant of works," as has been imagined. We never indeed read, in all the Bible, of any "covenant of works" that God entered into with Adam. The only covenant of "this kind" it speaks of is the "Sinai" one, made with the Jewish nation. And this is that "first" or "old" covenant, which is sometimes contrasted with the "second" or "new" covenant.

It will probably be asked here, Was the one man Adam then left at liberty, in his original state, with respect to all other works but this special one of "faith," on which his continuance

in life was dependent? Was he under no obligations to "the law of nature," the law of reason, which is the law of God? And had he violated "this law," would he not have incurred the displeasure of his Maker?

The answer is obvious. He was, without all doubt, under strict indispensable obligations to obey every other command of God, wherein it should be made known to him, as truly as "this special" one; and must have rendered himself obnoxious to the righteous resentments of his God and King, had he expressed a disregard to any of them. But then, it must be added, it was most certainly with a view to his being thus obedient, and in this way escaping the Divine displeasure, that God saw fit, in his great wisdom and goodness, to place him under this "special rule of trial."

It ought not to be supposed, that God would have made a "mere positive command," perhaps, indifferent as to the "matter" of it, the "rule" of his conduct towards man, merely for the sake of displaying his authority; or that he did this, as laying greater stress upon obedience to a positive precept, than one that was founded on the eternal unchangeable rectitude of his own nature*. To think or speak thus, would be grossly

* Those who ask, why was Adam's obedience tried in a merely positive instance? do not consider, "that an experiment of it could scarce have been made in any of the moral precepts;

grossly to reflect on the all-wise, righteous and holy Governor of the world. He must have had some great and noble design in placing innocent man under this particular constitution, rather than any other. And in order to our conceiving justly of it, let it be observed,

Man was now but just brought into existence; and though he possessed powers perfectly fitted for his gradually making the highest advances, proper to a creature of his rank; yet he had not, at present, had time or opportunity for any considerable improvements. Under these circumstances, God did not judge it suitable to leave him to the sole guidance, either of his implanted faculty of understanding, or disposition to virtuous and holy practice. He was rather pleased to take him under his own care, that he might be under the best advantage, in order to his gradually rising, in harmony with the constitution of his nature, to "that perfection" in actual knowledge, wisdom, and every other good qua-

"which there was no occasion to violate. For what should
 "tempt him to idolatry, or to take God's name in vain, or to
 "murder his wife? How was it possible to commit adultery,
 "when there was no body but he and she in the world? How
 "could he steal, or what room was there then for coveting,
 "when God had put him in possession of all things? It had
 "been in vain to forbid that which could not be done; and it
 "had not been virtue to abstain from that to which there was
 "no temptation, but from that which invited him to trans-
 "gress." Bishop Patrick, in his note on Gen. ii. 17.

lity he was originally made capable of attaining to.

And the "special command" God gave him, was the expedient to this purpose; and an admirably well-contrived one: for it was virtually, and in true design, a command carrying in it such language as this, Hearken to my voice, believe what I say, keep within the restraint I have laid upon you. You will find your account in so doing. I will, in this case, be your guard and guide, your instructor and assistant, so as that you shall be preserved blameless, and attain to an established perfection in all acquirements proper to your nature. But if, through unbelief, you set yourself up for your own director, and follow your own inventions, you shall soon see your folly in what you will expose yourself to.

The "enforcement" with which the command to Adam was accompanied, obviously and necessarily contains in it all this. If, from "faith in God," he had obeyed his voice, and so long as he had done so, he would have had a sure and just claim to the "life" that was promised upon this condition. But what was "this life?" We may be sure, it was not merely or simply his being continued in existence, but his possessing it in a state of favour with God, and to the true purposes of living. And if so, then with sufficient reason to expect, that his Maker would have been his never-failing patron and friend; afford-

affording him, at all times, and in all circumstances, protection, instruction and help: in so much, that he should have advanced, by quick and safe steps, in all spiritual understanding and godly virtuous practice, till he had been formed to a "meetness" for a confirmed state of glory and honour, above the need of being any further under discipline and trial. Whereas, if, through unbelief of God's word, he should chuse to be his own counsellor and guide, trusting in himself and his own abilities, the consequence must have been, the loss of God's favour, and an immediate liableness to the threatened death. Nothing short of all this will come up to the full meaning of the "constitution" Adam was placed under. And if this was its meaning, it was a most kind and ample provision for his best good.

He certainly stood in need of such a teacher and guide, as God here offered himself to be. In his present unexperienced and unimproved state, he would have been in extreme hazard of being betrayed into mistakes, both in judgment and practice, if, instead of the counsel of the all-knowing God, he had had only his own to have depended on for his guidance in the way of truth and holiness. This "special command of God" may therefore be reasonably looked upon, not only as a standing, striking call to him to give credit to God's voice, depending on him, and not on his own unimproved understanding and reason for the direction of his conduct; but a
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kind and gracious assurance, while he did thus, of God's readiness to be all along present with him, to guard him against evil and danger, and to do whatever might be proper, on his part, in order to his attaining the end of his creation, viz. his rising to such heights in intellectual and moral improvements, as would make him, in his measure, actually and perfectly like to the blessed God, and so prepared for an immortality of glory and happiness with him.

The "rule of trial" our first father was placed under, viewed in this point of light, is, at once, set free from all just exception.—It was properly adjusted to his real character; not being above, nor below his abilities, which ought, in reason, to have been the case.—And it was a wisely appointed mean to promote both the honour of God and the best good of man: As it was powerfully adapted, not only to teach him implicitly to believe, and unreservedly to obey his Maker; but to influence and engage him hereto, by threatening, on the one hand, certain ruin in case of his following his own counsel in opposition to God's direction, and promising, on the other, that, upon hearkening to God's voice, he should be so conducted in life, under the guardianship of his Creator, as to make the highest advances in holiness and happiness his nature was capable of. Whereas, if he is considered, according to the common representation that is made of him, as created with a fund of light in his

his understanding at once sufficient for his guidance into all truth, and with a disposition in his heart equally sufficient immediately to put him upon all holy practice, the Mosaic account, both of him and the constitution he was under, will be burthened with insuperable difficulties. There would, in this case, be no proportion between "the law of trial," and "the man to be tried." It would be too low for one of such exalted furniture. — Nor can it easily be imagined, what valuable end could have been proposed, or attained, by putting a creature so excellently endowed upon such a kind of trial. — Besides all which, it could not, in any reasonable way, be accounted for, that he should, upon being tried in so comparatively inconsiderable a matter, have been ensnared and seduced: especially, as the temptation by which this was done must, to such a creature as he is now supposed to be, have appeared, upon the bare proposal, contemptibly ridiculous and absurd.

Men may, if they please, talk at random about this matter; first bringing in man at once perfect in intellectual and moral accomplishments, and then placing him under a trial that would have been too inconsiderable for any of his imperfect posterity, arrived at the common measure of understanding; yea, a much lighter one than some of them have actually passed through with honour, though he, with his endowments heightened to perfection, was enticed and drawn aside.

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But the vain imaginations of men must not be taken for the truth of Scripture. We are very obviously led from thence to think of the first man, as made for "progressive improvement," and not that perfected creature at once he could have been only in a course of time, and in consequence of the proper use of his implanted faculties. This is agreeable to what appears, in fact, to have been the established order of nature from the beginning of the world; and it has all along uniformly taken place with respect to all the creatures of all kinds it pleased God to make; especially in regard of man, a creature of the first or highest rank. And the constitution he was placed under, so far as we give credit to the sacred books, and do not judge by mere fancy, was evidently suited, not to a creature of any exalted degree of present actual understanding, or holiness; but to one only capable of it, and advancing towards it. And it was under this constitution, as a mean principally intended herefor, that he was gradually to attain to the perfection of his nature.

The sum of what has been said, under the foregoing observations, representing the contents of the Mosaic account of the first man in his innocent state, to place it in one view, is this, that he was made male and female, the most excellent creature in this lower world, possessing the highest and noblest rank: That he was made by an "immediate" exertion of almighty power,
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and not by God's agency, in concurrence with second causes, operating according to an established course or order: That he was made in "the image of God;" meaning hereby, not an actual, present, perfect likeness to him, either in knowledge, wisdom, holiness, or happiness; but with implanted powers perfectly adjusted to each other, and as perfectly fitted for his gradually attaining to this likeness, in the highest measure proper to a being of his rank in the creation: That, upon being thus made, he was constituted the "head" or "root" of the human race, from whom, as the secondary instrumental cause, like essential powers with his own should, according to a divinely settled order, be transmitted to others, and from those others, to others still, throughout all generations; that is, powers inferring a capacity in nature of their being formed to a resemblance of the Deity in his moral glory, in consequence of which they would be individuals of the same kind that he was, and distinguished from all the other creatures: In fine, that being made, not perfect at once in actual knowledge or holiness, or any other intellectual or moral quality, but with implanted powers only rendering him capable of gradually attaining to this perfection, he was placed by his Maker under a "special law or rule," principally designed as a suitable and powerful mean to guard him against danger in his present unimproved state, and to encourage, assist, and conduct his
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endeavours in the use of his faculties, so as that he might gradually rise to as near a likeness to God in all intellectual and moral acquisitions, as was possible for such a creature as he was, and in this way be prepared for complete and perfect happiness.

This account of the creation of the first man, and of his state while innocent, is that which Moses has communicated to us, either expressly, or in words that naturally and fairly import this sense. And it is the whole we can now know about him, as it is the whole that has, in an authentic way, been handed down to us.

DISSERTATION II.

On the one man Adam in his lapsed state, with the temptation that brought him into it.

Notwithstanding what has been said of the first man Adam, descriptive of his implanted powers, and the advantage he was under, having God for his immediate instructor and guide, to have made use of them to his gradually advancing in knowledge, holiness and happiness, till he had attained the perfection proper to his nature; he was soon overcome by temptation to offend in the very instance wherein he was forbid to do so, hereby forfeiting the divine favour, and exposing himself to that death God had threatened in case of his disobedience.

The account of this whole affair Moses has transmitted to us; and it is from hence we must form our notions, if we would do it upon solid grounds, of the true state of our first progenitors, in consequence of the lapse, with the occasion that led to it.

The words in which this account is given to us, may be seen at large in the third chapter of Genesis. And two things, in general, are

contained in them which deserve our special notice. 1. The "temptation" with which the first parents of men were assaulted, and the "offence" it unhappily betrayed them into. 2. The "effects" that followed upon their offence, "both "natural" and "judicial." These are comprehensive articles, which, if considered as they ought to be, will take in the whole that Moses has said upon the matter.

I. As to the "temptation" with which our first parents were assaulted, and their "offence" hereupon, it is thus recorded.

GENESIS, Chap. III.

1. "Now the serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field, which the Lord God had made. And he said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden."

2. "And the woman said unto the serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden;"

3. "But of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die."

4. "And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die."

5. "For God doth know, that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened; and ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil."

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6. "And

6. "And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat."

The narrative begins, "The serpent said unto the woman."—The fact here related is, that it was a "serpent" that conversed with Eve, and managed the temptation by which she was seduced. Nor is it an objection of any force against the literal truth of this fact, that elsewhere in scripture an "evil spirit;" called "Satan" the "devil," the "prince of the power of the air, who worketh in the children of disobedience," is supposed to have been the "real agent" in this matter. And, in truth, upon any other supposition, it would be difficult, if possible, to give a good reason, why the "devil" should be called "the old serpent," as he is more than once in the book of the Revelation; why he should be spoken of in that style, "the devil that sinneth from the beginning;" why he should be termed "the father of lies," as being "a liar from the beginning," and, through his lying, a "murderer" also. But though he was the "great agent" in this temptation, and the "serpent" an "instrument only" that he made use of, yet it is the truth of fact, that the "serpent" really spake the words that are here said to have been uttered by him. It was by "his tongue" those modulated sounds were made, which, by
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the sense of hearing, conveyed into Eve's mind the ideas intended to be communicated by them. Moses does not enter upon the question, how these articulated motions in the air were occasioned, whether by the serpent himself, or as actuated by some superior being: And it might, perhaps, have been improper that he should. Eve knew nothing as yet of the existence of angels, good or bad: nor did she know it was beyond the natural capacity of this "serpent" to speak as she perceived he did. Probably she had, by observation, been led to think, that some of the beasts were not endowed with the power of speech; but she had not been long enough in the world to know, that they were all destitute of it. And this may be the reason of that remark relative to the "serpent," he was "more subtle than any of the beasts of the field." She might apprehend, he was made superior to any of the inferior creatures she had had opportunity to know any thing about, in this special respect; that he was endowed with an ability to speak, which they were not. Now, upon this representation of the state of Eve's knowledge, there is an obvious propriety in Moses's account of this fact. For he writes, as it was fit and natural he should do, according to the "visible appearance" of the thing, as well as "Eve's apprehension" of it, at the time when it happened. Nor is he singular in this manner of writing. The Apostle Paul, having occasion to

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speak

speaking of Eve's being deceived, does it according to the then appearance of the thing, in these words, "the serpent beguiled Eve;" saying nothing of the "devil," though he knew it was he that actuated the serpent. In like manner, the Apostle Peter, when speaking of Baalim, the son of Bosor, says, "the dumb ass, speaking with man's voice, forbad the madness of the prophet;" and yet, he knew, at the same time, that the ass was only the "instrument" God made use of in the rebuke that was now given. Moses, therefore, may reasonably be looked upon as "literally" writing a true fact, when he speaks of a "serpent" as talking with Eve, though it be supposed, at the same time, that the serpent was actuated by the "devil," and did not say a word in virtue of any natural power he was endowed with, sufficient for the purpose.

Some are pleased to give us wonderful accounts of this serpent; that he had wings, and could fly: that he was of the firey kind, and made a most beautiful shining appearance; and that, being of an erect figure, he could reach and take fruit from the tree, of which our first parents were not permitted to eat. And they might have gone on, and informed us still further, that he was the most distinguished of all serpents, and of all other beasts, in that he was naturally capable of managing a discourse with art and design. But it ought to be remembered, Moses only speaks of him as a "serpent, the most subtle

tle among the beasts;" not saying a word about his wings, or beauty, or any other peculiarity. All therefore we can depend upon as truth is, that it was a "serpent," in distinction from all other creatures, that was used as the "instrument" in the temptation that seduced the first of our race. Whatever descriptions are given of this serpent, however fine and curious, are the fruit of imagination only, and should be carefully distinguished from the truth of scripture-history.

Moses, having observed that it was a "serpent" that spake to Eve, goes on to relate what he said. And his first address to her seems to have been in the guise of an astonished inquirer, "Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?" Upon Eve's acknowledging there was one tree, concerning which God had said, "Ye shall not eat of it, nor touch it, lest ye die:" the serpent replies, saying to the woman, "Ye shall not surely die. For God doth know, that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened; and ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil." These are the only words Moses relates to have been spoken by the serpent; though others, by imaginary additions, have made him speak in the most artfully delusive manner.

After they have introduced the serpent "playing some of his wily tricks," and, in the woman's presence, taking and eating of the tree she was

restrained from touching, they represent him as
“putting on a more seraphic, or angelical
appearance,” and addressing her in such lan-
guage as this, “You see how the fruit of this
“tree has exalted me; so that from a beast of
“the field I am become a glorious “seraph,”
“and endued not only with speech, but with
“the knowledge of the Divine Will, which has
“not been fully opened to you by God himself—
“Can God possibly, do you think, have really
“intended, that you should not eat of the fruit
“of every tree of the garden, and of this in
“particular, which he himself has made and
“planted there? What did he make and place
“it there for then?—You are greatly mistaken.
“The fruit is not deadly, nor will it kill you,
“any more than it has me. Alas! all that God
“meant, by saying it would destroy you, was,
“that it would change and transform you. But
“so far will it be from making you cease to
“be, that, in the day you eat of it, it will open
“and enlighten your eyes, as it has mine; and
“as it has raised me from a serpent to a seraph,
“endued with speech and knowledge of the di-
“vine counsels concerning you, so it shall like-
“wise raise you from being mortals to be Gods;
“and, instead of bringing death on you, make
“you immortal like the great Creator himself;
“giving you the same kind of knowledge of
“good and evil that he has. You shall then
“know the way to possess all the good you en-
“joy,

“joy, independently as he does; and you shall
 “know how to avoid death, the threatened evil,
 “which would for ever put an end to all your
 “bliss and felicity. Even disobedience itself will
 “not then be able to bring it upon you. In fine,
 “you will find this tree to have the like powers
 “to improve and raise your minds, as the tree
 “of life has, to preserve your bodies *.”

Surely, this speech of the serpent took rise chiefly from imagination, not from any thing Moses has said to give countenance to it. The fact, as he represents it, appears, as it ought to do, not set off with laboured art and ornament, but in a naked, plain, natural dress. It is little more than a repetition of the words God had spoken, with a bold denial of their truth, in roundly affirming this falsehood, that, instead of dying, if they eat of this tree, “their eyes should be opened; and they should be as Gods, knowing good and evil.”

It should be remembered here, neither Adam nor Eve had as yet had opportunity for any considerable acquaintance with the use or force of words. It would therefore have been below the “subtlety of the serpent,” and indeed quite unnatural for him, to have addressed to the woman in that variety of artful language which has been put into his mouth. Such a manner of speaking would not have been adjusted to her proper

* Essay on the several Dispensations of God to Mankind, p. 5, 6.

character. Whereas, Moses's account, as it lies in his history, without the imaginary help of others, is contained, as it was proper it should be, in a few words, and such too as Eve, having heard before, may be supposed to have easily understood.

But however the words, in which the temptation was managed, are interpreted, they had their intended and desired effect; for they deceived the woman into the thought, as the history goes on, "that the tree was good for food, and to be desired to make one wise." And she accordingly "took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also to her husband, and he did eat," in direct opposition to the express command of God. And in this lay their "offence," and not simply in eating of this tree, which might have been an indifferent matter, had not God made it otherwise by interposing a positive declaration of his pleasure, that they "should not eat of it," though they might "freely eat of every other tree in the garden."

It will possibly be said here, is it a thing credible, that the all-wise good God should permit the entrance of sin into the world, as occasioned in the manner that has been represented, by a "temptation" begun, and carried into effect, by a "serpent," actuated by an "evil spirit?" Can it reasonably be supposed, that he would, when he had created man, have suffered the devil, before he had made any considerable advances in knowledge and experience of the world, to
"tempt"

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“tempt” him, so as to draw him into sin; and, in this way, bring ruin upon himself? Is this a fit thought to entertain of that God, who, of his mere goodness, had given him existence, that he might be happy in the love, service, and enjoyment of the original source of all being, and of all good?

The answer is this: It is in fact true, that sin and sorrow now are, and all along have been, in the world, however difficult it may be to account for their entrance. And difficult it really is, and vastly so, upon the principle of “reason,” as well as “revelation.” The greatest philosophers, in all ages, have found it a depth they could not fathom. The question, therefore, remains unresolved by them to this day, ποθεν το κακον, “whence came evil?” It is not pretended, that the difficulty is removed by what is said upon the matter in the sacred books. It is a difficulty still; though not so great an one as it was before. It is certainly lessened, and not increased.

The difficulty, as peculiar to the Mosaic history, and as stated in the above objection, lies in this, that sin, and ruin thereupon, should be occasioned by “temptation” from an “evil spirit,” and as practised upon the first parents of men, before there had been time for their making any “considerable improvements” in knowledge, experience, and goodness.

As

As to the first part of this suggested difficulty, man's being led into sin by "temptation from an evil spirit," I would say,

Temptation, in general, is the only conceivable, it may be, the only possible way, in which innocent man could have been induced to sin. It would be strange, unaccountably so, if he had sinned without any consideration exciting him hereto. But he could not have been excited, without being tempted. To excite to sin, in whatever view it be considered, is to tempt to it. The terms, though different, yet carry in them, at least in the present case, one and the same meaning. To say, therefore, that our first father could not have been placed in a state of temptation, is, in reality of sense, to say, that he must have been impeccable; which is the privilege, perhaps, of no creature in virtue of his mere natural powers, however advanced we may suppose them to be.

Besides, the placing man in a state wherein he might be tempted, generally considered, is not a difficulty peculiar to the Scripture. It is the truth, respecting all mankind, that they are sent into a world full of temptation; which is a difficulty, so far as it is one at all, in point of reason as well as revelation. And it as much concerns those to solve it, who have faith only in the being, perfections, and moral government of God, as those who, besides this, have faith in the Bible, as a revelation of his will.

The

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The difficulty, therefore, as it relates to the present objection, lies only in this special circumstance of the temptation, its being managed by "an evil spirit." And why not by an evil spirit, as well as by an evil man, or by a world so constituted as to be capable of being a temptation, by its smiles or frowns? It is not at all unphilosophical to suppose the existence of angels, either good or bad. We may more reasonably think, there are intelligent moral beings of various orders superior to ours, than that there are not. It is indeed the general opinion of "reasoners," that thus it really is. And analogy would lead one to imagine, that there may be, among these orders, some that are evil as well as good. What relation or connection there is between these superior intelligences, and us men, we know not with any degree of certainty: but should any take upon them to affirm there are none, and that God might not use them as instruments in the government of our world, they would say more than they have any warrant to do. It is no offence against any dictate of sober reason, to suppose the truth of what the Scripture declares, that the good angels are God's "ministers sent forth to minister to them who are heirs of salvation;" and that the evil angels are permitted by him, as his wisdom sees fit, to "work in those who are already the children of disobedience;" and in others, in order to tempt them to be so. And what difference is there, in

in the reason of the thing, between a temptation, arising from the solicitations of a wicked man, and of an evil angel? If the temptation, whether it comes from the one or the other, is not suffered by God to be disproportioned to the strength of the agent that is tempted, but he is left, notwithstanding, to his own choice, so as that it will be, properly speaking, his "own fault," should he comply with it, what just reason is there for complaint? And what greater reason for it, should it be managed by the "devil," than by those who are his children? It does not appear to make any alteration in the true nature of the case, or its aspect on the moral attributes and government of God, whether the former or the latter are the tempters to evil.

I may not improperly add here, if it became the wisdom and goodness of the all-perfect Being, to suffer our first parents to be "tempted" in any way whatever [and why not they, as well as their posterity ever since], this, in which Moses says it was done, is as natural and rational a one as can easily be imagined. Possibly, it was the only one, considering their then situation, in which their virtue could have been proved by their having opportunity and occasion to act their part well when tempted to the contrary. Inordinancy of appetite could have been no temptation to them; for this had not as yet any place in them. A temper of mind inclining them to oppose the authority of God, could

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could be no temptation to them ; for they were totally void of such a disposition. How then could they have been tempted, but in a way adapted to lead them into an apprehension of the command of their Creator, that differed from what it really intended ? This, accordingly, is the method Moses has related. And as to "Satan's" being the agent in endeavouring thus to delude them, it is as natural as any part of the story, and strictly rational. What other being could have done this ? It would be glaringly absurd to suppose such a thing of God, or the holy angels. And Adam and Eve, the only intelligent beings now existing in our world, could not, in this way, have been tempters to each other, till they had previously lost their innocence. Who then but some "evil intelligence," of some other class of beings, could have acted the part of a tempter to them ? And, as it was in "man's voice" that God spake to them, when he restrained them, by his command, from "eating" of such a particular tree in the garden, the way was pointed out, in which it would be most natural to suppose Satan should address to them in order to deceive them. It perfectly agrees with his character as a subtle, as well as wicked spirit, to think that he would speak to them in "man's voice," as God had done just before. Nor is it absurd to say, that God might permit this application of Satan to them, any more than it would be to say, he might permit him,

him, in like manner, to tempt their posterity, or suffer them to be tempted in any other way: always provided, that he so superintends and governs the temptation, that it shall be only a proper trial of virtue, a trial adjusted to men's state and character; and such as, notwithstanding the temptation, will leave them justly chargeable with sin, as being themselves the "faulty causes," if they are drawn aside to a compliance with the thing they are tempted to.

And this leads me to the other branch of the objection, Satan's being permitted to tempt our first parents "before they had time for any considerable improvements in knowledge and experience."

To which I would say, that it makes no real alteration, in the reason of the thing, whether their improvements were small or great, as having had a shorter or longer time for the advances proper to their nature, if the temptation did not exceed their abilities; but was such only as they might have overcome, and would have overcome, had it not been their own fault. And this was evidently the truth of the case, as Moses has related it. There does not appear any thing in the temptation beyond the strength of the first man and woman, however unimproved we can reasonably suppose them to have been. Satan's address contained little more than a bold, impudent contradiction of what God had said to them. God had told them, "they should die, "if they eat of the forbidden tree." Satan tells

them, "they should not die," but rather "become wise, and knowing as Gods." This is the whole of what he said. And surely the first man and woman must have been unimproved beyond all reasonable conception of their character, if they were not able to have resisted this temptation. It is indeed a temptation adjusted to small advances in knowledge; but those small advances were abundantly sufficient to have overcome it. To be sure, there appears nothing in the history, relative either to the temptation, or the abilities of our first parents, that should lead one to think they were tempted above what they might have borne, without being seduced into sin.

It appears, I would hope, upon the whole, that the account Moses has given us of the "fall" of our first parents, far from being trifling, ridiculous, or absurd, and therefore incredible in itself, is grave, solid, and rational; not justly liable to the objections that have been raised against it, but as unexceptionable as any that can be thought of, and therefore an account that no one need be ashamed to own that he receives, as containing the real truth.

It is acknowledged, Moses has said nothing upon the question, how could our first parents have been drawn aside to disobey God, by means of the devil's temptation, when they might, notwithstanding, have retained their innocence, and were furnished with sufficient ability here-
for?

for? Neither has he offered any thing to reconcile God's permitting him to sin, with the moral attributes of his nature; which is the greatest difficulty by far that attends the case. But he may easily be excused for his silence upon these points, if it be considered, that he was, in his own proper character as a man, unable to give a satisfactory account of these matters, and that God did not see fit to instruct him how to do it; and for this, among other reasons, because, in the present state of our faculties, we may be incapable of seeing to the bottom of so great a depth. But then, it ought to be remembered, these are difficulties not peculiar to revelation. However sin first came into the world, whether in the way Moses has related, or any other, the questions still recur, and in their full force—How came man to sin? How came the infinitely holy and good God not to prevent the entrance of that into the world, which is so odious in his sight, and destructive in its consequences, when, so far as we are able to conceive of the matter, he might, with infinite ease, have done it? And it becomes those to cease from clamouring against revelation upon these points, who do not find themselves able, upon the foot of solid reason, to give a clear and satisfactory solution of them. For it as truly belongs to them to do this, as those who are believers in Moses and the prophets, in Jesus Christ and his apostles.

II. The other thing mentioned as worthy of special notice is, the "effect" that was consequent upon the lapse of our first parents, both "natural" and "judicial."

What "naturally" followed upon their offence, Moses has handed to us thus.

GENESIS, Chap. III.

7. "And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig-leaves together, and made themselves aprons."

8. "And they heard the voice of the Lord God, walking in the garden in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God among the trees of the garden."

9. "And the Lord God called to Adam, and said unto him, Where art thou?"

10. "And he said, I heard thy voice in the garden: and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself."

11. "And he said, Who told thee that thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?"

12. "And the man said, The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat."

13. "And the Lord God said unto the woman, What is this that thou hast done? And

the woman said, The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat."

The first thing related as consequent upon the disobedience of Adam and Eve is, that "their eyes were opened;" not in the sense they were told they would be, when the serpent spake to them, but in a quite different one. The eyes of their understanding were opened, not to make them "wise and knowing as Gods," but to see themselves guilty creatures, and, as such, exposed to the righteous displeasure of their Maker. They now knew more than they did before; but it was knowledge accompanied with self-disapprobation; arising from an inward consciousness of having transgressed the command of God, which deserved punishment, they were at a loss how to escape.

It therefore follows, "they knew that they were naked." If these words are interpreted, as they commonly have been, to signify that they were now affected with "shame," being without any "vestment to cover their bodies," the meaning could not be justified upon any principle of solid reason. Why should they, in this sense, be ashamed of their nakedness after their fall, any more than before it? If being together without any cover on their bodies was, in the nature of the thing, a just ground for shame, they ought to have been ashamed before their offence in
eating

eating of the forbidden tree. If it was shameful in its own nature, it was so before as well as after the lapse. Besides, this sense of the word is quite foreign to the purpose for which it is here inserted. Moses, therefore, speaks of "fear," not "shame," as the passion that was now excited in them. It is accordingly observable, he brings in Adam, upon God's call to him, as saying, ver. 10. "I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself." Surely, his being "afraid," and thereupon "hiding himself," did not arise from this sentiment, that "his body was naked," meaning hereby, that it was not "clothed!" What pertinency is there in this sense of the word to his present condition, as a sinful, exposed creature? It would have been ridiculous in him to have given it as the reason of his "fear" to come before God, that he had no clothes on, when the true and only reason was, that he had disobeyed his command, and thereby incurred his displeasure: nor will any other reason consist with the scope and circumstances of the story, of which this word is an important part.

Perhaps, the phrase, "they were naked," may be fairly construed, they were in an "uncovered state," not concealed from the sight, and without all defence or protection against the resentments of God. A late valuable writer has, I think, very justly observed, "that the word we render "naked," besides its most obvious signification, is used, by a sort of metaphor, in "other senses, in many places of the Scriptures."

He particularly mentions, that in Job, where it is said, "Hell is [naron] naked before him, and "destruction hath no covering;" that is, "hell "and destruction lie open, not concealed from "the eye, nor in any way covered from the vengeance of God." This sense of the word, as used by Moses, is exactly suited to the character and state of the persons to whom it is applied, and carries in it a pertinent, significative, and strong meaning. It is natural to suppose the passion of "fear," in Adam and Eve, was set in motion from a sense of sin and guilt; especially as their eyes told them "they were naked," that is, in a defenceless state, altogether uncovered from the sight and stroke of their Maker, who had threatened them with death, in case of disobedience. And no wonder, if their thoughts run upon contriving some method to cover themselves.

It is, therefore, added in the next following words, in perfect agreement with what has been offered, "they sewed fig-leaves together, and "made themselves aprons." Says the above named Author, with great propriety, "the "word which we render "leaves" is, in the "text, not "plural," but "singular;" and, I "apprehend, that both here, and in some other "places of Scripture, it should be rendered, not "leaves," but a "foliature," or "intertwining of "leaves;" and that the whole paragraph should "be thus translated: "They wreathed together "a foliature of a fig-tree, and made themselves
"enwrap-

"enwrapments," *i. e.* they wrapped themselves "up in them." What they wanted was to "hide themselves from God." An apron, or cincture "about their waists would in nowise answer this purpose;—but the casing themselves up with—"in boughs full of leaves, to look like trees, "they might imagine would be sufficient to cover "them from the sight of God."

It may seem a reflection on the intellectual powers of the first parents of mankind, to suppose them capable of thinking, that they could conceal themselves from the sight of God by so trifling a cover as the best that could be made of "fig-leaves." But it ought to be considered, this did not discover greater weakness, than their attempt to "hide themselves from him among the trees of the garden;" which yet is expressly affirmed of them.

It should be remembered here, as we pass along, it is, from this part of the story, made evident beyond all dispute, that the advances of our first parents in knowledge were as yet but small. Surely, if they had been that perfectly knowing pair it has been often said they were, it would be altogether unconceivable, that they should have endeavoured, in such a poor low way, to have screened themselves from the eye and power of God. It is true, they had now lost their innocence; but nothing is said that would lead one to think, they had lost their understandings too, or that they knew less "speculatively" of God now, than they did before.

The knowledge of their "heads," whatever that of their "hearts" might be, was much the same immediately after, that it was before their "one offence." They certainly had not attained beyond an "infantile" kind of knowledge and experience. And in this view of their character, they might, as they had lost the guidance of God to follow their own counsel, be so ignorant before him as, in the hurry of their thoughts, through guilt and fear, to go into the methods of safety here specified, however foolish they may appear to those who have more knowledge of God and the world.

The plain truth is, "shame," arising from the want of clothes to cover their nakedness, could not be the passion now working in their breasts. They had offended their Creator and God by a presumptuous act of disobedience, hereby rendering themselves liable to immediate death. Their "eyes were opened" to see their sin and danger. They were, hereupon, inwardly moved and affected—With what? Surely, not with "shame," because they had no garment to cover their bodies. What connection has this with their present state of conscious guilt? Their thoughts could not have been employed upon so trifling an affair. No; "fear" was the passion that alarmed their hearts. And this put them, in the present confused state of their minds, upon first providing a "cover for their bodies," and then upon "hiding themselves among the trees in the garden," that they might, if possible, escape the observation of their

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their Maker: all which is natural, and just what might have been expected of persons in their circumstances.

I am not insensible, there is another way, in which some have endeavoured, while they explain the word "naked" in its most obvious sense, to give it a proper place, and significative force, in the Mosaic story. It is by supposing, that Adam and Eve, in their innocent state, were "covered with a robe of glory," as the badge or symbol of their superiority and dignity; but that, being stripped of it immediately upon their lapse, they knew, by seeing themselves to be "naked," deprived of this glorious vestment, that they had forfeited the favour of their Maker, and lay exposed to his righteous displeasure. This, it is acknowledged, will give an important sense to the word, and such an one as will perfectly consist with the whole account of their fall, of which it is a part. And was there sufficient reason to receive it for truth, that our first parents were thus "covered with a robe of glory," while innocent, but "stripped" of it after they had sinned, I should readily fall in with the sense that is herefrom put upon the term "naked." I will not say, the patrons of this opinion have nothing to offer in vindication of it. Perhaps, it is rather grounded on plausible conjectures from certain "modes of speech" sometimes to be met with in the Scriptures, than on reasons that will bear a thorough examination. Moses

does not seem to countenance it, unless from the connected use of the word "naked;" which, as we have seen, may be otherwise accounted for. And it is remarkable, he has expressly said concerning the first pair, in their innocent state, that "they were both naked," the man and his wife, "and they were not ashamed*." It was not, therefore, when they were first created, that they were thus "clad with glory;" but afterwards, if at all: of which the sacred historian has made no men-

* "It is very obvious to remark," says one, "how our translators and commentators came to have a notion of Adam and Eve's "shame" for their "nakedness." It being here observed, that no shame attended their being naked before they eat of the tree, it was concluded, that a "shame of being naked" entered with sin into the world." But," says he, among other things, "I apprehend the truth to be, that this verse was not intended at all to speak of their being "naked as to clothing." As the word "naked" has metaphorical senses in the Old Testament; so also has the word which we here translate "ashamed." It is far from signifying, in all places, being affected with what we call the passion of "shame." It often means being "confounded," or "destroyed."—And this was Moses's meaning in the word here used; a meaning of it perfectly coinciding with what afterwards appeared to be his sentiment of man's standing personally to hear the voice of God. Moses elsewhere speaks of it to be no ordinary mercy, that a man "should hear the voice of God and live;" and therefore he might here leave us this observation concerning our first parents, that God spake to them, and that, although they stood "naked" before him, i. e. in his more immediate presence under "no coverture," nigh so him to "hear the voice of his words talking to them," they experienced what Moses always reputed a very extraordinary thing, that "God did talk with man," and they were not "confounded," but "lived."

tion. And I know of no right others have to supply this defect.

I should now have proceeded, according to the method laid out, to consider the "judicial" consequences of the lapse, as they respect the first man and woman. But it will be previously proper to take some notice of those remarkable intervening words of Moses.

Ver. 14. "And the Lord God said unto the serpent, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field: upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life."

15. "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel."

It may be needful just to say here, as God knew, though Adam and Eve might not, that it was the "devil," in the body of the "serpent," and not the serpent himself, that had managed the temptation by which they were led into sin; it is noways unnatural or unreasonable to suppose, that it was in reality "the devil in the serpent," and not "the serpent himself," to whom these words are directed: though, being spoken in the presence of the man and the woman, and with a view to their attending to them, they are expressed according to the "appearance" of things, and their "apprehensions" concerning them. Having observed this, I go on.

The

The "serpent" may be the object of the curse pronounced in the former of these verses; though the words are addressed to the "devil," who acted in him: and the "devil," not the serpent, his instrument in what had been done, may be aimed at in the latter.

In the first of these verses, though Satan, who was invisibly present in the body of the serpent, is the agent really spoken to; yet the "serpent," his instrument only, may be the more immediate object of the curse pronounced. As if it had been said, not mentioning the "devil," but the "serpent," and hereby accommodating the language to the "outward appearance," thou hast been instrumental in drawing the man and the woman, whom I had made, into an act of open and daring rebellion against my authority. As a token, therefore, of my displeasure, and to guard against the like disobedience for the future, I degrade you, the instrument in this wickedness, into an inferior sort of creature. Like a low reptile, you shall hereafter crawl upon your belly, and feed upon the dust of the earth; and thus it shall be with all that shall derive their existence from you.

There is no difficulty in supposing "such a degradation," with respect to the power of Almighty God. He could as easily, by speaking only a word, alter the kind of any creature, as give it at first.

But it may seem strange, as the devil only was "agent" in the seduction of Adam and Eve, the
serpent

serpent being nothing more than the visible form, or material figure, that he actuated; I say, it may seem strange, that the "serpent," in this case, should be treated as though he had been worthy of blame, when he really was not; or, in other words, that he should be "curst" for doing what he was naturally incapable of doing, and was in fact wholly done by another; especially, that he should be dealt with in so severe a manner, being obliged to suffer "a degradation of his kind," insomuch that he, and all that should proceed from him, should be groveling reptiles, feeding upon dust.

This I readily acknowledge to be a difficulty, and a great one too: nor is it capable of being solved upon the supposition, that the "serpent" had "merited" the displeasure of God, or that he was reduced to this low state as a "punishment" for what he had done; for he was no "agent" in the case, and had really done nothing. It ought to be considered in a quite different view. And perhaps we may, by one or two similar instances, be led to conceive of it in a manner that will consist with the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the divine government.

It is said, in ver. 23. of this chapter, that God "curst the ground." Not surely on account of its having deserved to be cursed; for it was, in the nature of the thing, incapable of such desert. But he did this "for man's sake," that it might be an occasion of "toil and sorrow" to him, because he had sinned. And might he not as well

"curse

"curse the serpent?" Not on account of any thing he had done to deserve this curse, but "for man's sake" also, that it might be an occasion of "benefit" to him, by putting him upon his guard against sin for the future, as he would now have before his eyes such a visible testimony of what God would do in resentment of it. The evil brought upon the serpent might be, in a way of dispensation, for the good of man. The end in view here, according to this interpretation, is the reverse of that intended by the "curse" brought upon the earth. And it is remarkable, the curse of the earth is spoken of in that part of the history, which relates to the "punishment" of man; whereas this is mentioned, where God is introduced as opening his design of "mercy" towards him. What therefore is here represented as a "curse" either to the "serpent," or the "devil" acting in him, ought to be looked upon as, in the same proportion, a "blessing" to man.

In like manner, it was a law in Israel of God's making, and promulging, that "if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die, the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten. Exod. xxi. 28. It will not be pretended, that the ox was a moral agent, or that death could be inflicted on him as a "punishment" on account of what had happened. No; but the wisdom and goodness of this law lay in this, that it was a proper guard upon man's life, a reasonable provision for his safety and security. How? Not from any tendency it had to make other oxen afraid to go

men to death; but as it was naturally suited to put the owners of them upon due care to guard them against doing this mischief. The good of men was the great aim of this law. And why might not the "serpent," upon the like good intention, though not for any "crime" he could be charged with, be reduced to a lower state of being? He was incapable, it is owned, of this degradation, in point of desert: but who can say it was not wise and fit, with regard to the safety of man? He might, had not God thus dealt with him, have been a creature adapted, in his nature, to be far more mischievous and hurtful to mankind, than he now is; or however this was, his "degradation" in the presence of Adam and Eve, who thought it was he that had beguiled them into sin, might, at least, as to them, be a visible example of the displeasure of God, and serve as a "standing memento" to put them upon their guard against being again drawn aside by temptation. And to their "posterity," who, by after revelations, knew more of this matter than they did, it might be of great use, as it obviously points out the heinous nature of sin, and what may be expected as the consequence of it, when a creature that was nothing more than an "instrument" actuated by another in tempting to the commission of it, was, in the righteous government of God, for wise and good ends, degraded into a lower kind of being.

This is all I am able to say in solution of the objected difficulty. If any should think it insufficient,

cient, I will lay before them, in a brief summary way, what Dr. Shuckford has offered, upon another plan of interpretation, to set this part of the Mosaic history in an easy and unexceptionable light.

Says he, the Hebrew particle, *ci*, rendered in this place, "because," might have been translated "although." Several instances, in illustration of this, he has brought to view; and some others might be added to them. Having observed this, he considers this ver. 14. as an apostrophe delivered to the serpent in the presence of Adam and Eve, designed to evince to them, what a folly, as well as crime, they had been guilty of, in being deceived by so low a seducer. The words are, as if God had said to the serpent; "although" thou hast done this great mischief, "yet thou art no lofty and respectable creature: "Thou art one of the meanest of all animals: "Thou art not raised to any high form, but art "a mere reptile, and shall always continue to be "so: upon thy belly thou art made to go, and "shalt feed low all the days of thy life in the "very dust. Adam and Eve had conceived high "notions of the serpent, "above all the beasts of "the field, which the Lord had made;" but God "here reprehends their foolish fancy, and sets before them, what their own eyes might have told "them, that the serpent was a creature, made "only for a very low life, and that no such elevation as they imagined could ever belong to "him."

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I freely own, this would be the best account I have met with of the meaning of these words, if it could be well reconciled with the form of diction here used, "curst art thou above all cattle—upon thy belly shalt thou go—and eat dust."—One is naturally led, from this manner of speaking, to think, that the serpent was deprived of something he before possessed, and that the "curse" lay in this "deprivation." The Dr. was sensible of this difficulty, and in order to guard against it has said, "to be "curst," may be "to have some signal mischief or great evil, "either wished to, or inflicted upon the person "curst. This indeed is the general signification "of the word. But it ought to be considered, "whether it is contrary to the nature of the Hebrew tongue, to call a thing "curst," when "such circumstances belong to it as are so extremely bad, that it might be deemed as unhappy a thing, even as a most severe curse, to be under them, though they be not inflicted as a particular judgment. In this sense the Jews, in our Saviour's time, called their vulgar or common people, who, they thought, could not know the law, "curst."—It is no unnatural way of speaking, to say of poor, barren, and unprofitable land, that it is "curst" ground, not only when God may have been pleased to make "fruitful land barren for the wickedness of them that dwell therein," as was particularly the case of the earth "thus curst," upon our first parents having sinned; but also
 "when

“ when the land is very sterile and unfruitful,
 “ though no particular curse of God has ever been
 “ denounced against it. In the Hebrew tongue,
 “ we often find things eminently excellent in
 “ their kind, said therefore to be of God; “ Ce-
 “ dars of Lebanon,” highly flourishing, to be for
 “ that reason of God’s planting: so, on the con-
 “ trary, the word “ cursed” may as reasonably be
 “ used, as it were in contrast, where God had
 “ given no appearance of a blessing. Adam and
 “ Eve were thinking highly of the serpent: the
 “ design of what God now said, was to shew them
 “ that he was a creature deserving their lowest
 “ notice: They thought him above any beast of
 “ the field which the Lord had made: The words
 “ here spoken were to tell them, that he was not
 “ above, but beneath all others; so creeping and
 “ abject, that his make and form might be spoken
 “ of in terms, as if they were a “ curse” upon
 “ him.”

The reader is left to judge wherein, and how
 far, the Dr. has removed this difficulty. If he
 has really done it, I know of no reason why we
 may not rest entirely satisfied with the interpreta-
 tion he has given us.

The words that follow, in ver. 15. “ And I will
 put enmity between thee and the woman, and be-
 tween thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy
 head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.” These
 words, I say, are a continuation of what God said
 to the “ devil,” now present in the body of the
 serpent; and principally relate to his “ tota-
 over

overthrow," as the "tempter" and "destroyer" of man, by "one" who should be of "the seed of the woman:" Though the mode of diction, conformably to that which had all along been used before, is such, that neither Adam or Eve may be thought to have had any other than a low and imperfect conception of what was hereby really meant.

Not that they had reason from these words then, or any of their posterity since, to imagine, that the contest, here spoken of, between "the serpent and his seed," and the "woman's seed," lay in this, that serpents would be apt to "bite men's heels, and men in return to break their heads." It would be a dishonour to Moses's character, considered only as an historian, to suppose he could intend any thing so low and ridiculous; especially, when writing upon matters of such interesting importance. And it would equally reflect upon the understandings of our first parents, to think them capable of taking his words in so contemptible a sense. If they did not, by this time, begin to suspect, that some superior agent might have used the serpent in the temptation by which they were overcome; they, doubtless, understood what was now delivered by God as importing, that there should be a contest, and victory thereupon, in relation to, and agreement with, the main thing in view, their having been "tempted" and "overcome" by the serpent; that is to say, they must have understood it as a contest with the serpent in his character as a

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"tempter"

"tempter" and "seducer," in which characters he should be conquered, as he had conquered them.

It ought to be remembered here, these words were directed to the "devil," invisibly present in the serpent, and not to Adam or Eve. There is no necessity therefore to suppose, that they understood, or that it was intended by God they should understand, the full meaning of them. It is true, as they were uttered in their hearing, and with a view, doubtless, to their receiving comfort from them under their present guilty circumstances, it may reasonably be expected, they should sufficiently understand them for this purpose. If they understood them only according to the conception they may be supposed to have had then of the serpent, as one that had been the occasion of great damage to them, they would naturally and obviously have looked upon them as a kind provision of God for their security in time to come; it being hereby engaged, that the power of the serpent, not simply as such, but as a "tempter" and "seducer," should be "destroyed." By what "seed of the woman" this should be done, or when, or how, and after what manner, they had perhaps no idea at all.

The real truth is, the words were a declaration from God, summarily, though obscurely, promising, or predicting, the "destruction" of the devil, that is, his power, interest, and kingdom, notwithstanding what he had done, by "one" who should proceed from "the woman." Not that

that Adam or Eve understood much of the thing here promised and predicted : Though thus much we know they did understand by it, that it was an instance of the "divine favour" towards them ; and that their condition, on account of their sin, would not be deplorably fatal, as they had reason to expect. For, in consequence of these words, it became certain to them, that they should have "seed ;" which could not have been the case, if the "death threatened" had been, as it might have been, immediately inflicted on them. It is accordingly observed, in ver. 23. that Adam "called his wife Eve, because she was the mother of all living."

Let it be only supposed, as it all along is in the Mosaic history, that Adam and Eve were not as yet so far advanced in knowledge, but that they apprehended it was the "serpent," *sua virtute*, that was their tempter, and the whole account will appear just and natural. The remedy God had provided for their help, in their lapsed condition, is given in words adapted to the appearance of things, and their conceptions of them : nor is there any need to suppose, that they understood, or that it was intended they should have understood, more than is literally contained in them, considered, as they ought to be, in connection with their guilty state, and the way in which they were brought into it.

But this is no reason why we, who are favoured with after-revelation, may not know much more of the meaning of these words than they

did, or it was designed by God that they should. It is now plain to us, though it was not to them, that the "devil" was the "agent," and the "serpent" his "instrument only" in the temptation by which sin entered into the world. It is clear to us, though it was not to them, that "wicked men" are the seed of the devil, as having him for their father; and that there now is, and all along has been, a "contest between him and his seed," and the "seed of the woman." It is now evident to us, though they were ignorant of it, that "Christ" was the "seed of the woman;" as being, according to the flesh, "made of a woman," and born of her body. In fine, we are at no loss to say, though they had not light to say it, that the "grand work" of Christ, as the "seed of the woman," was to "destroy the devil," that is, his design as the "tempter" of men; and that he has been, and now is, carrying on this work, and will carry it on till it is completed: though he has, and will meet with opposition herein from the "devil" and "his seed."

In consequence of these advances in knowledge beyond the first man and woman, by being acquainted with after and more explicit promises and predictions, together with the explanation of them in their accomplishment by Christ, we are able, with a good degree of certainty, to say, that the devil, under the name of the serpent he actuated, is principally intended in the words

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under consideration; and that the "bruising the serpent's head" by the "woman's seed" means, in allusion to the method of killing serpents by striking at their heads, the "destruction of the devil," by Jesus Christ; not his being, but his design, his work and power, as the tempter and destroyer of men. We have, in short, sufficient reason to think, that the plan of grace, the gospel-scheme of salvation, which has been since opened to the world, especially by the revelation of Jesus Christ and his Apostles, was the real truth here summarily spoken of. Not that Adam, or his posterity in former ages, saw these things in the light we do, or that God intended they should. Perhaps it would not have consisted with the intermediate steps in the accomplishment of this full promise, to have delivered it in a manner so explicit that they might have thus understood it. But this is no argument, that it did not really contain this meaning, or that we may not be rationally and fully convinced that it did; considering it in connection with the scheme of providence, as it has since been opened, more especially in the revelation of God to his prophets, his Son Jesus Christ, and the apostles, and through them to us. We may, in consequence of these advantages, be able very easily and clearly to perceive, that this was the real intention of God in his promise, or prediction, in the hearing of the first of our race, and that the words in which it is delivered are not only capable of this sense,

sense, but as obviously and fully expressive of it as words summarily could be. And, in truth, it is with me one of the strongest evidences of the divinity of the Scriptures, that this, and other ancient promises and predictions, are so worded, that the scheme of salvation, as it has been gradually unfolding till these last days, is very obviously, however comprehensively, pointed out in them; insomuch, that a sober inquirer can scarce fail of perceiving, that one and the same scheme has been in prosecution from the days of Adam: which scheme, however dark to former ages, is now, in the times of the gospel, made sufficiently known to all men; though the evidence is not so full as it probably will be, when mankind are got still further into the accomplishment of the "grand purpose of God," generally declared in this original promise to Adam.

Instead of saying any thing farther to shew, that this 15th verse, in the sense I have given it, contains summarily the gospel plan of salvation by Jesus Christ, I would mention it as worthy of particular notice, that the method here provided for the relief of the first pair, and their posterity, against the hurtful consequences of the lapse, was opened, though, at this time, in obscure and general terms only, BEFORE the "sentence of condemnation" was pronounced. God did not see fit to proceed against man in a "judicial" way, till he had previously given him just reason to hope, that he might, notwithstanding
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this process, be reinstated in his favour, and the enjoyment of happiness.

It is easy to perceive, that the "judicial sentence," which was "consequent" upon this remedial grace, ought not to be understood in a sense that will render this "grace" null and void; but so as that they may harmoniously consist with each other. And, in this view of the matter, not only our first parents, but their descendants also throughout all generations, must be looked on, notwithstanding the lapse, and the "judicial" proceeding of God upon it, as under a divine establishment of grace through Christ, in consequence of which they may "live," though they must previously die, and that "for ever" in the enjoyment of God's favour. A most important and interesting thought this! The apostle Paul had it directly in his view, when he says, "if through the offence of one, many be dead; much more the grace of God, by one man Jesus Christ, hath abounded to many, Rom. v. 15. And again, ver. 18. "As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so, by the righteousness of one, the free-gift came upon all men to the justification of life." He refers likewise to this same provision of grace, when he speaks of "the creature," the creature man more especially, as "subject to vanity;" Rom. viii. 20. but "in hope." Of what? It follows, of being "delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children

of God." The foundation of this "hope" was the "promised seed of the woman to bruise the serpent's head;" which promise was made BEFORE it pleased God to "subject the creature" man to that "vanity," which is here spoken of. So that neither the first man or woman, nor any of their posterity, are "irreversibly" under any doom of God, on account of the first sin; but notwithstanding the utmost that can be included in the "pronounced sentence" against Adam and Eve, they are within the reach of God's favour, and under a "revealed constitution of mercy," conformably to which they may finally "inherit eternal life."

The way is now clear to consider the account Moses has given us of the "judicial" consequences of the lapse. And these are distinctly related; as they respect both the "man" and the "woman."

The history begins with the "woman," to whom God "judicially" says, ver. 16. "I will greatly multiply thy sorrow, and thy conception: In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." The just import of these words is so well known to the female sex by unhappy experience, that nothing need be said in explanation of them, or to shew that the daughters of Eve, in common with their mother, are deeply concerned in them.

Only,

Only, it may be proper for their comfort to remark here, that women-kind may, upon the plan of grace through Christ, so behave under the sorrows accompanying child-bearing, as to make them turn out in the end an occasion of salvation to them, according to those words of the apostle Paul, 1 Tim. ii. 15. Notwithstanding, she shall be saved in child-bearing; if they continue in "faith, and charity, and holiness with sobriety."

Dr. Taylor, in his note on Rom. vii. 5. in support of an unusual sense he had put upon the preposition *δια*, brings in this verse as a parallel instance. The apostle's words are, *Σωθησεται δε δια τεκνογονιας*, that is, says the Doctor, "she shall be saved *under*, in the state of, or notwithstanding the procreation of children; or *although* she be engaged in the procreation of children, in opposition to a state of virginity." But he has, without all doubt, misunderstood the true force of the preposition *δια*, in this place, and herefrom given an entirely wrong turn to the apostle's thought. If construed here, in its usual and most proper sense, it will present us with a far more noble and significant meaning. I should render the passage thus, "Nevertheless, she shall be saved [in the full gospel sense of the word] *by* or *through* child-bearing; that is, as the words that immediately follow are, "if they continue in faith, charity, and holiness, with sobriety." It is observable, "as the woman was first in the transgression," which
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are the immediately foregoing words, it is natural to suppose the apostle might recur in his thoughts to the "curse" pronounced against the "woman" herefor, namely, "I will greatly multiply thy sorrow, and thy conception: In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children." Upon which he adds, "Nevertheless, notwithstanding, she shall be saved, [in the full gospel sense of the word] *by, through, in consequence of*, child-bearing; if they continue in faith, &c." As if the apostle had said, "her bearing of children," as to the manner of it since the lapse, instead of proving a "curse," shall be an "occasion" of everlasting salvation to her in heaven, if she does but make a wise and good use of the sorrows and dangers she is liable to pass through in this circumstance of life; improving them as a means in order to her continuing in faith, and a holy, sober conduct of herself in life. This text appears to me an inspired illustration of the "way" or "method" in which the "curse upon woman-kind" may, in consequence of the grace of God through Jesus Christ, by being improved wisely as a "disciplinary trial," be turned into the greatest "blessing," their salvation in the eternal world. To understand by this "salvation," as Mr. Locke, Taylor, and most commentators do, "being carried safely through the sorrows and dangers of child-bearing," appears to me to give it a comparatively low meaning. Besides, it ought to be remembered, it was not "death" in child-bearing that

that the woman was subjected to, but only "sorrow." Had it been "death," in the same sense in which it was sorrow, there could not have been a multiplication of the species; there was therefore neither occasion, nor reason, for the apostle's saying, "she shall be saved," meaning hereby, she should not in this way see death. Moreover, this meaning doth not consist with the conditional proviso that follows, "if they continue in faith, and charity, and holiness, with sobriety." For it is true in fact, that "infidel" and "vicious," as well as "believing" and "virtuous," women are, in this sense, "saved in child-bearing," and perhaps there is no visible distinction between the one and the other.

I may not improperly add here, though it should be thought a little out of place, that the "sufferings," of whatever kind, the human race are subjected to in consequence of the lapse, may, in the same way, be made an "occasion" of spiritual and eternal good, by parity of reason. They are equally capable of being improved to the purposes of "holiness;" and, wherein they are so, they will equally turn to the "salvation" of those, who make this wise and good use of them. And, in truth, the special work we are called to in this world of sorrow and death is, to take occasion, from the evils we suffer, to exhibit a temper of mind, and behaviour in life, that may be suited to the circumstances in which God has placed us. Our trial for another state properly

perly lies in the "occasions" that are herefrom given us for the acquirement and exercise of meekness, humility, faith, patience, contentment, and resignation to the pleasure of the all-wise and righteous Governor of the universe. And if, upon being tried, it appears that we have made this christian improvement of the sufferings we have been called to pass through, we shall, in the end, in spite even of death itself, of the mercy of God, through Jesus the Saviour, be crowned with eternal life.

The woman having received her "judicial sentence," God is now represented as pronouncing the man's; and he does it in the following words:

Ver. 17. "And unto Adam he said, Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life."

18. "Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field."

19. "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return to the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return."

The first part of this sentence contains God's "cursing the ground for man's sake;" that is,

that it might be an occasion of "toil and sorrow to him all his days," by its being spontaneously productive, not of proper food for him, but of "thorns and thistles," to increase his labour, and give him vexation and trouble.

Dr. Taylor, in his scripture doctrine of original sin, calls upon us to observe here, p. 19. that, "though the serpent is "curfed," and the "ground is "curfed," yet there is no "curse" "upon the "man," or the "woman." He repeats the same remark again and again, in his supplement; but surely upon insufficient consideration, p. 46—50. "Was the Lord displeased against the ground? Was he angry against the earth?" Was the earth a capable object of his resentment? What he now did, most certainly terminated on man: He was the object in God's view; and if there was any "curse" in the case, he was the "person curfed." When it is said to the people of Israel, if they would not be obedient, "curfed shall be the fruit of thy land," Deut. xxviii. 15. 18. would any one be led to think, the land indeed was curfed, but no curse was hereby intended to fall on that people? It would be shockingly absurd to put such a construction on the words; but not less so, in the text before us; especially, as the "man" is named, and it is expressly said, that it was "for his sake," that is, on his account, in consideration of his offence, and as a testimony of the Divine displeasure against it, that "the earth was curfed,"
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that is, made an "occasion" of toil and sorrow to him all his days.

But says the Doctor, "sorrow, labour, and death, are not inflicted under the notion of a curse," p. 19. And again, though these are "consequences of Adam's sin, they are really a benefit," p. 21. It is readily owned, in agreement with what has been before observed, that those "evils," upon the foot of grace through Christ, the promised seed, are capable of being improved so as to turn out in the end for good. And so are all the judgments of God wherewith he visits the sins of men. But do those testimonies of his vengeance lose their nature as "judgments" on his part, and "real evils" on theirs, because they may be an "occasion" of that repentance which shall issue in salvation? When God threatened the Jewish nation, in case they would not do his commandments, with famine, the pestilence, the sword, and a dispersion into all parts of the earth, did he threaten them with a benefit? And when those threatnings were for their sins carried into execution, did he inflict a blessing on them? When he threatened, in particular, that, if they were disobedient, "they should be cursed in the field," Deut. xxviii. 16. did he hereby intend that the "field should be cursed," but that he meant thereby a "real benefit" to them? This is what the Doctor says, not virtually and constructively, but in direct words, in however strange a light it may make the Scripture appear.

Besides

DISSERTATION II. 111

Besides what has been already said, it ought to be remembered, God was now denouncing against man that "judgment to condemnation," which, in its consequences, has deeply affected the whole human race; rendering their life on earth, a life of toil, trouble, and sorrow. And shall this be thought a "condemnation to a blessing?" Can it reasonably be looked upon in this light? When God said to Adam, "in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die;" did he mean to guard him against disobedience by threatening him with a benefit? And yet, this he must have meant, if the "judgment" that fastened on him the appendages, forerunners, and occasions of death, was a condemnation to a benefit. The Scripture no where speaks any thing like this; but always considers the matter under the notion of a "condemnation" to that which was in itself a "real and great evil." And this it might be, though we allow, at the same time, that it was capable, of the mercy of God through Christ, of being an "occasion" of good in the end.

The undoubted truth is, this "curse of the ground," in consequence of which man became subjected to a life of toil and sorrow, till he should return to dust, was a "judicial" testimony of God's displeasure against the sin he had committed; and ought therefore to be considered as a "curse" that terminated on "him," and not on the ground, which was dead and unperceptive matter. This is the idea obviously and certainly con-

conveyed to us by what Moses has said. It would be to make him speak in a manner never before heard of, to suppose he was telling us, that, upon man's sin, and God's condemning him for it, he was really "blessing" him, by inflicting on him that which was greatly to his advantage.

The "earth" then was "curled" by God "for man's sake;" or, as a "curse to him," by being fitted to be an occasion of those "labours and sorrows," which would subject him to a state of suffering all his days.

It is an obvious deduction from hence, that the "earth," by being "curled," must have passed under some considerable change for the worse. It could not become a means of "toil, sorrow, and vanity" to man, if it had not been changed into a state very different from that it was in before his fall; that is, a state less fitted to give him pleasure, and more adapted to yield him pain and grief. Had the original state of the earth been what it is at present, there would have been no need of a "curse" from God, in order to its "bringing forth thorns and thistles," that it might be an occasion of toil and trouble. And as the earth was "curled" by God upon this express design, that it might be adapted to be the productive cause of labour and grief, it must follow from hence, that its condition before the lapse was not the same it has been since. If it was, what intelligible meaning can be put upon the curse?

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DISSERTATION II. 113

It is the truth of fact, that the constitution of the earth is now such, so fitted to be the occasional cause of "toil and sorrow" in innumerable ways and kinds, that there is no such thing as living in the world, but under suffering circumstances, in a less or greater degree. And was this the state of the earth when God created the first of our race? Moses declares the contrary; ascribing it to their "sin," and the "curse" thereby brought upon the earth, that it has been so changed as to be the occasion of their "labour and sorrow." And the Scripture, in other places, gives us the same account. The apostle Paul declares, that "the creature," Rom. viii. 20. eminently the creature man, "was made subject to vanity; not willingly, but by reason of him who subjected him;" that is, in consequence of the "curse," which altered the earth from what it was in its former state. So, when the apostle John says, in his description of the happy state of good men in the resurrection-world, that "there shall be no curse there," Rev. xxii. 3. the propriety of his remark is evidently grounded on those occasions of sorrow, mankind at present are subjected to, by reason of the "curse" that is on the earth: and if the "curse" had not made a vast change in the earth for the worse, how shall we account for those passages in the sacred books, which speak of the state of good men in the other world, under the emblem of a "paradisaic" one? Our Saviour said to the thief on the cross, "This

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day shalt thou be with me in paradise." The apostle Paul says of himself, "I was caught up to paradise." And in the book of the Revelations, the promise "to him that overcometh," is, "he shall eat of the tree of life in the midst of the paradise of God." The happy state described in these texts, under the resemblance of "paradise," is much greater than can be enjoyed on this earth, as it is now constituted; and consequently, the "ancient paradise," from whence the allusion is borrowed, must have been greatly different from our earth in its present condition. The "ancient paradise," it is true, was a particular spot of the earth, selected by God for the habitation of man in innocency; but there is no reason to think, there was any essential difference between this spot of the earth, and the earth in common. To be sure, if the rest of the earth, in that day, was similar to the earth in this, a "curse" from God, in order to its being an occasion of "labour and sorrow," was quite needless: merely an expulsion from "paradise" would, in this case, have answered all the ends of the "curse." So that it should seem a point beyond all reasonable controversy, that this earth of our's, by reason of the "curse" upon it for Adam's sin, is so changed from what it was before, as to be adapted to give rise to that "toil and trouble," which man has ever since been subjected to.

Mr. Whiston, in his theory of the earth, supposes, and very probably, as I imagine, that the
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external state of nature was quite different "before" the fall, from what it has been "since:" that the seasons were then equable, or gently and gradually distinguished from each other, without those extremes of heat and cold, and sudden changes of them from one to the other we are now subjected to, and to our great disadvantage: that the earth was better adapted then to the purposes of vegetation; producing many species of trees, plants, herbs, and flowers, we know nothing of at present; advancing those we are still acquainted with to a far more noble degree of perfection; and not invigorating the seeds which now grow into thorns and thistles, or else meliorating their juices so as to alter their nature from what it is now, and in this way rendering that "toil" needless which is occasioned by them: That the air was clear, pure, subtle, transparent, and perfectly fitted for respiration, and its other uses, whether in the animal or vegetable kingdom, without those gross steams, exhalations, and heterogeneous mixtures of various kinds, which are the occasion of numberless pernicious and fatal effects, which take place, either sensibly or insensibly, in our present world; and, in a word, that the constitution of things was then such, as naturally tended, conformably to settled connections, to make this earth a "paradisaic" one, in opposition to that "vanity, toil, and sorrow," ending in "death," the "curse" has since adapted it to be an occasion of to all its inhabit-

ants, in consequence of the lapse of the one man Adam.

I will not affirm, that the "mechanical causes" assigned by this learned theorist for the different state of things "before" and "since" the fall, are those God was pleased, in fact, to co-operate with, in order to their production; but this I will venture to say, that the state of things he has represented, as what might be owing to these "causes," is both intelligible, and credible, upon the strictest philosophical reasoning; and that we have therefrom a just account, how the "curse," the Scripture speaks of, might come upon the earth in consequence of the sin of the first parents of men, and change it from its former state, making it, in the natural course of things, the occasion of that "vanity, toil, and sorrow," we are now subjected to, and so earnestly groan to be delivered from.

And that the "earth" has been really "thus changed," to whatever cause it is attributed, whether the immediate power of God, or his power concurring with second causes, is, as we have seen above, the plain meaning of what Moses has said in his history of the fall. And the supposition of such a "change" in the state of nature, will best account for what we meet with, descriptive of a former "golden-age," in pagan writers, who lived in different parts of the world. See the testimonies produced to this purpose by Mr. Whiston, and Dr. Burnett, in their theories
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of the earth; as also what has been more largely offered upon this head by the author of Cyrus, in his principles of natural and revealed religion. It is not easy to conceive, how the notion of a former "golden-age," so agreeable in the main to the idea we are naturally led, from the Mosaic story, to form of the "paradisaic" state of the earth, should so generally prevail in so many different parts of the world, unless there had been some foundation for it in the truth of fact. In this case, it might have been handed down by tradition from the beginning; and the tradition, upon this point, would perhaps have been more particular and perfect, had it not been for those "conflagrations of books" which have happened, at one time and another, to the great regret of all lovers, especially of ancient learning.

The other part of the "judicial sentence" passed upon the "man" is, "dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." The thing meant, to speak concisely and plainly, is this, that he should "die," as it was "threatened" he should, if he was disobedient to the voice of God.

But the important question is, What are we to understand by this "death?"

To which I would say, there is no warrant, as it appears to me, from any thing Moses has related, to include more in its meaning, than the loss of that life, with the whole enjoyment dependent on it, which he had just received from God, and would not have been deprived of, had

he abstained from eating of the forbidden tree. This, as I apprehend, is the sense in which the word "death" is to be taken in the "original threatening." This is its sense, as explained and illustrated in the "sentence of condemnation."—And this is its sense also, when this sentence is spoken of as "carried into execution." That we may the more readily take in a clear idea of what may be offered upon this interesting matter, let it be observed,

The body of man, though formed by the wisdom of God out of the dust of the ground "into a curiously organised figure, was still, dead, senseless, inactive matter, till it pleased God to inspire it with "life." So the account runs, Gen. ii. 9. "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." Whether we understand, by God's "breathing into man the breath of life," the infusion of what we call the "soul," or "spirit," or whatever else can be supposed to be intended by it, it was this display of divine power that gave him "life," that is, constituted him a being capable of communication with the world he had made in a way of perception and enjoyment. It is accordingly added in the words that immediately follow, ver. 8, 9. "And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden, and there put he the man whom he had formed. And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant to

to the sight, and good for food : the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil." The meaning is, God having made man, in the manner above described, a "living soul," a conscious perceptive creature, capable of enjoyment from the world he had created, took care to make suitable provision therefor. Now, when it is said, in the same continued narrative, that God declared to Adam "he should surely die," if he "eat" of a certain "tree in the garden," mentioned by name, what more naturally and obviously presents itself to the mind, as the thought intended to be conveyed, than this, that he should no longer exist a perceptive being in the world he was placed in, for that he should have taken from him that "breath of life" which made him a "living soul." What other idea could Adam have formed of this threatening? In what other sense could he possibly have understood it? The "death" here spoken of, is evidently the "opposite" to the "life" that had been given *; and means

* Some are pleased to say, as by "life" the Scripture often means "a state of happiness," and by "death," its opposite, a "state of misery;" this may reasonably be looked on as the sense in which the words are here used by Moses. As if it had been said, if thou obeyest, thou shalt be completely and eternally happy; but if thou disobeyest, thou shalt be as completely and eternally miserable. The answer is obvious, whenever the words, "life" and "death," are used to signify a state of happiness and misery, they are thus used in a figurative sense, not

means a deprivation of this life. When God inspired Adam with life, he put into his body, which

according to their natural and literal meaning. And further, the propriety even of this figurative use of the words is essentially grounded on the previous supposition of "life," literally and strictly speaking, without which there could be no perception, and consequently no such thing as either happiness or misery. To apply this to the case before us; if Adam had been obedient, his life, it is acknowledged, would have been continued without end, and consequently his capacity for being happy; for which reason he would, as I suppose, have been so for ever. But, as he disobeyed his creator, he forfeited all right to this continuance of life, which was indeed the grant of God only upon condition of his obedience in the article wherein he was tried. How then could he have lived for ever, without which he could not have suffered misery for ever. Was "life, continued for ever," supposed in the "death" with which he was threatened? Thus it must have been; otherwise, no figure, no metaphor, no mode of diction, could make it signify a state of eternal misery; because, without "life," there would have been no capacity in his nature for the enduring this misery. But how could Adam have imagined, that, by "dying," he should "live for ever," that he might be capable of suffering for ever? In what way should he have been led into so strange a thought?

It will be said, he might have known, that he should have gone on perpetually living as to his "soul," or "spirit," though his body, by being separated from it, would have returned to senseless dust: and if he knew, that he should have perpetually lived as to his soul, what could he think, or expect, but that it would have been a life of perpetual misery? The reply is, How should Adam come by this pretended knowledge? surely, not from any reasoning power he was endowed with. For however indissoluble he might have argued his soul to have been, in opposition to any inherent principles that could naturally have brought on a dissolution, it was absolutely dependent on the will of God, whether it should continue at all a conscious living substance

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which was made of dust, a certain power, or principle, call it what you will, in consequence of

stance after its disunion from the body, or how long or in what way, or in what degree. And I am pretty sure, he could have known the will of God, in this matter, in no way but that of revelation. And where are we told it was revealed to him, that he should have continued to all eternity a living conscious active being? Nothing of this nature is said any where, that I can find, in the sacred books: much less is it any where declared, that he should have lived, as to his "naked soul," suffering torment for ever. And, in truth, had it been the intention of God, that he should, for his one offence, have lived eternally in a suffering state, why was he so plainly and solemnly told, that "he should die?" What conceivable reason could there be for the "threatening of death," upon this supposition? It might rather have been expected, that his "body" should have been made "immortal," that he might have suffered, as an human creature, in that body in which he had sinned. And this way of suffering, it should be particularly remembered, is the only one that falls in with the "opposition" upon which the suffering pleaded for is grounded. The happiness engaged to Adam, upon his obedience, was happiness in a "body animated by the breath of life;" the misery threatened ought therefore to be misery in the "same body actuated by the same breath of life," and not as endured by this breath of life in a "naked separated state." This would be an imperfect "opposition," and an arbitrarily made one too.

It may be worthy of special notice here, the proper "wages of sin" to all wicked men since the lapse, is misery in their "bodies enlivened and actuated by the breath of life." It is accordingly one of the grand revealed truths of God, that they shall all be "raised from death to life," that they may be the capable subjects of this misery. Christ, the appointed judge of men, will not bid the wicked "go away into the fire prepared for the devil and his angels," till he has first established a relation, connection, union, or whatever else any may please to call it, between their "bodies," and an "animating principle of life."

of which he became a conscious perceptive being, capable of acting in the body to the purposes for which he was sent into the world. The continuance of this life is the continuance of this ani-

life." And from hence it follows, that the "death" spoken of in the sacred books as the punishment that shall be inflicted on wicked men, as "the wages of their sin," cannot mean the same thing with that "death" Adam was liable to upon his disobedience; unless it be ridiculously supposed, that the "resurrection" of Adam to life after death, was included in the death with which he was threatened.

Should it be still said, there are some Scripture passages, especially in the New Testament, which speak of good men, on the one hand, as capable of enjoying happiness in their "souls" after death; and of wicked men, on the other, as equally capable of suffering misery; and that this was the truth of the case respecting the first man Adam. I would briefly answer, whatever "life," and capacity therefrom of enjoying good, or suffering evil, there may have been after "death" since the lapse, is wholly owing to that "new plan of God," which is summarily represented in the promise of "the woman's seed to bruise the serpent's head." It is upon this plan, the doctrine of a "resurrection from death to life" is grounded; and it is, as I imagine, upon the same plan, that the animating living principle in man, whatever it is, retains its consciousness and activity after death, if this is really the case, as seems to be the purport of the texts referred to above. And the latter is as easily to be conceived of as the former, and may possibly be well adapted to answer like good and valuable ends in the all-wise righteous government of God. The "soul," whatever it is supposed to be, neither is, nor can be, "immortal" any more than the body, but in subserviency to the sovereign pleasure of God. And his pleasure, upon this head, is nowhere signified but in the Bible, and upon the scheme of government founded in Christ. Separate from this, there is, so far as I am able to judge, no hope after death in respect of what we call the "soul," any more than in regard of the body.

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animating perceptive principle in the body; and its ceasing to be any more this active animating principle in the body, gives the true and proper notion of death. This accordingly is the thing meant by the "death" with which Adam was threatened. It was, that he should lose that principle which animated his body, and made him capable of perception and enjoyment; insomuch, that he should be the same senseless matter he was before God breathed into him the breath of life. It is not easily conceivable how Adam could have thought of death in any other light: neither can we, if, disengaging ourselves from all previous biases, we keep to the single force of the word as used by Moses.

And we shall have confirmed reason to understand the word "death" in this sense, if we turn our attention to the "judicial sentence," which God passed upon Adam in consequence of his lapse. It runs in that strain, Gen. iii. 19. "till thou return to the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." None will deny, that these words bear an evident reference to the before recited account of man's formation, and consequently, when it is here declared, Gen. ii. 19. that "he should return to dust out of which he was taken," we are directly led to conceive of his punishment as consisting in this, namely, "his reduction to unorganised unanimated dust," or, in other words, "his ceasing to be that living creature" God had made him, and becoming as incapable of perception

ception as he was before his organised dust was animated with a principle of life.

The idea we have given of this "death" is farther strengthened from the "execution" of the original sentence upon our first father. The account we have of it is in these words, Gen. v. 5. "all the days that Adam lived were nine hundred and thirty years, and he died;" that is, a period was put to his existence as a perceptive being on the earth, and therein he suffered the punishment which the law had threatened, and his righteous Judge, in consequence of his lapse, had condemned him to. The "death" he is here said to have suffered, is plainly opposed to the "life" he had enjoyed, which was a life here on earth: consequently, there is no reason to think, that any more is meant by this "death" than the "privation of that life he had, for many years, been in possession of."

It may add some weight to what has been above argued, if it be observed yet further, that the "destruction of life here on earth" was the only thing the Jews, for whose instruction the history of the fall was more immediately wrote, could understand by this word "death." For though it is very frequently used by Moses, and as standing to denote a "threatened penalty," yet it never signifies more than "a period to the present life." The texts to this purpose are very numerous. Thus, when Abimelech gave it in charge, saying, Gen. xxvi. 2. "he that toucheth this man,

or his wife, shall surely be put to death ;" the words, in the original, are the same as in the sanction which guarded the law given to Adam in paradise. So in Exod. xxi. 12. 15, 16, 17, where it is ordained, that the persons guilty of the crimes there specified, "shall surely die," the original words are still the same; as also in Levit. xx. 2. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. 15. and in other places, almost beyond number; in all which places, the "death" threatened, is that punishment which was to be inflicted by the civil magistrate, and therefore can mean nothing more than "the loss of life here on earth;" for the power of man is confined within those limits. How then should the Jews understand, by the original threatening, any more than "the destruction of that life which was at present enjoyed?" This is the meaning of the word "death" elsewhere in the writings of Moses; and from hence they must have been led to conclude, when it was told Adam, "he should die," if he eat of the forbidden tree; that the thing meant was, that he should cease to continue "a living creature." And more than this we have no warrant from Moses, or any other of the sacred writers, to include in the primitive threatening, expressed in these words, "thou shalt surely die."

The plain truth is, man is a compound of "organised matter," and an "animating principle of life;" that is, he is constituted of what we call a "body," and a "soul:" between which there is so close and intimate a relation, union, or

connection, that the body is a mere useless machine, only as it is actuated by the soul; neither can the soul, conformably to the present laws of nature, exert itself but by the body as its instrument. This is our frame. Thus we are constituted living agents, beings capable of perception in the world God has placed us in. Now "death" is the destruction—of what? Not of the existence either of soul or body; but of the "relation" there is between them, and their "subservient fitness" to influence each other to the purposes of life; or, in other words, "death" is the destruction of that "mode of existence" with which, in conformity to settled laws, perception and life are connected by the God of nature. And "this destruction" is the thing meant in the law given to Adam, and 'tis the utmost it can reasonably be explained to mean.

The "soul," it is true, or, what I mean hereby, the "animating principle" in man, being, as I suppose, a spiritual immaterial substance, remains "undissolved" after its disunion from the body; but it may still, in virtue of this disunion, be unfitted for those exertions wherein consist the idea, and benefit of life. Some "special mode of existence" may be necessary even for "spirits," at least such spirits as our's are, in order to their being in a state of "actual" life. Perhaps the soul, though it is immaterial and indissoluble, may be so affected in its "manner of existence"

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by death, as to be hereby as truly disqualified as the body, though not in the same way, for the proper functions and operations of life. And had it not been for the "promise through Christ," which took place immediately after the lapse, the soul would have existed in its separate state without "actual" life, as truly as the body, though in a different way. Neither Moses, nor any of the inspired writers, do teach us to think otherwise of the matter.

Thus much, indeed, we are certainly taught, if not by Moses, yet by some of the other sacred penmen, that both "soul" and "body," notwithstanding "death," the penalty of the law put into execution according to its full meaning, are still capable of being again related to each other, and of becoming the "same percipient individuals" they were before the infliction of death. It is upon this "capacity" that the "gospel scheme of redemption" is essentially grounded. It does not set aside the threatened death, in regard of any one thing included in it; but supposes its full execution, conformably to the true meaning of the law, and takes place in consequence thereof. "Death," whatever the Scripture means by it, whether respecting the soul or body, is actually inflicted upon every son and daughter of Adam? nor do any of them partake of that "restoration" which is opposed to this death, till they have really suffered it. And
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this is a strong confirmation of the idea we have given of death, the sanction of the law man was originally under, viz. that it means nothing more than the destruction of that "mode of existence," with which life is connected by the establishment of God. In this view of the matter, it is easy to conceive how those who suffer death, may, by the wisdom and power of God, be brought back again to life. Nothing more is necessary in order to it, but their being restored to their former *mode of existence*, or to one analogous to it; which, perhaps, is the precise idea of the *Scripture-resurrection*.

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DISSERTATION III.

Of the Posterity of the one man Adam, as deriving existence from him, not in his INNOCENT, but LAPSED state.

IT is an undisputed truth, among those who have faith in the Scriptures as a revelation from God, not only that the human race descended from Adam as their first progenitor, but that existence was communicated to them in his LAPSED state; in consequence of which they have all along been, now are, and in all coming generations will be, subjected to a variety of evils, grievous in their nature, and absolutely unavoidable, by the all-wise, righteous, and holy appointment of God.

What these are, we can learn from the Sacred Books only; to which, therefore, we must repair, if we would know, with any degree of certainty, wherein, and in what sense, we are sufferers by means of the offence of the one man, our common father.

The apostle Paul is, of all the sacred writers, the most explicit, and particular, in speaking of

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the ORIGINAL LAPSE, and of its consequences as extending to the whole human kind. No one can read his Epistles, and not at once perceive, that, in his view, the gospel scheme of mercy stands in close connection with the unhappy state mankind universally are brought into, by means of the lapse of our first progenitor. No intelligible meaning can be put upon the following passages in his Epistle to the Corinthians and the Romans, upon any other supposition: "Since by man came death, by man also came the resurrection from the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. By one man, sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death hath passed upon all men, for that all men have sinned. As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to the justification of life."

The commentators, and other writers, I have had opportunity to consult, have evidently taken either too much, or too little, into his meaning, in what he has said with reference to our participation in Adam's lapse; and by this means, they have all, in their turns, as it appears to me, made him speak, either absurdly, or, at best, less clearly and pertinently, than they might otherwise have done.

Those who interpret him, when he says, that, "by the disobedience of one," the one man Adam, "many were made sinners," as designing

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to suggest, that his **FAULT** was made theirs, or that they really **SINNED** when he eat of the forbidden tree, do, without all doubt, apply a sense to his words that is grossly absurd; may I not say, impossible to be true? For sin, which is a moral irregularity, stands in necessary connection with the agent who commits it, and must therefore, in the nature of things, be **PERSONAL**. One man may be a **SUFFERER**, in consequence of the sin of another; but one man cannot be **GUILTY** of another man's sin. Sin, as it essentially supposes *moral agency*, is, at all times, and in all worlds, confined to the agent that omits some action he should have done, or does one he should not have done; and cannot be transferred, any more than moral agency itself. There can be no reasonable room, one would think, for dispute upon this head, where common sense is allowed its proper exercise. Nay, even in the case of a **LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE**, who acts in the behalf of others, the act of the representative, morally considered, is **PERSONAL**. The consequences of it only, whether good or bad, extend to those he represents. So that, should it be even allowed, that Adam was the **CONSTITUTED REPRESENTATIVE** of his posterity, it would not follow herefrom, that they were *guilty* of his sin; but only that they might be *sufferers* in consequence of it.

Those also who represent the apostle Paul to have taught, that mankind come into existence **MORALLY CORRUPT** creatures, as having derived

from their first father a positively **SINFUL NATURE**, are equally mistaken in the sense they put upon his words. For Adam was no more than the medium, or instrument, by or through whom God communicated to men the nature they have, simply as it comes from him; for which reason, it should seem an impossibility, that it should be **SINFUL**, because it is precisely, as derived to them, *that nature*, which God, through Adam, conveyed to them, without the intervention of any agency of their own.

It is true, they may come into being with animal tendencies, which may prove the occasion of their sinning themselves; yea, they may have these tendencies in such a degree, as that the danger may be great, exceeding great, lest they should hereby be enticed, and drawn aside; nay, further, these animal tendencies may be converted into **SINFUL PRINCIPLES** of action, as indeed, God knows, they too often are in fact. But as they exist in our constitution, upon our first entrance into the world, it cannot be thought they should be **MORALLY CORRUPT**, because they are such, and only such, as the great Creator was pleased to give us, previous to any agency of our own.

On the other hand, those who speak of mankind as subjected indeed to *mortality*, by means of Adam's lapse, but still deriving from him the *like perfection of nature* which he had while innocent, *alike fitting* them for a life of conformity to the law of God; I say, those who exhibit such an account of
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the constitution of human nature since the lapse, do as evidently put a wrong sense on the apostle Paul's writings; losing sight of that grace which he designs to exalt, at least, in one of its eminent branches, and putting it out of their power to give that force to his reasoning, in many places, which it justly carries with it.

Two things, with respect to the state of mankind, since the lapse of the one man Adam, and in consequence of it, appear very obvious to an attentive unprejudiced mind, upon reading the New Testament books, especially the Epistles of St. Paul. One relates to their subjection universally to a *life of vanity and sorrow, ending in death*. The others, to such *imperfection of nature* as renders it impossible, upon *the foot of mere law*, that they should attain to a righteousness that could avail to their justification before God. The eight first chapters of the Epistle to the Romans are essentially grounded on this representation of the state of Adam's posterity since the lapse. The thread of reasoning is not only perplexed, but its strength destroyed, upon any other supposition; it being the main design of the Apostle to shew, that the grace of God, through Jesus Christ, is as truly intended for the help of our nature brought into a disadvantageous state in consequence of the lapse, as to effect our deliverance from the vanity and mortality to which we have been subjected. And it is this thought, and this only, that will give connection to his discourse, and force to the

arguments he has largely insisted on; as we may afterwards have occasion to make abundantly evident.

In order therefore to our entertaining a just idea of the true state of mankind since the lapse, we shall be distinct in considering both the *mortality*, and *imperfection* of nature, to which we are universally subjected: endeavouring, at the same time, to give such an account of each as may fit easy on the mind, and silence the objections that would represent either of them as unreasonable and absurd, dishonourary to God, or unjust to man.

Only before I proceed, I would interpose an important thought, which it would be highly expedient we should heedfully attend to, through the whole of what may follow. It is this: the MOMENT Adam eat of the forbidden tree, he became liable to the threatened death, and had it not been for the display of *grace*, he would IMMEDIATELY have been deprived of life; in which case he could not have had posterity. And can it be imagined, that *grace* would have suspended the operation of the threatening, and continued him in life so as to have posterity, unless it had been the intention of God, that they should be dealt with, as he himself was, in a way, not of rigorous justice, but of gracious mercy. It ought not to be supposed; nor will the supposition at all consist with the express declarations of Scripture upon the point. It is observable, the sentence of condemnation

demnation occasioned by the lapse, is spoken of as POSTERIOR to the promise of a SAVIOUR. God first declared, that "the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head;" and after this pronounced the sentence, "dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." This promise, without all doubt, was intended as a remedy against the disadvantages which Adam had brought upon himself, and consequently upon his posterity, by means of his "one offence;" and, in virtue of it, they were all placed under a *dispensation of grace*; that is, put into such a state, as that, through "the seed of the woman," it became possible for them to be as happy as Adam would have been, had he continued in innocency; which could not have been the case, but by a new establishment upon the foot of grace. The apostle Paul certainly viewed the matter in this light. Hence, in the 8th chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, ver. 20, he declares, that "the creature [by which phrase he most certainly includes mankind] was made subject to vanity [*ἐν ἐλπίδι*] IN HOPE." Of what? It follows in the next verse, "that [so the particle *οτι* should have been rendered here, as it is in hundreds of places elsewhere] the creature itself; also [*καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις*, the self-same creature that had been subjected to vanity] shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God; which could not be, it would have been impossible, but upon a new plan of grace. He very obviously leads us

into the same way of thinking upon the matter, in his 5th chapter, 18th verse, where he says, "as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to the justification of life." And again, ver. 19. "as by one man's disobedience, many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one, many shall be made righteous." These texts, in their proper place, will be largely considered and explained. It may, at present, without saying any thing upon them, be left with those, to assign any intelligible meaning to them, who suppose, that the posterity of Adam will be dealt with in a way of rigorous justice, and not upon the gospel-scheme of grace.

The plain truth is, the whole human race, in consequence of a divine constitution, occasioned by the obedience of the one man Jesus Christ, are as certainly under the advantage of a deliverance from death, as they were subjected to it in consequence of a counter-constitution, occasioned by the offence of the one man Adam. Deliverance from the power of the grave, is **ABSOLUTELY** and **UNCONDITIONALLY** the grant of grace to mankind without distinction, or exception. It is no more connected with their own agency, than was the doom to suffer death; but, be their nation, condition, or moral character what it may, they shall as surely "come forth from their graves," as they went down into them. There can be no room for dispute here, if it is a revealed truth, that there

there shall be a UNIVERSAL resurrection from the dead. And let it be added here, the Scripture is as exprefs and peremptory in affirming, that it is “in Christ that all are made alive, as that it is in Adam all die.” It must therefore be ascribed to grace, dispensed through the one man Jesus Christ, that the human kind will be delivered from death: It would otherwise have everlastingly reigned over them. For, being once dead, they must have been for ever dead, if grace had not interposed to restore them to life.

And as the posterity of Adam came into being under an absolute declaration from the omnipotent God, that they shall be raised from death to life; so it is made certain to them, that this life, upon a new establishment of heaven, MAY be a gloriously happy one. We are accordingly assured, by the inspired Paul, the advantage by Christ has exceeded, reached beyond, the damage by Adam, particularly in this respect, that whereas “the judgment was by *one offence* to condemnation, the free gift is of *many offences* unto justification;” the undoubted meaning of which, at least in part, is, that mankind may, in consequence of the advantage they are placed under by means of Christ, obtain the gift of pardoning mercy, notwithstanding their personal sins, however MANY they may have been. And that they might be prepared, not only for the bestowment of this gift, but the enjoyment of an eternal reign in happy life after death, provision has been made, through the promised

mised "seed of the woman," for the destruction of the prevalence of sin in them, and the implantation of that "incorruptible seed," which shall spring up in all those fruits of righteousness which are to the praise of the glory of God. This was the great thing designed in the original promise, putting the race of men universally under a new state of trial for an eternal happy life after death; and this also was the aim of God in the various dispensations, at various times, he saw fit to put any of the sons of men under. And this, in special, was the grand view of God in the dispensation erected since the coming of Christ, and commonly called, by way of eminence, the Gospel-dispensation. In this administration of the law of grace, with Jesus Christ at its head, we are assured, that "God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance;" that "who-soever will, may come, and partake freely of the water of life;" and that if any do not "come to Christ that they may have life," a life of complete happiness in heaven, it is because they "will not:" for which reason the fault will be their own, and not chargeable on Adam, or any else, if they miss of salvation, and suffer the second death. But I may not enlarge any farther here. To return:

I. The first thing proposed to be considered was, the subjection of mankind universally to DEATH, through the lapse of our first father Adam

Adam. There is no room for dispute as to the fact itself, the subjection of the whole human race to the stroke of death: nor will it be disputed by those who pay regard to the books of sacred Scripture, that this subjection to death is owing to a divine constitution, occasioned by the lapse of the one man Adam. This is an essential article in the apostle Paul's argument, in Rom. v. from the 12th to the 20th verse; and again in chap. viii. from the 23d to the 29th verse. And yet again in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. xv. the 26th and 27th verses.

But what are we to understand by this DEATH? and how do Adam's *posterity*, through his lapse, become *universally* subjected to it? These are the only proper questions here, and they are too important not to be particularly and distinctly answered.

In answer to the first of these questions, some have said, that the evil meant by the death to which Adam was doomed, and which consequently comes upon his posterity, is not only the reduction of that admirably contrived machine, the body, to its primitive dust, but the entire destruction of its animating principle, called, by Moses, "the breath of life." This was the sentiment of the great Mr. Locke; and it has been adopted by many others, in their writings upon this subject. But the Scripture, as it appears to me, contains nothing in it that gives
countenance

countenance to such an idea of the originally threatened death. Far from this, one of the essential strokes in the scheme of redemption it reveals, seems wholly irreconcilable herewith. What I mean is, that the production of beings, after annihilation, is a quite different thing from that RESURRECTION which is the grand object of the "hope set before us" in the "gospel of the blessed God." For, as an excellent writer reasons, when a being has once ceased to exist, it can never exist more the SAME individual thinking being. A new one may be produced exactly like the former; but it will not be the SAME with that which had an end put to its existence. After there hath been a gap, a separating space, nothing can possibly unite the being existing before, and that which exists after, into one. And this alone, to those who believe a resurrection, may be instead of a thousand arguments to prove, that the animating principle in man does not, by death, totally cease to be. For in this case, instead of a RESURRECTION, there would be the production of a new conscious principle, which would constitute a DIFFERENT individual agent, having no interest in the good or bad conduct of that which existed before; though, perhaps, it might resemble it as nearly as one being can another. It is true, that MODE of existence is destroyed by death, which would have put a period to all possibility of perception, or exertion

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in any shape for ever, had it not been for the interposition of grace, through Christ. This has laid a new foundation for perception and enjoyment after death, if not before, in consequence of a RESURRECTION; by which the Scripture means the putting together again the bodily machine, and animating it with that conscious principle, which had not been turned out of existence, but remained in such a state as to be capable of constituting the SAME individual person it was before the coming on of death.

Others are pleased to affirm, and with great positiveness, that the TORMENTS OF HELL-FIRE FOR EVER are included in the death threatened against Adam's "one offence," and that all his posterity, on account of this one act of disobedience, are exposed to, and may justly have inflicted upon them, these torments. But it is, in true reason, an incredible thing, that the children of the first man, throughout all generations, should, because he committed an act of sin, be subjected to NEVER-CEASING MISERY. Can it be supposed, in consistency with that common faculty by which mankind are enabled to distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, that the infinitely just and good God should send millions that die before they come to a capacity of moral agency, as is the case of all infants, the moment they leave this world, to the place of "weeping, and wailing, and gnashing of teeth for ever," and for no other fault than

than that their first father, thousands of years before they had existence, "eat of a tree," concerning which God had said, "thou shalt not eat of it?" The thought only of such a procedure in God, is shocking to the human mind! It contradicts all the natural notions we have both of justice and benevolence. It is indeed a most injurious reflection on the "Father of Mercies," unfit to be believed, and impossible to be true. Nor is there any thing in the writings, either of the apostle Paul, or of the other penmen of the sacred books, that lead to such a strange thought; though they have all said enough to convince all that need to be convinced, that it is no where contained in the Bible.

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It is eminently worthy of our remark here, that the apostle Paul, in the 5th chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, the 12th verse, expressly assures us, that THAT DEATH, be it what it may, which entered into the world through the lapse of the 'one man Adam, HAS PASSED UPON ALL MEN. What he means is, not merely, or only, that all men are liable to this death, but that it really, and in fact, comes upon them. That which certainly shall be, he here speaks of, as though it actually had been. If now, ETERNAL MISERY, in a future state, is one thing included in the DEATH with which the original law was guarded, THIS MISERY must, in event, and fact, be suffered by ALL Adam's posterity, as well as himself; for the DEATH, with which his lapse was

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was threatened, if we may believe the apostle Paul, HATH PASSED UPON ALL MEN; that is, they all, in EVENT and FACT, do really suffer it. But it would directly contradict the whole Scripture-account of REDEMPTION to say, that all men are, or shall be, eternally miserable in the other world. The exact truth is, the redemption by Jesus Christ does not supersede the execution of the original threatening, but is grafted on it, and takes rise from it. The posterity of Adam ALL DIE in consequence of his lapse, according to the true meaning of the death threatened: but if this death included in it ETERNAL MISERY, it would be impossible they should both suffer it, and be redeemed from it.

It is further observable, "the fire prepared for the devil and his angels," or, what means the same thing, the punishment the wicked shall FINALLY suffer, is never spoken of, in the Bible, as inflicted upon any, till mankind UNIVERSALLY have been delivered from THAT DEATH which has passed upon them, in consequence of the one lapse of the one man Adam. Hence we always read of the FINAL MISERY as POSTERIOR to the general judgment, which will not commence till after the GENERAL RESURRECTION. Now, if none of the sons or daughters of Adam will be condemned to FINAL MISERY, till after they have been delivered from the DEATH which comes upon them in consequence of his lapse, it is impossible THIS MISERY should be included in THIS

DEATH;

DEATH: especially if it be considered, that this misery will not be inflicted upon men INDISCRIMINATELY, and UNIVERSALLY, as is the case with respect to the death that comes through Adam's lapse. This "passes upon all," without distinction, or discrimination: whereas, final misery will be suffered by those only who have PERSONALLY sinned. It is accordingly observable, in all the accounts we have of the process of the general judgment, mankind are condemned *separately* and *individually*; and this, not for the *lapse by Adam*, but for their own *personal* sins. It will then be "rendered to men according to the deeds done in the body;" and their condemnation will be lighter, or heavier, in proportion to the number, and aggravating circumstances, of the sins they have committed in their own persons.

Having thus said what is not the meaning of the DEATH we are all subjected to, through the lapse of the one man Adam, it will be more easy to ascertain its true and proper sense. We cannot indeed well mistake its just and full import, if, instead of giving scope to imagination, we closely confine ourselves to what the Bible says upon the matter. For it is at once obvious, that the term, DEATH, when used with reference to the posterity of Adam, considered simply as such, cannot contain more in its meaning, than is included in it when used with reference to Adam himself. Now, the word, DEATH, as has been

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been already proved at large, not only in the threatening denounced against Adam in case of disobedience, but in the judicial sentence after his lapse, means the destruction of that *mode of existence* upon which *life* was dependent; or, in other words, the capacity for perception and enjoyment.

Only it should be particularly remembered here, the holy God, instead of turning Adam INSTANTLY out of life, as he had a right to do, in virtue of the threatening, upon his one act of disobedience, he only turned him out of paradise, subjecting him, in the room of that happy life he might have enjoyed, had he not sinned, to a life of toil, labour, and sorrow, that would gradually, but certainly, terminate in death. The sentence of condemnation, recorded Gen. iii. 17, 18, 19, is clearly and fully expressive of this. The words run thus: "And unto Adam he said, because thou hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, thou shalt not eat of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake. In sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life. Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat of the herb of the field. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return to the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return."

It is abundantly evident, from this condemnatory sentence of God, not only that it was for *Adam's* sin that the earth was cursed; but that it was

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curfed (as has been largely illustrated) upon this fpecial defign, namely, that he might thereby be fubjected to a life of labour and forrow, till he fhould return to his original duft.

This now leads us into a clear and juft idea of the real circumftances of his pofterity in confequence of his lapfe. We come into exiftence, and live on this earth, not as it was in its priftine ftate, but as it now lies under the *curfe of God*; that is, adapted to render life, as long as it lafts, a fcene of labour, vanity, and forrow. It is both feen and felt, by unhappy experience, that the world we inhabit is fuch, in its prefent ftate, as that it is impoffible for any fon or daughter of Adam to poffefs life in it, but in fuffering circumftances in a lefs or greater degree. As the Scripture fpeaks, “man that is born of a woman is of few days, and full of trouble.” And again, “he is born to trouble as the farks fly upwards.” And fuch, in truth, are the inconveniencies and trials, fuch the labours and forrors we are all fubjected to, by the very conftitution of the earth we live upon, fo various in their kind and unavoidable in their nature, that the prefent ftate of exiftence may be confidered as a fcene of *vanity, fuffering, and death*; and the longer we, any of us, continue in it, the more thoroughly we are convinced, that this is a real representation of the cafe. Some, perhaps, fuffer more evil than they enjoy good; and if any enjoy more good than they fuffer evil, it is but in a
fmal

small degree. The same earth that is fitted to give us pleasure, is fitted also to give us pain; and every convenience is so attended with some opposite inconvenience, that it is hard to say, in many cases, on which side the balance turns. At the best, our condition here is so chequered with interchangeable good and evil, that we may all take to ourselves words, and say, with accurate truth, "vanity of vanities, all is vanity, and vexation of spirit."

This was not the state in which God created the *first* of our race. The Scripture, instead of suggesting that it was, is particular and express in declaring, that it was owing to the disobedience of the *one man Adam*, in the special article wherein he was tried, and the curse of God thereby brought on the earth, that *death entered into the world*, with its forerunners and appendages, in all their tormenting forms, and has reigned ever since, and even over those, who never "sinned after the similitude of his transgression;" which naturally leads to the other proposed question,

How, or in what sense, does the lapse of Adam subject his posterity to these disadvantages, signified by death? The answer whereto is plainly this:

Adam, having "eat of the forbidden tree," was, by the judicial sentence of God, doomed to a life of *vanity and sorrow, ending in death*; which judicial sentence CONSEQUENTIALLY extends to,

and affects, all his posterity throughout all generations. The apostle Paul is particularly express upon this point. Hence those words of his, Rom. viii. 20. "the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who subjected the same."—It is directly affirmed, in this text, that "the creature," by which word must be meant, at least in part, the creature MAN*, was "subjected to vanity; and not only so, but that it was brought into this subjection by the WILL, or CONSTITUTION, of GOD. For this is evidently the import of the words, [δια του υποταξαντα] "by him who subjected the same." Dr. Doddridge indeed supposes *Adam* to have been the *him*, by whom mankind became "subjected to vanity." Mr. Locke says, it was the devil. But neither of these writers, however high an opinion we may have of them, appear to have hit upon the true substantive here understood. It is readily owned, both the devil and Adam had a hand in introducing this subjection: Adam, by his one act of disobedience;

* If the words in this passage of Scripture, *η κτίσις*, and *πασα κτίσις*, are extended in their meaning, as some are pleased to extend them, so as to take in the *inanimate* part of the creation, the *rational* or *moral* part ought not to be left out; as the judicial sentence, "subjecting the creature to vanity," particularly affected the *rational* part of the creation, or mankind. And it respected the creation, as to its *inanimate* part, no otherwise than as a *mean* to carry the judicial sentence, as it would affect mankind, the more fully into execution. The *rational* creature ought therefore to be more especially considered as the creature here spoken of as "subjected to vanity."

and the devil, by tempting him to it. But though the devil's temptation was the occasion of Adam's disobedience, and Adam's disobedience was what gave occasion to this subjection; yet the *will of God*, published in the judicial sentence, taking rise from this disobedience, was *that*, and that only, which fastened it on mankind. This will, or constitution, of God, therefore, taking rise from Adam's lapse, must be the thing intended by the apostle. Nor will there be any room for doubt upon the matter, if we compare what he here says, with his more clear and positive declarations upon the same point in the 5th chapter. His words are, ver. 16. "the judgment was by one to condemnation." And again, ver. 18. "by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation." The meaning of which texts is, that mankind universally are subjected to mortality, with the appendages and attendants on it, by the judicial sentence of God, occasioned by the "one offence" of the "one man" Adam, their common father. No sense that does not include this, can be put upon these Scripture-passages. This I esteem a point beyond all reasonable dispute.

Another question therefore arises here, namely, how comes it to pass, that the posterity of Adam are included in the judicial sentence of God, which, by reason of his lapse, condemned him to a state of suffering and death?

This question has often been resolved by saying, that, in virtue of a constituted relation between Adam and his posterity, they *SINNED* when he committed the "one act" of disobedience, and that, for this reason they were involved, in common with him, in all the evils consequent upon the first transgression. But this, without the least hesitation, may be pronounced the invention of man, and not a truth contained in the word of God. There is no hint given in the Mosaic history of the fall, of Adam's being so constituted the head of his posterity, as that they *SINNED* when he eat of the forbidden tree. The whole Old Testament is silent also upon this matter; and a few phrases only in the New Testament are repaired to, as containing this sentiment. The principal ones are to be met with in the 5th chapter of Paul's epistle to the Romans, in the 12th verse, where it is said, "death hath passed upon all men, for that all have sinned;" and in the 19th verse, in which his words are, "by one man's disobedience many were made sinners." But it is one of the grossest mistakes to suppose, that the apostle intended to convey this idea, that Adam's posterity *sinned* when he sinned, and that, for this reason, they are subjected to death. Such a construction of his words appears, at first sight, to a mind not previously blinded with prejudice, to be as truly absurd as to say, that the sacramental bread and wine, by the priest's consecration of them, are converted into the real body and blood of

of Christ; or that God, who is a pure spirit, has eyes and ears, hands and feet. The sin of one man cannot be the sin of another, unless he has been in some way or other necessary to it. The thought involves in it a palpable inconsistency with the nature of things. *Moral irregularity* and *moral agency*, are inseparably connected with each other. Were the posterity of Adam, thousands of years before they had a being, moral agents? Could they, while as yet in possible existence only, have been, in any shape or view, accomplices in the sin of their first progenitor? Are they not as distinct beings from him as they are from one another? And can one being be a sinner, because another that is distinct and different from him is so: A greater moral contradiction can scarce be conceived of. Besides, nothing is more absurd than to suppose, those should be chargeable with sin, wherein they never were, or could be, conscious of the least guilt. Were any of the sons or daughters of Adam ever conscious of its being a fault of theirs, that their first father eat of the forbidden tree? They may have been affected with grief, while they have employed their thoughts on this sin of his: but did they ever blame themselves for it? Did God's vicegerent in their breasts ever accuse and upbraid them for THEIR disobedience, in the one act of Adam's disobedience? I dare be bold to say, this was never the case, with respect to any one of the first man's descendants, unless through the influence of a

deceived imagination. We are indeed so made, by the God of nature, that we cannot be conscious of any fault, unless we have PERSONALLY done that which is wrong. And this is an invincible proof, that God doth not look upon Adam's posterity as having *sinned*, when he committed the one offence, which has brought death into the world. Surely, he will not account men *sinners* for that, in relation to which they cannot charge themselves with being sinners, and it is impossible they should, while they pay regard to their proper make, as intelligent and moral agents. I shall further say here, such an interpretation of the apostle's words as has been opposed would make him speak inconsistently with himself. For, in the 8th chapter of this epistle, where he is upon the same subject, he directly affirms, that "the creature," the rational creature, man, "was made subject to vanity, not willingly," οὐχ ἐκούσα, not by any wilful act of its own*: nay, in the very paragraph itself in which these phrases are found,

* Says a critical expositor *in loc.* and, as I judge, with great pertinency and truth, ἐκούσα seems here to have the same signification as ἐκούσιως, *wilfully*, Heb. x. 26; or as θελοντας, 2 Pet. iii. 5. "this they are wilfully ignorant of. What we render, "lie not in wait," (Exod. xxi. 13.) the Seventy render, οὐχ ἐκω, "not wilfully, in opposition to "presumptuously," in the next verse. Thus ἐκούσα denotes a *criminal choice*, and in an high hand too; [carefully observe, how ἐκούσιως stands, Heb. x. 26.] namely, a transgression subjecting to wrath. "The creature was made subject to vanity," not by its own *criminal choice*, not by "sinning after the similitude of Adam's transgression," Rom. v. 14.

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the apostle would grossly contradict himself, and counteract his own reasoning, if he meant, that we had "sinned by Adam's sinning;" and that it was for this reason, upon this account, that we were brought under subjection to sorrow and death. For he has very clearly and strongly declared, over and over again, that we were subjected to death, not for any sin of OUR OWN, but through the sentence of God, occasioned by the lapse, sin, or offence of our common progenitor, "the one man Adam." Hence those decisive affirmations, "through the offence of ONE, the many [*οἱ πολλοί*] are dead," ver. 15; "the judgment was by ONE to condemnation," ver. 16; "death reigned by ONE," ver. 17; "by the offence of ONE, judgment came upon all men to condemnation," ver. 18. The true meaning of which text is obviously and certainly this, that mankind were subjected to a suffering mortal state, not for any sin they had THEMSELVES committed; but SOLELY through the constitution of God, occasioned by the lapse, offence, or disobedience, of "the ONE MAN Adam." This matter is made, if possible, yet more indubitable in the parallel the apostle has run, in verses 15, 16, and 17, between "Adam," and "Christ," in which he considers "the offence of Adam," on the one hand, as the true source, through the constitution of God, of that "DEATH which passes upon all men;" and the "obedience of Christ," on the other hand, as the proper ground, through a like divine constitution, of "the gift unto justification

fication of life." So that "the offence of Adam," and not any sin of *ours*, is as truly the occasion of our subjection to death, as the "obedience of Christ," and not "our own personal obedience," is the reason or ground of our being admitted to the benefit of justification. Accordingly, when the apostle says, that "death hath passed upon all men, for that all have sinned;" and that, "by the disobedience of one, many are made sinners: I say, when the apostle declares thus, he ought not, most certainly, to be understood in a sense that will make us SINNERS by Adam's sinning, and ground our subjection to death on our OWN SIN instead of HIS; for this would introduce a downright contradiction between the sense of these phrases, and those passages, in the same paragraph, which affirm, that "death reigned by ONE;" that we were "dead by the offence of ONE;" and that the "judgment to condemnation was by the disobedience of ONE*." The real

* In what has been above offered, it will readily be perceived, that I have not endeavoured to ascertain the true real meaning of the apostle Paul in those phrases, "for that all have sinned," and "by the disobedience of one, many were made sinners." This was purposely erased, lest it should have been, in the present course of reasoning, too long, and too dry an interruption for common readers. What I have to say upon this head, I have reserved for a supplement, in which I shall closely and critically examine these phrases, and the passages in which they are found. To this part of the work, the more inquisitive reader is referred; where, it may be, he will meet with that which will positively let him into the just import of the phrases that have been mentioned.

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truth, upon the whole, is, that Adam's being the constituted head of his posterity, in a sense that would infer, that they SINNED when he "eat of the forbidden tree," and are chargeable with transgression in this instance wherein he transgressed, is not only an absurdity in reason, but a thing quite remote from the apostle's thought, and indeed absolutely inconsistent with the whole scope of his argument in this portion of Scripture. We may therefore be sure, the posterity of Adam are not subjected to sufferings and death, in consequence of the original lapse, because they sinned when Adam sinned; no constitution, in consistency with the make of men, as individual moral agents, could put this within the reach of possibility.

But, if the posterity of Adam are not subjected to a state of suffering and death, as having *sinned when he sinned*, the question still recurs, from whence does this proceed? How comes it to pass, that the judicial sentence, which was passed upon him, takes place upon them also? The answer whereto is plainly this:

As Adam was the NATURAL HEAD, root, or stock, from whence the human species were to come into being, their subjection to suffering and death became unavoidable, upon the judicial act of God, which condemned him thereto. For as is the stock, so must the branches be; and as is the fountain, so must the waters be that flow from it. I shall not think it needless, or impertinent,

to dilate a little in explaining myself upon this point; as it enters so essentially into the subject we are upon, and the apostle Paul's account of the lapse, in the 5th chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. Let it then be observed,

Though it pleased God, without the intervention of second causes, to give being to the first man Adam; yet it was with an intention, that he should be the *head, root, or stock*, from whence, in a mediate successive way, conformably to laws established by his wisdom, the whole human race should be brought into existence. This being the plan, according to which mankind were to have their beings in the world, the condition, or circumstances, under which they were to receive them, was unavoidably dependant on the condition, or circumstances, of him who was their original father. Had he, by his integrity, in his day of trial, secured that favour of his Maker, which put him in possession of paradise, and gave him access to the "tree of life," designed to render him immortal*, he would have transmit-

* It ought to be particularly remembered here, Adam, in his innocent state, was naturally a MORTAL creature. He was made of "the dust," and, according to the course of nature, would have "returned to dust," had it not been for "the tree of life," which, by virtue communicated to it from God, or by its being a divinely instituted symbol of the perpetual continuance of life, would have made it certain, that that which was mortal should, by the interposition of grace, be made immortal. So that the judicial sentence, dooming Adam to death, was really nothing more than the withdrawal of that free favour, to which

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ted existence to his descendants under these advantages: whereas, on the other hand, having, by his disobedience, in the article wherein he was tried, exposed himself to an exclusion from paradise, and a right to "take of the tree of life;" and not only so, but to a judicial sentence from the supreme lawgiver and judge, "cursing the earth for his sake," that is, that he might be in a state of labour and sorrow, till he should "return to the dust" out of which he was taken; I say, it now became impossible, consistently with

it was entirely owing, that he might have enjoyed immortality, without passing through death. The descendants from Adam come into being, as he did, naturally mortal, corruptible creatures: only with this difference, the favour of God, which, if Adam had not been disobedient, would have continued him in life for ever, without the intervention of death, is not granted to his posterity. And what obligation can it be supposed God could be under to prevent that death, which, according to the course of nature, would take place in consequence of those corruptible materials of which we are formed? It was most certainly a matter of choice, under the direction of wisdom, whether he would, or would not, interpose by his grace to hinder that, which must otherwise come into effect. And, as he had seen fit to counteract, by a display of favour, the natural operation of established laws, who shall charge him with having done wrong? It would be an ungenerous return to the good God, if I did not add here, that the posterity of Adam may, upon the foot of a new plan of grace through Christ, be as sure of a happy immortality, if they are obedient since the lapse, as they would have been, if Adam had continued in innocence; only with this difference, they might, in that case, have enjoyed perpetual life, without death; whereas they must now pass through death before the mortal can put on immortality.

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the established method in which his posterity were to come into existence, but that it should be transmitted to them under the disadvantageous circumstances of sorrow and mortality, to which their first father had himself been subjected. The condemnatory sentence, pronounced against Adam for his "one offence," could not but extend CONSEQUENTIALLY to them, and affect them, as they were to proceed out of his loins, according to established laws. God must have altered the established method of their coming into existence, or their sharing with their common father in the disadvantages under which he possessed life, by reason of his lapse, must have been unavoidable in the nature of things.

This I take to be the true answer to the above question; and, indeed, to all the objections which have been made to our being in a suffering state, through the offence of the one man Adam. And I cannot but esteem it entirely satisfactory; and the rather, because our frail mortal condition, in consequence of the sin of our first progenitor, is, in this view of it, perfectly analogous to what still happens every day, in consequence of established laws in general, and the law of propagation in particular.

It is the real truth of fact, not only that mankind are made, and preserved, by the intervention of second causes, in an established course; but that this is the occasion of numberless infelicities,

cities, which they daily groan under, but cannot prevent. There is not a person in all the world, but has suffered more or less, in one kind or another, in consequence of those established connections which constitute what we call, the course of nature. This is particularly the case of children with respect to their more immediate progenitors. They not only derive from them that mortality, with its attendants, which is common to all men; but various SPECIAL DISADVANTAGES, by means whereof life is rendered far less desirable than it would otherwise have been. Thousands and ten thousands of children have had transmitted to them, in consequence even of the vices of those they descended from, constitutional disorders, which have been the occasion, not only of tormenting sensations while they lived, but of bringing on death before they had continued on the earth one half the general period of human life. Nay, it has often happened, that children have been sufferers, and to a great degree too, even in consequence of *judicial sentences* both from God and man, taking rise from the misdoings of their parents. The connection, indeed, between parents and children is such, that parents cannot be *judicially* punished, either by God or man, but children will, in some shape or other, be sufferers with them. And, in many cases, a *condemnatory sentence*, taking place upon parents, cannot but CONSEQUENTIALLY

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QUENTIALLY extend to their children, depriving them of such advantages in life, as will subject them to a state of comparative misery.

And, perhaps, there is no way in which we can so well account for this, as by recurring to established laws, in consequence of which it becomes unavoidable, that children should be liable to sufferings, through even the default of their parents. And the subjection of mankind in general to a suffering mortal state, in consequence of the lapse of Adam, and his condemnation therefor, is, in this way, as easily and fully reconcilable with the justice and benevolence of God, as the sufferings of particular children, in consequence of the folly of their more immediate progenitors. They both arise from the same cause, and evidently bear an analogy to each other.

II. The other thing mankind universally are subjected to, since the lapse, and in consequence of it, is a STATE OF NATURE LESS PERFECT, than it might otherwise have been, rendering it morally impossible that they should, upon the foot of STRICT RIGOROUS LAW, attain to the justification of life.

This *state of nature* is considered by many under the notion of a MORAL TAIN^T; an infection, corruption, or depravity, that is SINFUL, or WICKED. But this, without all doubt, is an impos-

impossibility in the moral world. Nothing transmitted to us from Adam, or any of our more immediate parents, can, simply in this view, make us *sinful*, or, what means the same thing, *morally* faulty. It may be our unhappiness to come into existence with a nature *less perfect* than it might have been; but it cannot be, that we should be blameworthy on this account. We are incapable subjects of blame, till we become *moral agents*: nor can we then deserve blame, only as we are chargeable with voluntary neglect in improving, or restraining, or governing the nature that has been communicated to us. This is so evident, upon the bare proposal, that no medium of proof can make it more so. It is indeed a truth intuitively appearing to be so to all, who have not, in one way or another, become "vain in their imaginations," having "darkened their hearts." Without our own agency, how should it be possible we should be blameworthy? And are we at all concerned, as agents, in our own formation? Do not we come into being absolutely independent on ourselves? What more grossly absurd, therefore, than to think, or suppose, that Adam, because he had sinned, should transmit to his posterity a nature that is sinful; or such as that it may be charged with *MORAL* faultiness, as it exists *SIMPLY* in the state in which it was transmitted?

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Perhaps, Christian divines have spoken upon no subject with greater inaccuracy, not to say inconsistently with the truth, than upon the article we are now considering. It has been too generally their doctrine, that the posterity of Adam, as they come into existence, are, in consequence of his lapse, MORALLY DEPRAVED in all their powers. Hence the frequent mention that is made, in their writings, of a *moral* blindness of mind, perverseness of will, hardness of heart, stupidity of conscience, irregularity of passions and affections, which mankind universally are born with; and as their *fault* too, and what they are *blameable* for, so as on this account to be liable to the eternal wrath of Almighty God. But no such doctrine as this can be the truth of *revelation*, because inconsistent with the real, known, certain state of human nature, in its simple form, as transmitted from Adam. Neither our understandings, or wills, or hearts, or consciences, or affections, are any more *at first* than *implanted powers*, absolutely incapable, at present, of *moral* exertion; though capable of opening and expanding, and becoming, in time, fitted therefor. How, in this view of the matter, should we be accountable for those powers, upon our first coming into existence, or chargeable with any fault for their being what they are? For they are now such, and only such, as the Author of our being, absolutely without

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without any *choice* or *doing* of ours, was pleased, according to a course of nature his own wisdom established, to communicate to us. It is no more our fault, it is not possible, in the nature of things, it should be, that we have not as perfect powers as any may suppose Adam to have had in innocency, than that we have not the same powers the angels in heaven are endowed with. The good culture, and proper exercise, of our implanted powers, is that, and that only, on account of which we are capable, in the nature of things, of being chargeable with blame. I shall not think it an impertinence to illustrate this by a particular instance.

The mental power we call the understanding, is at first a naked capacity, fitted for the reception of knowledge, but, at present, totally destitute of it. For there can be no knowledge without ideas; and these, conformably to the established course of nature, are acquired but slowly and gradually. Impressions from the material world, by the intervention of suitably adapted bodily organs, affect the mind, and in time store it with ideas; which ideas, together with the perceptions we have of the operations of our own minds, are the true source of the knowledge we naturally attain to, in this present state. Is it now any fault of ours, that we come into existence thus destitute of actual knowledge? Will any affirm, that we are, upon this account,

morally blind, or *sinfully* in the dark? A man must be out of his senses to suppose such a thing.

Should it be said, the understanding, considered as one of the powers of our nature, is transmitted to us, by reason of the lapse, in a less perfect state than it would otherwise have been. Be it so. What follows herefrom? Not that we are *faulty* in possessing this power in this less perfect state; not that it is our *sin*, and that we are blameworthy on this account. It may be our unhappiness, that our faculty of understanding is not communicated in a more perfect state; but it is not, neither is it possible it should be, an *immorality*, or vice in us. This power, in the simple state in which it is transmitted to us, is just such as God was pleased it should be. And if there is any *moral* fault in its being no better, wherever the reproach finally terminates, we are certainly clear of it.

The plain truth is, there is no imaginable sense in which we can be faulty, or chargeable with sin, with respect to our understanding, but by neglecting, or misusing it, after we are become proper *moral agents*. And here, one would think, without going any further back, there is room enough for blame. And, indeed, we are all blameable, in a less or greater degree, for want of care in the culture of our understandings, or for not making a wise and good use of them. Though it ought to be well observed here, the fault, with respect to the understanding, which
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the Scripture describes by its being "blinded," or "darkened," is always the result of moral folly in the *persons themselves*, whose understandings are represented to be in this bad state. This "blindness," or "darkness," is of that sort which argues a wilfully depraved mind, and could not have taken place, if the subjects of it had not neglected their understanding, or abused their natural powers, by perverting it to those ends for which it was not implanted in them.

It may, in a sense, it is true, be said, even of the best of men, that they have "darkened their hearts," and "blinded their minds;" for who will pretend, that he has made so good a use of the means of information and instruction as he ought to have done, and might have done? Yea, who can declare, and do it with truth, that he has not actually been the occasion of introducing darkness, instead of light, into his mind, in a less or greater degree, by criminally indulging to unreasonable prejudices, and undue attachments to his passions and affections? But even this "blindness," which good men, in this imperfect state, are too often chargeable with, is not *that* which is pointed out in Scripture, when it speaks of the "heart as darkened," and the "mind as alienated from God through ignorance." It is rather now describing the character of habitually wicked men, and giving us an idea of that *moral* corruption, or defilement of their understand-

ings, which is not the effect of mere *frailty*, but of great *wilfulness* and *perverseness*.

What has been thus said of the understanding, is equally applicable to all our other implanted powers, and will readily be perceived to be so by every intelligent reader. They are all, at *first*, mere capacities only, neither fitted nor designed for *present* MORAL exertion, but yet so formed as that, in time, they may attain to an ability herefor. And these capacities, whatever they are upon our first coming into the world, being precisely such as were communicated to us, absolutely without any will, action, or influence of ours, conformably to laws established by the God of nature from the beginning of the creation, how should they be MORALLY faulty in their first simple existence? Nothing is more self-evidently true, than that their becoming *morally* depraved, in whatever degree they are thus depraved, is, and must be, the effect of the *personal* folly of each individual subject of these powers, by the neglect, misimprovement, abuse, and perversion of them. Nor is any son of Adam esteemed blameworthy, with respect to these original capacities, upon any other account, or in any other view, in any part of the whole book of God.

It is commonly said here, Adam had, by his "one offence," corrupted his whole nature and, being himself a creature totally corrupted

before he was a father, such also must be his posterity. The descendants from him must be, as he was, *morally* corrupt, or sinful, in all their transmitted powers.

The reply is obvious. Adam, in virtue of the law of propagation, established by God, was no more than the medium, instrument, or means, by which the human kind, in distinction from every other, should be brought into existence. He could only transmit, in consequence of this law, THAT NATURE which would denominate the descendants from him MEN, and not creatures of another sort or kind. His superinduced character, as a *morally* corrupt man, was no part of that nature he was made, by God, an instrument in transmitting to others: nor indeed could it have been in consistency with the eternal rule of right. There can be no such thing as *moral* depravity, but in connection with misused moral agency. And will any say, that the misused moral agency of one man can, by propagation, be transmitted to another, so as to be HIS misused moral agency? Yea, that this misused moral agency is capable of being communicated from one *morally* corrupt man, throughout all generations to the end of time? And yet, this must be the case, if Adam, because he had *morally* corrupted himself, must transmit *moral* corruption to all that ever have, or will proceed from him. There is not a more certainly known truth, than that the qualities of parents, confi-

dered as *virtuous* or *vicious*, in consequence of the good or bad use of their moral agency, are not transmitted to children. The machines, called our bodies, it is true, may, in consequence of the virtues or vices of progenitors, be transmitted in a better or worse state to be employed as instruments for the soul to act by. But this infers only a more or less advantageous communication of existence; not any *moral* faultiness, or sinfulness, in the existence itself, considered simply as communicated. We come into being, in the way of generation, existences of the same rank, or order, that Adam was, in distinction from the other creatures; but as to any superinduced qualities, considered as *virtuous* or *vicious*, they were not propagated from him to any of his immediate children, nor from them to any other generations: nor was it ever intended by God that they should, in virtue of the divinely instituted law of multiplying the human kind. The powers that *essentially* constitute the nature of man, in distinction from the other species of creatures, are communicated by generation, not that state of those powers which is the effect of the good or bad improvement of them. The proper just character of every individual of the human race, as *virtuous* or *vicious*, as *morally* depraved or holy, must be determined, not by their powers, as simply communicated with their existence, but by the use they make of them, after they have arrived to an ability of acting

acting as moral agents. This account of the matter is both intelligible and reasonable; and not only so, but it perfectly agrees with revelation, which blames no man but for his folly in not making that use of his transmitted powers, under the advantages he is favoured with, which it is reasonable he should do, and must be self-condemned if he does not.

It may not be amiss to add here, How is it known, that Adam was that *entirely corrupted creature*, "indisposed to all good, and prone to all evil continually," he is represented to have been? Does the Scripture teach us this for truth? It informs us, it is acknowledged, that he disobeyed in the ONE article wherein he was tried; and that, in consequence of this sin of his, he became exposed to the penalty of the law he had violated; insomuch, that it might have been immediately put in execution. But where do we find, that, in consequence of his lapse, his WHOLE NATURE became sinfully corrupt, either by *natural operation*, or *divine infliction*? It is not easy to conceive, how one single act of sin should *naturally* operate to produce at once this effect. It certainly does not so operate, with respect to those of his posterity, who are "new men in Christ." And no good reason can be given, why its operation should be so widely different in regard of their first father. And are we told by the inspired writers, that this befel him, in a way of punishment, by infliction from the Deity?

Deity? Most certainly Moses has given us no such account; though he has particularly recorded the sentence of condemnation that was passed on him for his "one offence." If any other of the sacred penmen have transmitted such an one, let it be plainly and particularly pointed out. In the mean time, it should be remembered, Adam, notwithstanding his lapse, and all the effects of it, whether natural or judicial, was favoured by God, and even before the condemnatory sentence was passed, with the promise of THE WOMAN'S SEED, in consequence of which, being placed under a new state of trial, he might so use, and improve, his originally implanted powers, as to attain the CHARACTER of a truly righteous man, formed to a meetness for an eternal life of blessedness in the resurrection-world. And, for aught that is known by any one living to the contrary, this might have been his *character*, he might have been *this righteous man*, before he had posterity. And if this was the case, it may as reasonably be said, that the descendants from him were *born righteous*, as that they would have been *born corrupt*, had he been the corrupt creature that is pretended: though the real truth is, neither a *virtuous* or *vicious* character is transmitted by propagation. This always was from the beginning of the world, and will be to the end of it, consequent upon a good or bad use of the essential powers that have been

been communicated, conformably to the established law of propagation.

It is said likewise, in vindication of our deriving from Adam, with our very existence, a *totally corrupt nature*, that we may feel the workings of this corruption, and so as to know, from our own inward perceptions, that we really are the corrupt creatures we are represented to be. I answer, be the perceptions of the working of corruption as strong, and general, as any may suppose them to be, it will not follow from hence, that any son of Adam ever felt the working of what is called original corruption, or corruption communicated with existence itself. Who, among all that have descended from the first pair, can say, from their own experience, what their inward workings were, when they first came into existence? They were THEN no more capable of feeling moral corruption, than of morally corrupting themselves. It requires time, I might say years, according to the establishment of heaven, before we are capable either of moral feeling, or moral exertion. Be the feelings, therefore, of any, after their arrival to a capacity of moral discernment, as they may, they are not the perceptions of the workings of their nature when they first came into being. They may, by this time, have made themselves the subjects, in a less or greater degree, of moral corruption; and, if they should feel the workings

workings of it, it would be nothing strange: but no more could be argued from hence than this, that they are now morally corrupt creatures; not that they were so the first moment they came into the world. They may know, and with all certainty, from the PRESENT workings of corruption, which they have the actual perceptions of, that they are AT PRESENT polluted; but that their nature was, at first, in the simple state in which it was communicated, thus polluted, is what they do not feel, ever did, or ever could.

It is said also, the general prevalence of sin, from the days of Adam, through all successive generations, to this day, is a sure argument in proof of our bringing into the world with us a morally depraved or sinful nature. How else can it be accounted for, that the "world should lie in wickedness," as has been the case all along from the beginning? It is readily owned, the wickedness of mankind has been, and now is, awfully great and general; and this, notwithstanding all the preventive methods of heaven, upon the plan of grace through Christ: though, perhaps, some may have been betrayed into a like mistake with that of the prophet Elijah, who supposed the idolatry of the people of Israel was so universal, that he was left the alone worshipper of Jehovah, the one true and living God; while yet the real truth was, that God had
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among that people seven thousand, who had not bowed the knee to Baal. There has been, without all doubt, a number of truly pious holy men, in all ages, since the lapse. What proportion this number has borne to the impious and unsanctified, is known, with exactness, to God only. So far as we are able to judge, from the past history, and present state of the world, it may, I believe, be said in general, that the righteous have been few in comparison with the wicked. But the wickedness of the wicked, however great or general, is no argument that we are born with *morally* depraved or sinful nature. Neither Adam, nor Eve, were created sinful; and yet they both fell by transgression: which is a demonstrative proof, that there may be the commission of sin, without a previously supposed corrupted nature. It will, doubtless, be suggested here, the created sinless beings in our world were only two: whereas, since their lapse, in the several successive periods of time, sinful men have been vastly numerous. And how should such vast numbers exhibit such plentiful evidence of their being sinful creatures, if they did not come into being with sinful natures? The answer is obvious. If two only, without an originally sinful nature, might be overcome by temptation to violate the law of their Maker, the same thing was equally possible for two more, and so on to any assigned number. No reason can be given, why it must have been otherwise.

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And, it is the truth of fact, so far as we may give credit to revelation, that thousands and ten thousands of originally created sinless beings, rebelled against the God who brought them into existence. The angels that sinned were at first angels of light, and yet they made themselves devils, and in numbers awfully great. We are told, that a LEGION of them were in one man only, in the days of our Saviour Jesus Christ. The general wickedness of mankind may as easily, perhaps much more easily, be accounted for without the supposition of a previously sinful nature. The plain truth is, neither angels nor men, Adam or his posterity, were made impeccable creatures. The possibility, therefore, of their making themselves sinners, is essentially founded in their original constitution, as fallible mutable creatures. Whether we can or cannot point out, with precision, how that which was *possible* becomes *actual*, is a matter of no great importance; though it certainly is, that we do not impose upon ourselves or others, an account of this matter that is *false*; as would be the case, if we should ascribe the wickedness of men, since the lapse, to a sinful nature communicated to them with their existence. For this would be grossly absurd in itself, and an utter inconsistency with the whole moral system.

It is still said, in proof of our being born with a morally corrupt nature, that this is one of the first things

things made manifest in the temper and conduct of little children. It is acknowledged, that children, very early, discover their being the subjects of various appetites, passions, and affections, by their various, and, many times, undesirable exertions. But none, surely, will pretend, that their nature is sinful merely, or only, because it is endued with appetites and passions: for they were implanted in Adam at his first creation, and his posterity come into being the subjects of them, for wise and valuable ends, which could not have been so well answered without them. The sinfulness, therefore, of these appetites does not lie in their simple existence as transmitted to us, nor yet in any exertions of them, till we become actual agents, and obliged as such, in duty to God, to keep them under due government. This little children are absolutely incapable of. They are not, at present, moral agents; and God only knows, with any degree of certainty, how long it is before they are so: let therefore their discoveries in their nonage, or wilfulness, peevishness, passion, or any thing else that is disagreeable, be as they may, they are *essentially* wanting in that which will denominate them *sinful*; and this is, a present capacity for moral agency. Nothing they either think, or say, or do, can partake of the nature of sin, till they are arrived to an ability of moral discernment, and to such a degree as to be accountable for their conduct as moral agents.

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It would not be a needless digression, if I should add here, as the *natural* operation of our implanted appetites and affections takes place, before our mental powers are got to a state wherein it is possible this operation should be *morally* restrained and governed, there is great danger lest, in after-life, the appetites and passions should have the chief sway over us. It may be principally owing to this, that such numbers among mankind turn out corrupt, sinful creatures. This, to be sure, will much better account for the general wickedness of the world, than any are able to account for the disobedience of two perfectly intelligent, and perfectly holy creatures, in a case wherein they might, so far as appears, have easily withstood the temptation they were assaulted with, and retained their integrity. Some, perhaps, may be disposed to complain of the established method of our growing from infancy to a state of actual moral agency. They may be ready to think, it would have been better, if, according to the settled course of nature, our mental powers might sooner have come to such strength and vigour, as that the exercise of the appetites and passions should have been restrained and governed by them. The apostolic solemn check, recorded in Romans, ix. 20. is properly applicable here, "Who art thou, O man, that thou repliest against God! Shall the thing formed say to him who formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?"

thus?" A small degree of modesty, one would think, might be sufficient to keep men, "who are of yesterday, and know comparatively nothing," from finding fault with the work of that being, who is infinite in understanding, as well as in benevolence and righteousness. And there is less reason for complaint here, as the all-wise good God has committed the guardianship of children, during their growth to a mature state, to parents; enjoining it on them, as their indispensable duty, to exercise that moral government over them, they are incapable of with respect to themselves. Parents, it is true, may, by their negligence, inattention, and in ways still more criminal, be the faulty occasion of children's being habituated to live and act under the influence of the flesh, in opposition to the mind. And it is a great unhappiness to children, and as great a fault in parents, when they are neglected, and suffered, as they grow in years, to grow in bondage to appetite and passion; their state of trial for another world will, on this account, be rendered far more difficult and hazardous, than it would otherwise have been; though, after all the criminal neglects, or positively faulty influence of parents, and contracted bad habits in children hereupon, it remains a certain and most comfortable truth, that they may, in consequence of the plan of grace through Christ, be delivered from whatever bondage they may have been brought into by corruption. Though they

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should have been "the servants of sin," they may become "the servants of God," and "have their fruit unto holiness, the end whereof will be everlasting life."

It is said yet further, there are many passages in the sacred books, which clearly and fully teach the doctrine of a corrupt sinful nature, as derived from Adam to all his posterity, in consequence of his lapse. This has often been pretended; but the produced texts, said to teach this, are far from containing so gross an absurdity. It would take up too much room to be particular in severally examining these texts; and it might be thought needless, as they have been so repeatedly set in a just and unexceptionable light. However, it may not be improper to take a brief notice of such of them as are supposed to be most strikingly conclusive.

One of this sort is Job, xiv. 4. "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? not one." It is not easy to conceive, how any could cite these words as a convincing proof of a sinful nature derived from Adam with existence itself, unless it be first supposed, that they had previously imbibed, and were strongly prepossessed in favour of this sentiment. The quoted words are, at first sight, a proverbial general saying, the particular, more special sense of which, as here used, can be ascertained in no way, but by the nature of the discourse of which it is a part, and to illustrate which it is brought. The

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question then is, to what purpose is it introduced by Job? What is its connection with the point he is upon? Whoever will consult the preceding and following words, can be at no loss to determine, that it relates wholly to man's frailty as a mortal creature. It must, therefore, be here used as a known common mode of speech, importing in general, that the thing produced must be as that is from whence it proceeds. As if it had been said, man that is born of a woman is a poor, frail, mortal creature. And how should it be otherwise, since, from the general proverb, "a clean thing cannot proceed from unclean," it appears, that as is the source, so must be the derivation from it? We proceed from those that are frail and mortal; it is, therefore, no other than may be expected, that we should be so too. It is observable, MORAL UNCLEANNES is no part of the subject Job is upon in this place: nor, if it had, would the proverb he brings to view have been to his purpose. For uncleanness, considered in a MORAL sense, cannot proceed naturally from parents to children. They may be, as in fact they really are, instruments in conveying existence; but they cannot convey with it MORAL uncleanness, because this is inseparable from moral agency in the persons themselves, who are the subjects of it. To suppose otherwise would be to contradict all the ideas we have of the nature of sin.

Another text we are turned to is Psalm li. 5: "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." It would be absurd to say, that David, in the latter part of this passage, had it in view to represent his mother as a filthy woman, as she must have been, if, literally speaking, he had been "conceived in sin." The absurdity would be much greater, if it should be supposed, that he ought to be understood according to the strictness of the letter; when he speaks, in the former part of the sentence, of his being "shapen in iniquity." By whom was he shapen? His own sense of the matter is expressed in that address to God, Psalm cxix. 73. "Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me." And again, Psalm cxxxix. 13, 14. "Thou hast covered me in my mother's womb. I will praise thee, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made." In thy book, "were all my members written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them?" Will any now imagine that David could mean, in the text before us, to represent God as the being that "shaped him in iniquity?" And, had he made him with a corrupt sinful nature, would he, from heart-felt gratitude, have praised him herefor? It would reflect highly on him to suppose such a thing.

Whether the words in dispute are well rendered in our English Bibles, or whether they might be better translated, "I was born in iniquity,

quity, and nursed by my mother in sin," is a matter of no great importance. In either way of translation they are certainly an hyperbolical mode of diction, strongly expressive of David's early attachment to sinful indulgences, through the unrestrained influence of his natural appetites, passions, and affections. What he here laments may be explained by that prayer of his, Psalm xxv. 7. which he utters in simple plain language; "Remember not the sins of my youth, nor my transgressions." It may be worthy of our notice, like figurative ways of speaking are common in Scripture. Says Job, in mentioning his benevolent case of the widow, chap. xxxi. 18. "I have guided her from my mother's womb." According to the strictness of the letter, these words do not contain the truth: for it was not possible he should be a guide to the widow, till he had arrived to a capacity of being so. David himself uses the same figure, Psalm lviii. 3. where he says, "The wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as soon as they are born, speaking lies." He could not here mean, that the wicked told lies before they had attained to an ability of using their tongues to the purposes of speech. The language, therefore, is figurative, importing only an aggravation of their wickedness; for that they were prone to "speak lies" from their early days. The same figure still is used by the prophet Isaiah, chap. lviii. 8. where, speaking of the people of Israel, he says, they

were "called transgressors from the womb;" that is, soon after their political existence. They had scarce been formed into a nation before they transgressed. The penitential acknowledgment of David is evidently expressed in the like figurative language. It would be as grossly absurd to suppose, literally speaking, that he was "shaped in iniquity, and conceived in sin," as to say of the wicked, that they could "speak lies" before they could speak at all; or of a benevolent man, that he could be a "guide to the widow," before he could, in any sense, be a guide either to himself or any one else. Besides what has been already said, it may be proper to observe, it would be very extraordinary to suppose, that David, while confessing and lamenting his sins before God, in all their aggravating circumstances, should, in the midst of this penitential exercise, reflect the blame of his sinfulness on God, instead of taking it wholly to himself; which would certainly be the truth of the matter, if he is brought in telling his Maker, he was "shaped in iniquity, and conceived in sin;" understanding the words in their literal sense: whereas, if they are interpreted figuratively, as carrying in them this meaning, that he had even, from his early days, been addicted to sin, through the prevalence of his natural appetites, it would perfectly fall in with the grand business he was now engaged in, that of confessing and bewailing his past sins. It was highly fit and proper he should, upon this occasion,

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sion, look back to former iniquities, even those of youth and childhood, from a deep sense of shame and guilt.

Another text still, that has often been mentioned in proof of our coming into the world with a corrupt sinful nature, is Eph. ii. 1, 2, 3. This text I should have passed over, it is so little to the purpose for which it is brought, but that I was willing to take this occasion to give what I judge to be the most obvious and undoubted meaning, not only of the whole passage, but of those words in it in special, "and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others." The apostle, that he might affect the hearts of the Ephesian Christians with an admiring sense of the "rich mercy and great love wherewith God had loved them," turns their view back, not to what they were when they first came into existence, but to what they had been in AFTER-LIFE, before their faith in Christ. Says he, speaking of such of them as were converts from Gentilism, "Ye were dead in trespasses and sins, wherein, in time past, ye walked according to the course of this world; according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience." He then adds, with reference to himself, and those who were believing Jews, "among whom also we had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and the mind, and were by nature the children of
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wrath, even as others." There is not a word in this whole passage that can be applied to those converts, either from Gentilism or Judaism, considered simply in the state in which they first existed. Their character is wholly drawn from their conduct in life, AFTER they became capable of a vicious course of "walking in lust," of having their "conversation according to the desires of the flesh." And, having thus made themselves morally corrupt, and to an high degree of guilt, "they were by nature the children of wrath;" that is, judging of their case upon the principles of mere nature, they had rendered themselves the objects of Divine wrath. It is observable, the apostle does not say, "We ARE by nature the children of wrath," but we WERE; that is, in consequence of a past, wicked, and sensual course of life. He could not have used words more directly and strongly fitted to convey this sentiment, that their being "children of wrath" was owing to their having been personally the "children of disobedience," and as such the meet objects of the righteous displeasure of Heaven; which was so evident, that it might be clearly known from "nature," the "law written on man's heart," without any help from supernatural revelation. "We were by nature the children of wrath, even as others." As if the apostle had said, we who are now believing Jews had, "in times past," so indulged to the lusts of the flesh and mind, and made ourselves such heinous sinners, that we might
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certainly conclude, from the law of nature only, that, in common with the like sinful Gentiles, and as truly as they, we had rendered ourselves justly obnoxious to the wrath of Almighty God. This meaning of the apostle gives the original word PHUSIS, NATURE, its proper full force, is so obvious at the first glance, and so perfectly falls in with the whole discourse with which it is connected, that one can scarce help wondering it has not been universally perceived and adopted; especially if it be remembered, that this same apostle has told us, that "the work of the law, NATURALLY wrote on man's heart, shews itself by the witness of conscience," in accusing and condemning, as well as excusing: insomuch, that those who have no other law than that of *mere nature*, may "know that they who commit such sins are worthy of death," deserving of God's wrath, Rom. i. 32. and ii. 14, 15, compared. When, therefore, he is speaking, in the passage before us, of those who had been abominably disobedient by their own personal transgressions of the Divine law; and then says, they "were by nature the children of wrath," what more easy, intelligible, and consistent meaning, can his words be taken in than this, that they had, judging of their case upon the principles of mere nature, the dictates of common reason, made themselves "children of wrath."

It is said yet further, the numerous texts of Scripture which affirm the necessity of men's
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being "born again," of their being made "new creatures," of their being "anew the workmanship of God created in Christ Jesus," in order to their admission into the kingdom of heaven, are so many clear, strong, and full proofs, of our being born at first with a corrupt and sinful nature. Far from denying the doctrine of the "new birth," I entirely acquiesce in it as a Scripture one, highly important, and closely connected with salvation; insomuch that there cannot be the latter without the former. But where is the necessity of grafting this doctrine upon a sinful nature, communicated with our beings upon our first coming into existence? The Bible teaches us no such thing. It is, indeed, the invention of man, and not a deduction from the word of God.

The state of the case is plainly this: as we first come into being, we are nothing more than creatures of the human kind, in distinction from every other. Our powers are naked capacities only, which, as they gradually unfold and gain strength, will, by their good or bad improvement, acquire different moral qualities, giving us an answerable different character. If our natural powers are neglected, misimproved, and turned aside from their proper use, we become morally corrupt, or sinful; but if they are cultivated and improved to our attaining an ACTUAL LIKENESS to God in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, we have now a new nature superinduced, and may, figuratively speaking, be said to be new-born creatures.

creatures. It is a mistake, and a very great one, to say that we must be born into the world with a corrupt sinful nature, in order to give sense to what the Scripture means by the "second birth." The idea it would convey by this metaphor, is that acquirement which makes men *actual living images* of God, as being the subjects of those moral qualities which are included in his character as HOLY. They are not, upon their first being born, the subjects of this likeness; but they have, in their NATURE, a capacity for its superinduction: and whenever it is superinduced, they are the persons of whom it may be said, and in Scripture actually is said, that they are "born again;" and with great propriety, for they are now in the *moral* sense, as truly new-born creatures, as, in the *natural* sense, they were born at first. There is not the least need of a supposed original sinful nature, in order to give meaning, and an highly important one, to what the Scripture calls the second birth; and it is, without all doubt, a real truth, that some among the "born again" were never the subjects of REIGNING depravity, either natural or acquired. In consequence of a good education, animated by the superintending influence of the Divine spirit, they became possessed of those morally good qualities, on account of which men are called the "born of God," the "born a second time;" and this, before they had acquired that state of mind which would have made them the "servants of corruption." Not that

that this is a common case. Generally speaking, the appetites and passions first bear sway, and gain strength, so as that our nature becomes morally corrupt, or sinful, before we are God's children by being "born again." In all instances of this kind, the new-birth is a change, not merely, or only from our nature in the simple state in which it was transmitted to us, but from our nature, as having had superinduced on it those qualities that are morally corrupt or sinful. And from hence many have been led to suppose, that *that* sinfulness that has been superinduced upon nature, is a sinfulness of nature we are all born with; and that the new-birth takes rise from native depravity, corruption coëval with our first existence. But this would be to ground so great and good a work as the "new man," the "new-born creature," upon a non-entity; for we are not more sure of any thing than this, that there cannot be moral depravity, or sinfulness, where there is no present capacity for moral agency, as is infallibly the case with respect to every descendant from Adam, when he first comes into being.

The plain truth is, a likeness to God in his moral character is, essentially, the idea the Scripture would convey by the metaphor of a "new birth." And this likeness may be an acquirement either previous to, or consequent upon, a moral depravity or sinfulness of nature. In some, though comparatively few, it actually is an

an attainment previous to, and preventive of, that bondage to corruption, which denominates men the children, not of God, but of the evil one. In others, and by far the most, it is a superinduction upon their nature AFTER they had, as agents, introduced into it those vicious qualities, on account of which they might justly be called morally corrupt or sinful creatures. But in no instances whatever does the "new birth," take rise from moral corruption co-existent with man's nature, as at first derived; for, in this simple, naked state, it is not a capable subject of moral corruption, though capable, by misimprovement, of being made morally corrupt; or, by a due culture, under the Divine influence, of attaining that likeness to God which denominates men his children, as being figuratively "born" or "created again." The sacred books, instead of interfering with this representation of the matter, perfectly harmonise with it.

It would be an omission if I did not add here, that the superinducing upon our nature, as at first transmitted to us, an actual likeness to God in his moral glory, is the result of that new dispensation of grace mankind were placed under after the original lapse; for which reason it may, with emphatical propriety, be described by our being "born again," by our becoming "new creatures," and the like. And as this new dispensation we are under is founded in Christ, and has him at its head with the Holy Ghost as his agent;

agent; it is with equal propriety that we are said to be "born of the spirit," to be the "workmanship of God created in Christ Jesus." Only it should be remembered, when the Scripture speaks of the "new-born creature," the "new man created in Christ," the mode of diction is figurative. We are, in a physical sense, the same creatures after the "new birth," or the "new creation," we were before. No new faculty is added to our nature; but whatever is done in this work, is done upon those powers we at first brought into the world with us. A MORAL alteration only is effected in us; and this is effected in a way adapted to our character as men, or, what means the same thing, intelligent moral agents. God, it is true, by the influence of the Divine spirit, has the main hand in forming the character which gives the denomination of "new men in Christ;" but, in the doing of this, he considers us as naturally endowed with the several powers of thinking, reflecting, willing, choosing, refusing, hoping, fearing, loving, hating, and the like, and accordingly deals with us as such by co-operating all these powers in the use of means suitably adjusted to their nature. He does not make men his children by regeneration without the use of their own faculties, neither does he form them to his own moral likeness by giving them any physically new faculties, or by destroying or making any physical change in their old ones; but accomplishes his pleasure in them by accommodating

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modating his agency to their proper make and constitution. The Bible always sets the matter in this point of light. And this method of acting exhibits the true reason, and the only consistent intelligible one, of the creation of the gospel kingdom, with its various means, helps, privileges, motives, and blessings.

I have now offered what may be thought sufficient to make it evident, that we do not come into existence with a morally corrupt or sinful nature: nor, may I pertinently add here, is our nature, as transmitted to us, so destitute of all capacity for that which is morally good, as that a native total corruption of heart becomes hereupon universal, without the exception of a single descendant from the one man Adam. This, of late, appears to be the sentiment of some, who would be thought to be more consistent and refined Calvinists than their brethren. Says one*, in this way of representing the matter, "In order to account
" for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total
" native depravity of the heart of man, there is
" not the least need of supposing any evil quality
" infused, implanted, or inwrought into the na-
" ture of man, by any positive cause or influence
" whatever, either from God, or the creature;
" or of supposing, that man is conceived and
" born with a fountain of evil in his heart, such
" as is any thing positive." How, then, possibly

* Mr. Edwards, on "Original Sin," page 317.

can be a "total NATIVE depravity of heart" in the children of Adam, or, in other words, how they should come into being morally corrupt or sinful, and totally so, without any positive influence either of God or man, is a secret this author has not seen fit to reveal, and it will, without all doubt, remain a mystery to the end of time. Besides, by affirming, as he does*, with great peremptoriness, that the doctrine of original sin "neither implies or infers any corruption infused into the human nature by positive influence, or any quality, taint, tincture, or infection, altering the natural constitution, faculties, and dispositions of our souls," he directly contradicts the doctrine of "native universal corruption of heart," as received, preached, and strenuously pleaded for by Calvinists of the highest rank for learning, and other qualities, natural or acquired. But what is his peculiarity upon this point? Take it in his own words. Says he†, "I think a little attention to the nature of things will be sufficient to satisfy any impartial considerate enquirer, that the absence of positive good principles, and so the withholding of a special Divine influence to impart and maintain those good principles, leaving the common natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, &c. (which were in man in inno-

* Mr. Edwards, on "Original Sin," page 316. 317.

† Ibid.

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" cence) leaving these, I say, to themselves with-
 " out the government of superior Divine prin-
 " ciples, will certainly be followed with the cor-
 " ruption, yea, the total corruption of the
 " heart, without occasion for any positive influ-
 " ence at all: and yet it was thus, indeed, that
 " corruption of nature came on Adam immedi-
 " ately on his fall, and comes on all his posterity
 " as sinning in him, and falling with him."
 This is his notion. But he goes on more parti-
 cularly to open and explain it. Says he*, " The
 " case with man was plainly this: when God
 " made man at first, he implanted in him two
 " kinds of principles: There was an *inferior*
 " kind, which may be called NATURAL, being
 " the principles of mere human nature; such as
 " self-love, with those natural appetites and pas-
 " sions which belong to the nature of man, in
 " which his love to his own liberty, honour, and
 " pleasure, were exercised: these, when alone,
 " and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures
 " sometimes call FLESH. Besides these, there
 " were *superior* principles that were spiritual,
 " holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in
 " Divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual
 " image of God, and man's righteousness, and
 " true holiness; which are called in Scripture
 " the *Divine nature*. These principles may, in
 " some sense, be called SUPERNATURAL, being

* Mr. Edwards, on " Original Sin," pages 317, 318, 319.

“ (however concreated or connate) such as are
 “ above those principles that are essentially im-
 “ plied in, or necessarily resulting from, and in-
 “ separably connected with, *mere human nature*,
 “ and being such as immediately depend on
 “ man’s union and communion with God, or
 “ divine communications and influences of God’s
 “ spirit; which, though withdrawn, and man’s
 “ nature forsaken of these principles, human
 “ nature would be human nature still; man’s na-
 “ ture, as such, being entire without these divine
 “ principles, which the Scripture sometimes calls
 “ SPIRIT, in contradistinction to FLESH. These
 “ *superior* principles were given to possess the
 “ throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in
 “ the heart: the other, to be wholly subordinate
 “ and subservient. When man sinned, and broke
 “ God’s covenant, and fell under his curse, these
 “ *superior* principles left his heart: and thus man
 “ was left in a state of darkness, woeful corrup-
 “ tion, and ruin, nothing but *flesh* without *spirit*.
 “ It were easy to shew how every lust and de-
 “ praved disposition would naturally arise from
 “ *privative* original, if here were room for it.
 “ Only God’s withdrawing, as it were highly
 “ proper and necessary he should, from rebel
 “ man, being, as it were, driven away by his
 “ abominable wickedness, and man’s natural
 “ principles being *left to themselves*, this is suffi-
 “ cient to account for his becoming entirely cor-
 “ rupt, and bent on sinning against God. And

“ as

" as Adam's nature became corrupt, without
 " God's implanting or infusing any evil thing
 " into his nature, so does the nature of his
 " posterity. God dealing with Adam as the
 " head of his posterity (as has been shewn), and
 " treating them as ONE, he deals with his poste-
 " rity as having all sinned in him. And, there-
 " fore, as God withdrew spiritual communion,
 " and his vital influences from the common
 " head, so he withholds the same from all the
 " members, as they come into existence;
 " whereby they come into the world mere *flesh*,
 " and entirely under the government of natural
 " and *inferior* principles; and so become wholly
 " corrupt as Adam did."

This state of the case, far from being fetched
 either from reason or revelation, is utterly in-
 consistent with both.

As to Adam:—Where are we told in the
 sacred books, that the created principles by
 which he was enabled to love, honour, and obey
 his Maker, were SUPERNATURAL, any more than
 his other principles, either bodily or mental?
 The principles he was formed with were, without
 all doubt, different in their kind, some *superior*,
 others *inferior*; as it was proper they should be,
 because designed for different ends; some higher,
 others lower. But let their superiority or infe-
 riority be as it may, they were equally NATURAL
 to him as a creature of such an order in the scale
 of beings. Nay, if Adam, upon his being
 O 2 brought

brought into existence, was obliged to behave with all dutiful reverence and submission to his Creator, he must previously have had implanted in his nature such principles as would render this service performable by him. It is a contradiction to all the ideas we have of that which is right and fit, to suppose otherwise. His being under obligations to duty, and principles in his nature making it possible for him to perform it, were absolutely necessary concomitants. Those *superior* principles, therefore, in consequence of which he might pay homage to his God, were no more SUPERNATURAL, than his appetites, passions, affections, or any other principles of his nature: they were ESSENTIAL to him as a moral agent, placed under moral obligations to the Deity. It lay wholly with God to choose, whether he would make him at all, or what sort of creature he would make him; but if he saw fit to make him a being of whom he required, and from whom he expected, the return of love, gratitude, and constant obedience, it was in itself right, yea absolutely necessary, that he should endue his nature with principles, rendering it possible for him to do what was thus expected and required of him. Had he created him without the natural organs of sight or hearing, could he have been obliged to perceive the difference between colours and sounds, or to have had in his mind so much as the idea of either? It would be equally absurd to say, he could be bound to

love

love and honour God, if he had not been formed with a capacity in his nature fitting him herefor. Such a capacity, upon supposition of such obligation, is rather a matter of justice than of grace. Without the former, the latter would be morally wrong, unfit, unjust.

A distinction ought always to be made between Adam's implanted powers, and the use or exercise of them. His well-using or abusing these powers, *superior* or *inferior*, did not give him the denomination of *man*, that is, a creature of such a rank in the order of being: but it was **ESSENTIAL** to his being thus denominated, that his nature should be endued with principles that would render it possible for him to conduct himself conformably to what was required of him. Such principles were necessary ingredients in his constitution as man, and inseparable from it; insomuch that he could not have existed a creature of this rank or kind without them. His approving himself a good man, or becoming a bad one, was dependent on the use he should make of his implanted principles; but he could not have been a creature under moral obligations to love and serve his Maker, if no principles had been implanted in his nature; in consequence of which this would have been a performable duty: nor, would I further say, does it appear from the sacred books, or elsewhere, that God, even after his lapse, ever withdrew from him, meaning hereby his leaving his nature entirely

devoid of these essentially necessary principles. It would be highly unreasonable in itself, and greatly dishonourary to the all-wise, righteous, and benevolent Ruler of the world, to suppose such a thing, if it be at the same time supposed, that he saw fit to continue him in being under like moral obligations to do duty to him. Surely, if Adam had been divested of that capacity in his nature, that principle, or whatever other name any may please to give it, without which it would have been as impossible for him to love and honour the Deity, as to see without having eyes, or to hear without having ears; he never would, he never reasonably could, upon being deprived of this capacity, have had this required of him. God might, it is true, upon the offence he had committed, have immediately turned him out of existence, as he threatened he would; the effect whereof would have been the total loss of all his principles, bodily and mental, and of all his obligations: but he saw fit, notwithstanding his lapse, to continue him in being (though under a sentence of death), and with the same natural essential principles he was endued with before his fall. The sacred books, far from suggesting any thing to the contrary, directly lead us to think thus of the matter. The new state of trial he was placed under, in order to his reigning in eternal life after death, is clearly, I may say essentially, connected herewith. To say that he now existed devoid of all capacity in his nature to do what

was

was required under this new state, would be as absurd and unreasonable, as it was in the task-master of Egypt to require "the full tale of brick without giving any straw." Had there been, upon Adam's lapse, a total withdraw of that faculty, principle, or capacity in his nature, without which a compliance with the demands of the new establishment he was under would have been impossible, it must have been restored, or it would have been palpably absurd to have made such demands. To require that of a creature, though fallen, if placed under a new trial upon the foot of grace, which he has no principle in his nature, no faculty rendering it possible for him to perform, is, in the moral sense, absolutely wrong, and must intuitively appear to be so to all who have not perverted their understandings. To represent Adam, therefore, as left destitute of those *superior* principles in his nature, the total absence of which, even under that dispensation of grace in which he was placed, must have been followed with a total corruption of heart, and impossibility of doing any thing that could be pleasing to his Maker, is a base slander injuriously reflected on the good God; and the more so, as it is entirely the result of a vain imagination, and not the dictate either of reason or Scripture.

What has been said with reference to Adam, is equally, to be sure, not less forceably, applicable to his posterity. It would argue their

being cruelly, I may rather say unjustly, dealt with, to suppose, that they come into existence under obligations to attain to a truly virtuous character, under the penalty of eternal ruin, while they are, at the same time, supposed devoid of any faculty, or principle in their nature, in the exercise of which, it would be possible for them, by complying with their obligations, to escape this ruin. The entire want, or absence of a principle or faculty in their nature, the effect whereof would unavoidably be a total corruption in heart and life, and a liability hereupon to certain remediless misery, is, in reality of construction, precisely the same thing, as if they had been brought into this wretched condition by the *positive* infusion of principles that are corrupt. There is certainly no difference as to the unavoidableness of the event; nor is there any, in point of equity, as to the way in which this event is effected. If they must be corrupt creatures, and as such exposed to the vengeance of heaven, it matters not whether, what is thus unavoidable, takes rise from *positive* or *privative* principles; the infusion of those that are bad, or the withholding those which would have made it possible they might not have got into this deplorable state. The Scripture, far from giving this absurd account of the matter, is particularly clear and express in assuring us, that the posterity of Adam, notwithstanding his lapse, or any consequences of it, come into existence

istence under an establishment of grace, putting them upon trial for an eternal happy life after death. It is accordingly declared, in all parts of the sacred books, that they shall be dealt with, in the great day of retribution, conformably to what they have done in the body; and that it will be their own fault, not owing to Adam, or any other being in heaven, or hell, or earth, but wholly to themselves, and the mis-use of the faculties they were endued with, if they are adjudged to misery, and not happiness. Now the supposition only of their being in such a state of trial is in itself an absurdity, as being inconsistent with that which is morally fit and right, if there is in their nature the total absence, or want of a capacity, faculty, or principle, without which this trial they are placed under, would unavoidably prove ruinous to them. Is there any understanding to which it would not appear grossly absurd to suppose, that men should be put under trial for their perceptions of sounds or colours, if they had no organs planted in their constitution, making it possible for them either to hear or see? The absurdity is not less glaring to say, that they come into a world in which they are under trial as to their being truly virtuous, when, at the same time, it is affirmed, that they have no faculty, no capacity in their nature, in the use or exercise of which this is possible. It is, indeed, upon such a capacity in nature, which the human kind come into existence endued with,

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that the scheme of grace through Christ is grounded. It does not suppose that any faculty, or principle, proper to man as a moral, intelligent agent, or that Adam, the first progenitor, had implanted in his constitution, was destroyed by the lapse, either naturally, or by positive deprivation; nor does it make provision for the superinduction of any physically new faculty or capacity in any of the sons of men; but whatever it proposes should be done, is done upon faculties or capacities they bring into the world with existence itself. It does not lead us to think, that their becoming vicious, instead of virtuous, is owing to the want, or absence, of a faculty or principle in their nature, without which this is absolutely unavoidable; but to their own negligence, folly, and sin, in not making that use of their implanted principles and faculties they might have done, and ought to have done, under the helps and advantages they are favoured with. And, in truth, had they no faculty or capacity in their nature, in the exercise of which they could, upon the establishment of grace through Christ, attain the character of virtuous persons, the whole gospel-apparatus of means, helps, advantages, arguments, and motives, could be of no more consideration, than preaching over the graves of men naturally dead and buried would be, in order to their rising alive out of them. There must be a capacity, or principle in nature, in consequence of which
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men may be truly virtuous, or it is impossible they should be so. If therefore this capacity is wanting in human nature, or absent from it, it must be created and introduced by the almighty miraculous power of God, or means, motives, persuasion, and the like, will be so many nothings. We might as well be without them as with them. They would have no more influence upon the production of this faculty, or principle, than mere sounds would have to give life to the dead in their graves: nor, in this case, would there be a foundation laid in nature either for blame or punishment.

The plain truth is, it is always taken for granted, in the gospel scheme of grace, that the posterity of Adam come into existence with implanted capacities, or principles, in the due use of which they may attain to a moral likeness to God, and meetness for the enjoyment of him; and it provides for the help and guidance of those implanted principles, in order to prevent, in a moral way adapted to the character of moral agents, their becoming "the servants of sin:" or, should this be unhappily the case, it affords all needed assistance in order to their being "delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the sons of God." And this it effects, not by creating a new understanding, but by enlightening the old one; not by producing any new faculties, but by severally applying to old ones, according to their

their respective natures. Nothing physically new is introduced, no power, no principle, no capacity, by which we discern, choose, relish, approve, love, or hate, what we could not before, through the absence, or want, of a faculty in our nature heretofore. There is indeed no need of the infusion of any new faculty in order to our being "new men in Christ," and interested, as such, in the promises of the gospel-covenant. The due exercise of those naturally planted in the human constitution, will be sufficient for the purpose; and they may be thus effectually exercised under the helps, means, and advantages of that kingdom of grace God has created in our lapsed world.

It will perhaps be said here, there is no faculty or principle in the nature of Adam's posterity, as such, to distinguish between moral good and evil, or to perceive the beauty of the former, and the deformity of the latter, so as to approve and relish the one, and disapprove and be disgusted at the other. The answer is easy. The God of nature has so framed our minds, and given us such a natural power of discernment, that it must be owing to some great fault we ourselves are personally chargeable with, if we cannot at once see the difference between right and wrong, in the more important points of moral obligation. Will any man, who has not strangely vitiated his perceptive powers, pretend that he cannot, or does not see it to be right
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and fit, on the one hand, for such creatures as we are, to love, honour, and worship the God who gave us our beings; and, on the other, to be unfit and wrong to hate him, and behave with irreverence and undutifulness towards him? Will any man, not deprived of natural reason, calmly and deliberately say, that he does not at once see it to be right, that he "should do to others as they ought to do to him," and wrong that he should do otherwise? Will any man, not lost to common sense, pretend, that he cannot see a difference between honesty and knavery, kindness and cruelty, brotherly love and hatred, chastity and lewdness, temperance and debauchery; or that he does not perceive the former to be amiable lovely virtues, and the latter detestable infamous vices? The moral difference between these tempers and behaviours is self-evident to those who have not blinded their eyes, and rendered themselves not easily capable of discernment. There needs no argumentation, no series of intermediate ideas to enable men to perceive this difference; and that it is, on the one hand, right; and, on the other, wrong. The bare mentioning these virtues and vices, provided it be done in intelligible words, is at once sufficient, not only to enforce conviction, but to excite approbation or disapprobation; unless men have, by their own personal folly, perverted the operation of the natural powers they brought into the world with them. The true reason, why they are so prone to practise

tise vice rather than virtue, is not because they do not discern a difference between the one and the other, or because they inwardly approve the former, and disapprove of the latter; but because they are enticed and drawn aside of their lusts. It is a real and certain truth, in regard even of wicked men, that they often do that, as induced thereto by their appetites and passions, which their reason condemns. They may, by an habitual indulgence to sensual gratifications, become, in time, the willing slaves of corruption, perceiving little or no struggle between "the law of their members, and the law of their mind." But this is not the ordinary state of sinners. There are comparatively few, very few, who gratify their lusts, but with some contest between their animal appetites, and the remonstrances of their inner man. They give into these and those gratifications, not because they do not perceive them to be unreasonable, but because their fleshly part gets the better of their mental. And to this it is owing, that they often do those things which are strongly disapproved of by their understandings: nay, they frequently hate with their minds those actions they are betrayed into by the powerful influence of their animal inclinations. I doubt not, I here speak the real experience of most wicked men. It is indeed the truth respecting all, who have not by habitual folly awfully corrupted their natural powers. By these we are fitted, not only to perceive

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perceive moral forms, and the difference between them, but to feel the beauty and excellency of virtuous ones; and the ugliness and deformity of those that are vicious. This capacity has not been destroyed by the lapse; and it is, perhaps, impossible it should be totally destroyed, but by the destruction of the faculty itself by which we perceive at all. It is accordingly the truth of fact, that men, who, by their personal folly, have awfully vitiated their understandings, and moral taste too, are yet capable of seeing, and feeling, a beauty and glory in characters that are the reverse of their own. When placed before their view, in a strong point of light, they command their approbation; they cannot but own their perception of that which is amiable and excellent in them; though, at the same time, they are ashamed they are not themselves the subjects of this glory.

Upon the whole of what has been offered, it appears, that our nature, as transmitted from Adam, is neither morally corrupt, or devoid of those faculties or principles, in the exercise of which we may, under the means, helps, and advantages we are favoured with, become the subjects of those qualities, which will prepare us for honour and immortality in God's kingdom that is above: but still, it would be greatly beside the truth to say, that it is as *perfect* as our first father received it from the creating hand of God, and that we are as able, notwithstanding any disadvantage

vantage that has happened to us, by reason of his lapse, to obey our Maker, as he was, in paradise. This, I am sensible, is the opinion of some; but it appears to me a great mistake. And I cannot but wonder, that those should fall into it, who have been much conversant in the apostle Paul's writings. His Epistles, in general, and his Epistle to the Romans in particular, cannot, as I imagine, be understood upon any other supposition than this, that mankind, in consequence of the lapse of the one man Adam, came into the world under a *disadvantageous* state of nature; insomuch that it is morally impossible they should, upon the terms of law, law disjoined from grace, obtain either the *justification of life*, or that *meetness for heaven*, without which they cannot have admission into that blessed place: and this I shall now endeavour to confirm with all the clearness and brevity I can. In order where-to, let the following things be carefully attended to:

1. The apostle Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, has distinctly and largely proved, not that mankind are *totally corrupt in heart and life*, either by the *positive infusion of bad principles*, or the *withdrawment of good ones*; but that, when they are capable of moral action, they will so far transgress the rule, as to be incapable of claiming justification upon the foot of naked law. The proof he has exhibited of this, is contained in the

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the three first chapters of this Epistle; where we shall find a very melancholy account of the degenerate state the whole world of men, then consisting of Jews and Gentiles, had sunk into. It cannot, indeed, with any face of reason, be supposed, that the character he here draws of Jews and Gentiles justly belonged, in all its lineaments, to either of them *individually* considered. There were, without all doubt, among both these bodies of men, a number, who had "escaped the pollutions" that were common in that day "through lust:" nay, there is no reason to think but that some, at least, of the *individuals* that constituted those *collective bodies*, were really good men, in the gospel-mitigated sense of the words; but still, it was true of them all, that they had "gone out of the way;" not equally, viewed as individuals, but in various degrees, some in one, others in another, and the generality in an high degree; insomuch that the Apostle might justly describe them, in the gross, as awfully corrupt. For this was the real truth of their character; though it might be said of some of them, in the *individual* sense, that they were sinners only in the eye of law, as separated from the grace that is in Christ Jesus.

And that it was really the design of the Apostle to give us to understand, that they were all sinners in the judgment of rigid law, *individually* speaking, and not in the *collective* sense only, should seem evident beyond all reasonable dis-

pute. How else could he say, chap. iii. ver. 9. "We have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are ALL under sin?" How else could he say, in consequence of this proof, ver. 19. "that EVERY MOUTH is stopped, and ALL THE WORLD become guilty before God?" How else could he introduce, from his thread of reasoning in these chapters, the universal conclusion, ver. 20. "therefore, by the deeds of the law shall NO FLESH be justified in his sight?" And, in short, how else could he go on and affirm, as in ver. 21. that "now," that is, under the gospel, "the righteousness of God," the righteousness God will accept in the affair of justification, "without law," upon another foot than that of mere law, "is manifested?" And again, ver. 24. "that we are justified freely by his [God's] grace, through the redemption that is in Jesus!" And yet again, ver. 28. "therefore we conclude, that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law?"

It should seem indubitably clear, that the Apostle's aim was to teach, and establish, justification upon other than *law terms*; and that his reasoning, in the three first chapters of this Epistle, was principally directed to settle this important point. But if, in consequence of his reasoning, it is not the truth of fact that both Jews and Gentiles were sinners in the account of *strict law*, considered INDIVIDUALLY as well as COLLECTIVELY, there is no argumentative connection

nection between the point he had in view, and the reasoning he has used to defend and support it. Nay, if it were true of any one individual, whether in the Jewish or Gentile world, that he was not a sinner, judging of his character by law, without grace, the Apostle has left his doctrine of the impossibility of justification upon the terms of law, without solid proof, at least, in regard of that universality in which he has asserted, and endeavoured to maintain it. He can, in a word, be looked upon as a consistent conclusive writer upon no other scheme than this, that Jews and Gentiles, individually as well as collectively considered, were sinners in the eye of law, as having been the breakers of it in a less or greater degree, and therefore not within the possibility of being justified upon a trial by so severe a rule.

I may pertinently add here, that the Apostle's reasoning, with respect to the unattainableness of justification upon the terms of law, ought to be considered as referring not only to mankind as existing at the time when he wrote, but to mankind in all after-ages to the end of time. For the consequence he deduces, from his method of reasoning, is in those strong terms of universality, "therefore by the deeds of the law, there shall NO FLESH be justified in his sight." NO FLESH; that is, no son of Adam, not one of the human race. Nor, unless he is to be understood as taking into his meaning mankind universally, have we, in these days, any concern with his

doctrine of "justification without law:" whereas, he most certainly wrote with a view to after-ages, as well as that in which he lived; designing to affirm, and prove, that no man, in any age till the end of the world, could be justified upon mere law-terms; because, in the eye of naked law, they could not but be found guilty before God. And the real truth is, his reasoning upon this head is as applicable to mankind universally in these days, as to mankind at the time when he wrote his Epistle. For it is as true now, as it was then, and has all along been so, that they have universally sinned. Not that mankind, in all ages, have been sinners just in the same degree as in the Apostle's days; but they now are, always have been, and always will be, sinners in such a sense, as that it is impossible they should be justified by the rule of strict law.

And this account of his reasoning, it is observable, perfectly coincides with the representations that are, every where else, given of this matter in Scripture. Says the inspired David, Psalm cxxx. 3. "If thou, Lord, shouldest mark iniquities, O Lord, who shall stand?" And again, Psalm cxliii. 2. "Enter not into judgment with thy servant; for in thy sight shall no man living be justified." To the like purpose is the reasoning in the book of Job, chap. ix. ver. 2, 3. "How should man be just with God? If he contend with him, he cannot answer him one of a thousand." To the same purpose still are those words

words of Solomon, Eccles. vii. 20. "There is not a just man upon earth that doth good, and sinneth not." Agreeable whereto the apostle John assures us, in his first Epistle, chap. i. ver. 8. that "if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."

2. The apostle Paul, and indeed all the sacred writers of the New Testament, do as certainly ground man's *sanctification*, as their justification, on the scheme of grace that is opened in the gospel; giving us to understand, that no son of Adam can, upon any other foot, attain to a "freedom from sin," any more than "condemnation." Their language is as full and express upon the former, as the latter of these points. Hence the gospel is called, verse 2. of the 8th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, "The law of the Spirit of life," which makes us "free from the law of sin and death." Hence "the righteousness of the law" is said, ver. 4. to be "fulfilled by those who walk after the Spirit," that is, as influenced and conducted by the Spirit of God, who is exhibited in the gospel plan as the dispenser of all gracious assistances. Hence our "mortifying the deeds of the body" is spoken of, ver. 13. as accomplished "through the Spirit," that is, help ministered from him. And hence our attainment to a state of *moral rectitude*, is every where attributed to those influences which are beyond the power of mere nature.

Agreeably, we are not only said to be "born again," to be "created again," to be "renewed in the inner man;" but to be "born of the Spirit," to be "created in Christ Jesus," to be "renewed by the Holy Ghost;" the evident purport of which texts is, that, upon our becoming good men, we have, as it were, a new moral existence, and have it from the grace and spirit of God, through Jesus Christ; and not in consequence of the sole workings of mere nature. And this is equally true of all the sons of Adam, whether they are Jews or Gentiles. In short (for it would be needless to enlarge in so plain a case), it is very obviously the great scope, especially of the apostle Paul's writings, to teach us, that our condition in the world is such, as that it is impossible, by the force of mere nature, under a dispensation of rigid law, to attain to a state of sanctification, any more than justification. He equally grafts both these attainments on the gospel-plan; nor can his writings be made intelligible and consistent upon any other supposition.

3. I now add, in the last place, that he has distinctly and particularly acquainted us with the *true rise*, or *occasional cause* of all this; namely our coming into existence through the first man Adam, and, in consequence of his lapse, under a DISADVANTAGEOUS STATE OF NATURE. There are several passages in the 5th chapter of his Epistle

Epistle to the Romans, which evidently carry in them this meaning: nor can they be understood, as I imagine, in any other sense, so as to make the Apostle a coherent conclusive writer. The passages I refer to are those, in general, contained in the 12th to the end of the 19th verse; more especially these words, "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death has passed upon all men, for that all have sinned:" I would read the last words "for that all have sinned," [ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἡμαρτον] UPON WHICH, IN CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH, all have sinned; or, in other words, are in such a state, under such circumstances, as that it is morally impossible but they should *so far* sin, as to be incapable of being justified by law without grace, or of attaining to a meetness for the future glory and immortality. That this is the meaning of the Apostle in these words, or that, by using them, he had it in design to represent "the one offence of the one man Adam," as that which gave rise, or occasion, to the *disadvantageous* circumstances under which his posterity come into existence, in consequence of which they will turn out sinners, and unfit for heavenly happiness, should they be dealt with according to law, without the intervening mixture of grace: I say, that this is the idea the Apostle intended to convey, we shall endeavour, in a supplemental dissertation, largely to shew. And I chose to offer what was proper

and necessary to be said upon this head in a distinct dissertation, that I might not engage the attention of the common reader to what he might think too tedious, as well as hard to be understood.

From the two foregoing particulars, and the last, as illustrated in the Supplement to this Work, it undeniably appears, that mankind come into the world, in consequence of Adam's lapse, not only subjected to *death*, but to *such a state of nature* as renders it impossible they should, upon a rule of law not mixed with grace, obtain the justification of life, or that moral rectitude, without which they cannot be happy as moral and intelligent agents. And I have taken the more pains upon this head, because the gospel-scheme, as set forth in the writings of the apostle Paul, takes rise from BOTH THESE DISADVANTAGES, derived to us in consequence of the lapse of our first father Adam; and this, with evidence so clear and full, that it is really unaccountable any, who have made it their business to study his Epistles, should declare to the world, that "mankind derive from Adam *as good a nature* as he had before his lapse;" that is, a nature as well furnished to attain to a state of *moral rectitude*; and that the "gospel-scheme no otherwise refers to the lapse of Adam, than as it delivers his posterity from the power of death, to which they had thereby been subjected." For, if this is a just representation of the case, the posterity
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of Adam had no more need of the gospel-dispensation to promote sanctity in them, than he had to promote it in him in his innocent state, however they might need it to deliver them from the power of the grave. For possessing, by supposition, a nature as well fitted for moral attainments, as his, they might, without the gospel, have been the actual subjects of them as well as he: but, surely, the apostle Paul has given us a quite different account of this matter. Can any, who have carefully studied his Epistles; his Epistle to the Romans in special, with the least face of reason, pretend, that mankind, in his view of the case, stand in no more need of the gospel than innocent Adam, in order to their attaining to a freedom from the power of their fleshly nature? and that the gospel relates to no other *disadvantage*, arising from his lapse, than our certain lability to suffer *death*? It must be owing to some strange bias of mind, if it is not perceived that the apostle Paul makes it impossible, that any son of Adam should attain to a state of *moral rectitude* without the gospel, or by the sole force of mind, or reason; and that the gospel-dispensation was as truly erected in relief of our *weakness* and *imperfection*, in ourselves simply considered, with respect to *sanctification*, as to deliver us from *death* which had got dominion over us.

It has been said by no less a writer than Dr. Taylor, and by others from him, "that it cannot
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be collected from any thing that was either said or done by Adam before his fall, that his faculties were superior to what they were afterwards, or that they exceeded the faculties his posterity have been endowed with since." Should this be allowed, it will not follow (as has been largely proved already in answer to this objection), but that he might, notwithstanding, have possessed faculties that would have enabled him, by use and exercise, in due time to have attained to vastly more exalted degrees, both of knowledge and holiness, than any of his posterity are capable of in their present state.

And it is with me past all doubt, that this is the truth of the case. For if it be a real fact, as we have in some of the foregoing pages endeavoured to prove it from the Scripture to be, that the earth has been changed from its pristine state by the CURSE of God, it is highly congruous to reason to suppose, that some analogous change has been made also in the constitutions of men, fitting them to live on it. And, without introducing the immediate agency of God to effect this change, it may easily be accounted for. It is both natural and philosophical to think, that the *bodily* constitution of Adam might be gradually altered, upon his being turned out of paradise, into a world that had been *curst* of God; that is, so changed as to be adapted to very different purposes from what it was before. It could not indeed have been otherwise.

Established

Established connections made it necessary. A change in external nature, rendering it *less perfect*, would, in consequence of settled laws uniformly taking place, produce a like change in his bodily machine, gradually reducing it to a state similar to itself. And if his bodily nature was rendered *less perfect*, the disadvantage would unavoidably have extended to his soul. For as his soul acted by the medium of his body, its exertions must have been proportioned to its fitness as an instrument to act by; which amounts, in true sense and reality of construction, to the same thing, precisely, as if a change had been made in his soul itself, because its faculties, with respect to their use or exercise, is all we are concerned with in the present argument. And as the posterity of Adam were to have existence as derived to them through him, and to hold it in a world that lies under the curse it was doomed to for his offence, it could not be but it must have been in the like changed and less perfect state*.

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* I have supposed, in the above reasoning, that our first father might have been gradually changed, according to the established course of nature, into a *less perfect* creature, in consequence of the CURSE that was fastened on the earth by reason of his lapse; though it might also have been effected in a more direct way, by the *immediate* agency of God. A change in his *body*, as his soul could act only by that as its instrument, was all that was necessary. And why may it not be thought that the *body* of Adam, upon his lapse, was deprived, in a measure, of that perfection, as a machine, which it had in his innocent state, and by the same power that originally formed it? Possibly the resurrection-

And it was, perhaps, expedient, in point of wisdom, that, upon a change in material nature, there should be a change also in the human constitution. A different state of the earth would require a proportionably different one in the powers of its inhabitants. Such powers as we now have, might not be suited to the state of the world before the lapse; as, on the other hand, such powers as Adam had in innocency might not be adapted to the condition the world has been in

restitution-bodies of the saints may be little, if any thing more, than their comparatively "vile bodies" restored to the state they might have been in, had it not been for the lapse of the one man Adam. There may be reason to think thus, if we attend to the manner of speaking sometimes used in the New Testament writings: as in Acts, iii. 21. where "the heavens are said to receive Christ until [*ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων*] the restitution of all things;" that is, the times when they shall be restored to the state they were in before the lapse, and the curse that was consequent upon it: so, in Matth. xix. 28. where our Saviour, speaking of those who had followed him, says, "In the regeneration [*ἐν τῇ παλιγγεσσίᾳ*] they shall sit upon twelve thrones." The regeneration here mentioned, doubtless, points our view to the intended renovation of all things; their being, as it were, born again, so born as to exist in their former better state. In like manner, the apostle Peter bespeaks the Christians he wrote to in such language as that, 2 Ephes. iii. 13. "We, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." This new heaven and new earth is the same with that which the apostle John saw in his visions, Rev. xxi. 1; which seems to have been the earth delivered, as he speaks, chap. xxii. 3. from the curse, and restored to its paradisaic state: for it is represented to have in it "a river of water of life," and "the tree of life," in allusion to the paradise of innocent Adam, Rev. xxii. 1, 2.

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since. It might be unfit, disproportionate, for Adam, or any of his posterity, in such a world as the curse has made this to be, to be capable of acquiring either so much knowledge, or holiness, as might have been suitable and proper for them to have acquired in the paradisaic world. The world, in its present state, may be quite unfit for such improvements, either intellectual or moral, as might have been highly proper in its original state.

But, however this be, it is certainly the truth of fact, and known to be so from universal experience, that the posterity of Adam are in such circumstances, as that an unerring attachment to the rule of duty is not to be expected; insomuch that it is not possible they should be justified upon the foot of rigid law, or that they should attain to acceptable rectitude, but by the assistance of grace. And, if we may depend upon the inspired Paul, this state we are in took rise from the offence of the one man Adam, our first father.

It will, probably, be said by some, as an insuperable objection against our deriving from Adam, in consequence of his lapse, the state of nature we have described, that it bears hard upon the attributes and moral government of God: and I acknowledge, with all freedom, if God had determined to deal with the posterity of Adam in a way of *strict law only*, the objection, so far as I am able to judge, could not possibly be answered. But, if they were placed from the beginning, and
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have all along since been, under a dispensation that is adjusted to their nature and circumstances (which, as I suppose, is the real truth of the case, and has, in some of the foregoing pages been proved to be so), there is no difficulty in the matter; at least, no greater difficulty than arises from the subjection we are under to sorrow and death, in consequence of this same original lapse. Both these *disadvantages* stand upon the same foot. They are both justified by like analogies, and may equally be accounted for upon the doctrine of *general laws* established for the *general good*.

We have already seen that children are subjected to heavy sufferings, yea, grievous anticipated deaths, through the default of their more immediate parents; which is a fact perfectly analogous to that subjection we are all under to sorrow and death, through the default of our common father, and may, in the same way, be reconciled with the perfections and righteous government of God.

I now add, the same analogy takes place, with respect to the *disadvantage* here objected to. It is daily seen in fact, and known by experience, that children derive from their next or more immediate progenitors, constitutional turns, complexions, temperatures, disorders, or whatever else any please to call them, which have a very great influence in the formation of their main character in life. In virtue of these *general laws*, which the God of nature has established, these constitutional

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constitutional turns (whether we can conceive of the modus of the thing, or account for it or not) are not only transmitted from parents to children, but, in consequence of them, children are subjected to *vast disadvantages*, with respect both to *mental* and *moral* attainments. To this it is owing, that some children are born incapable of ever coming to the proper exercise of reason and understanding; to the same cause it may be attributed, that others arrive to the exercise of reason in a poor, low degree only; and to the same bodily temperature still it may justly be ascribed, at least in part, that many among those who possess the power of reason, in a considerable measure, are so exceeding apt to be betrayed into wrong and mistaken notions. And *bodily constitution* has the like influence upon men's *morals*. It is not more certain that children derive from their parents *bodily tendencies* towards these and those distempers, than that they are born with *constitutional turns*, prompting to these and those moral irregularities. The sanguine, for instance, have that in their natural frame which tempts them to lightness, vanity, and wantonness; the choleric, to passion and quick resentment; the phlegmatic, to idleness, sloth, and carelessness; and the melancholic, to suspicion, jealousy, and sourness of temper. These, and the like turns, may, possibly, be superinduced in some persons upon nature; but, with respect to multitudes, they have their foundation in that animal temperature which

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has been transmitted to them from their parents.

Not that any are to be **BLAMED** for their constitutional disorders, simply as such, be they as they may. It is no more my **FAULT** that I was born with a temperature of blood and spirits, in consequence of which I am apt to be betrayed into rash anger, jealousy, hatred, or fleshly indulgences, than that I was born with a tendency in my nature to the gout, or gravel, or stone, or any other bodily distemper. I may be **FAULTY**, when I come to the exercise of reason, for not restraining and governing my constitutional turns; but it is impossible I should be justly chargeable with blame for having them in my nature, simply as they are transmitted to me with my existence. But still, these constitutional disorders are great **DISADVANTAGES**, and may prove the occasion of, or temptation to, a very vicious and immoral character in after-life; which, God knows, is too often the case in fact: nay, these bodily temperatures may render our state of trial far more difficult and dangerous than it would otherwise have been; nay, further, in consequence of them, it may be impossible, upon the foot of a dispensation not mixed with grace, but that we should be miserable.

Now, if the established laws of nature are such, as that we may come into existence, and be obliged to hold existence, under the **DISADVANTAGE** of a constitution **LESS PERFECT**, and **LESS**

FITTED for intellectual and moral attainments, than would have been transmitted to us, had it not been for the sin and folly of our *more immediate* progenitors, why may not the like *disadvantage* be derived to us from our *original* and *common* father? There is certainly an analogy between these cases; and if the former can be accounted for, the latter may also, in the same way.

It will, perhaps, be said here, Why need the Deity have confined himself to establish general laws in the bestowment of existence? Why, to laws from whence have arose such manifest inconveniences? Does it not argue a defect in God's wisdom or benevolence, that mankind, by the fatality of settled connections in nature, should be made liable to sufferings, and this, through even the follies and vices of those from whom they derive their being?

In reply, it is easy to observe, that questions of this kind do, in their final result, prove nothing more than the ignorance of those who make them. It may be true, for aught any one can say to the contrary, that man's coming into existence, and then holding existence, not by immediate, unrelaxed exertions of Divine power, but conformably to established connections, in an uniform course, is the fittest method for the accomplishment of the best and wisest ends: and it may be as true, that the connections which God has, in fact, established, are as well adapted as they could have been to promote those same ends. To

be sure, no man has a right to find fault, either with established laws in general, or those in particular which are established, till he is able to make it appear that better ends could have been answered; that is, inconveniences lessened, and the common good, upon the whole, augmented, if no connections were settled, or others established, in the room of those that now take place.

Should it be again said, upon supposition of a course of nature, and such an one as is actually established, might not INTERPOSITIONS be reasonably expected, such interpositions as would prevent the inconveniences that would otherwise happen? And does not the want of these interpositions, and the sufferings of mankind thereupon, bear hard upon the benevolence of the Supreme Being?

The answer plainly is, the inconveniences which arise for the present, from general laws stately permitted to take their course, may possibly, under the conduct of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness, be remedied in the final issue of their operation. But however this be, who knows what would be the result of those desired interpositions, whether good or evil, upon the whole? It is true, if they would be followed with no other consequences than the prevention of the inconveniences they are introduced for, they might reasonably be desired and expected; but who can say, there would be no other consequences; yea, that there would not be bad ones.

it may be, such as might be more than a balance for the evil it is proposed they should remedy? The truth is, these asked-for interpositions would necessarily introduce an essential change in the government of the world: and we may be ready to imagine, it would be a change for the better; but we know not that it would. And if we should affirm such a thing, it would be only by way of mere random conjecture. Besides, it ought to be remembered, the interpositions here required are such as must be EFFECTUAL certainly to prevent *moral* as well as *natural* evil. And will any undertake to make it evident, that *moral* evil could certainly and effectually have been prevented by interpositions that would not, at the same time, have brought on other consequences as truly fatal to the happiness of moral agents? It is, perhaps, an indubitable truth, that no interpositions but such over-bearing ones as are destructive of moral agency itself, could have certainly and absolutely prevented *moral* evil. And the destruction of moral agency would, I will venture to say, have at once destroyed the true and only foundation on which the greatest and most valuable happiness, that is communicable from the Deity, is built; as an intelligent reader may easily perceive, by pursuing the thought in his own mind.

Upon the whole, the method of giving existence to the human species, and supporting them in it, not by immediate unrelated acts of power

and goodness, but in a successive way, conformably to established laws, not over-ruled by frequently repeated interpositions, but permitted to take effect in a regular uniform course, may be the wisest and best; and the Deity might know it to be so, and for this reason pitch upon it as the only way in which he would manifest his benevolence in bringing mankind into being, and continuing them in it. And we ought to rest satisfied with this method; to be sure, we ought not to find fault with it, till we find ourselves able to devise one that is better.

And if this method, for aught we can say, may be the best fitted to accomplish the best ends, it is no objection against the wisdom or goodness of it, either that the whole human species, in consequence of its operation, come into existence subjected to the *disadvantages* we have been speaking of, or that any of the individuals of this species, in consequence of the same established laws, possess their beings under *inconveniences peculiar* to themselves. For these may be unavoidable effects of that which is the best adapted scheme to accomplish, upon the whole, the greatest good.

It may be subjoined here, as a just corollary from what has been said in the immediately foregoing paragraph, that the whole human species, by means of the first man Adam, or any of the individuals of this species, by means of their next progenitors, may come into existence and possess it, under *disadvantages* it would be a reflection

tion on the Deity to suppose he should subject them to, if they received their being *immediately* from his creating hands. The reason of this is evidently founded on the preceding doctrine of *general laws* taking place conformably to an established settled course: for, according to these laws, the abuse of moral agency is connected with disadvantage, not only to the guilty individuals, but others also connected with them, especially those who derive their existence from them; which connection of disadvantage, with the abuse of moral agency, notwithstanding its thus consequentially affecting others besides the guilty persons themselves, may be the wisest and best expedient to accomplish, upon the whole, the best and wisest ends. And if so, this subjection of others, besides the guilty persons themselves, to this *consequential* disadvantage, may consist with the highest wisdom and benevolence in the Supreme Being; while yet it might be inconsistent with the honour of those perfections to suppose, that he should subject those innocent beings to this disadvantage, without the intervention of abused moral agency; as would be the case, if they were brought into existence by *immediate unrelated* acts of power. From whence it follows, that should it be the truth of fact, as I doubt not but it really is, that the condition of mankind, by means of their first father and after-progenitors, is such as they could not be placed in, if they received their existence by immediate acts

of creating power; I say, should this be the truth of fact, it may, notwithstanding, be as true a one, that their subjection to this condition is perfectly reconcilable with the attributes of God, as it comes to pass in consequence of laws, which, though established for the accomplishment of the best ends, are yet unavoidably capable, in the nature of things, of being perverted in their operation, so as to leave room for this *inconvenience*, however great a one it may be esteemed,

But, after all that has been said, it may yet further be objected, Why need Adam, upon his one offence, have been subjected to a doom that made it impossible for him to attain to a happy immortality, without first passing through a variety of sorrows, and even death itself? Could not the all-merciful Being have admitted him to pardon upon the terms of repentance, and a better care of obedience for the future; and in this way have prevented these sufferings? And would not such a method of conduct have better comported with the conceptions we have of his infinite goodness? Especially as the sentence pronounced against him would, in consequence of settled conviction, involve his posterity, throughout all generations, in a multiplicity of trials, and unavoidably prevent their ever obtaining eternal life without first undergoing death.

This objection, it is obvious, would set up a scheme in remedy of the inconveniences of the lapse, different from that which is proposed in
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the revelations of God. But who can say what would have been the result of this scheme of man's wisdom? Will any pretend to affirm, that it would, in the final issue of its operation, have been more honorary to the Governor of the world, or more conducive to the good of mankind, than that which is opened in the sacred books of Scripture? Perhaps, the reasons of government might make it fit and proper, and therefore morally necessary, that the threatening which God denounced should be executed; Would the wisdom of the Supreme Legislator have guarded his prohibition with a penalty it was not reasonable and just he should inflict? And might not the infliction of it, when incurred, be of service, signal service, to the honour of the Divine authority, and to secure the obedience of the creature in all after-times? And it might be more for man's good, for the "one man" Jesus Christ to become "the wisdom and power of God" unto our salvation, than that it should be left with ourselves to work it out; especially after the trial that had already been made with respect to the first man.

It is true, there is no arriving at immortality in the way proposed in the inspired writings, without passing through sorrows, trials, and even death itself; but these are all capable, upon the plan of God, through the grace there is in Jesus Christ, of becoming *advantages*, rather than disadvantages, to us. For the greater our sorrows,

the more numerous and heavy our sufferings, the "more exceeding will be our weight of glory" in the resurrection-world, if, by means of them, we are made more perfect, in conformity to the example of him who is our pattern and Saviour: and they may, upon the gospel-scheme of mercy, be a fit and wise course of discipline, in order to our being formed to a meekness for this glory and honour.

The short of the matter is, God would not have permitted Adam, after his lapse, to have continued in life long enough to have had posterity, if he had not devised a scheme for their relief under the sorrows and trials they would come into existence subjected to, and the sins likewise they might be led aside and enticed to commit. And this scheme, we may depend, is a wise and good one, an infinitely better one than could have been contrived by man, or God would not have adopted it. It is, at present, in operation only; and as we do not see its whole result, we can judge of it but imperfectly: but when it has had its full effect, and is a finished work, there will be no room left for dispute. All intelligent beings, in all worlds, who may be made acquainted with it, will be obliged to own and admire the riches both of the wisdom and goodness which have been manifested by it.

DISSERTATION IV.

Of the difference between the one man, Adam, in his innocent state, and his posterity descending from him in his lapsed state.

NO one can read the foregoing pages, and not perceive, that there was a difference (important in some respects) between the one man, Adam, in innocency, and his posterity as deriving existence from him, after his fall from God. It may not be improper to be particular and distinct in pointing out this difference, as it will enable us to take in, at once, a clear and full idea of the true state of our first father before his lapse, and of ours in consequence of it.

Adam was brought into being by an *immediate* exertion of creating power. He was, accordingly, as at first made by God, a creature perfect in his kind; that is, he had nothing wrong in his nature, no faculties, either bodily or mental, but what were wisely and admirably well adapted to one of his rank in the scale of existence. He was not made naturally incapable of misusing his implanted powers. Had this been possible,

possible, it did not seem expedient to the wisdom of God; for it is evident, from what has taken place in fact, that he might become a sinful creature. But yet, his endowments were such as that he was every way fitted to answer the ends for which he was created. This, as we have seen, is the account the Scripture has given us of the matter. His bodily machine was curiously suited to be a fit instrument for his soul to act by; and his soul was furnished with intellectual and moral faculties, rendering him capable of attaining to an actual resemblance of the Deity in knowledge, holiness, and happiness; and of growing perpetually in this likeness to the highest degrees attainable by a creature of his order in the creation.

The posterity of Adam come into existence, not *immediately*, but by the intervention of an *established course of nature*. And to this it is owing, that existence is handed to them in a *less perfect* state than that in which it was communicated to the one man, Adam. If the original progenitor had continued innocent, it is not certain that his posterity, from generation to generation, would have had his nature transmitted to them in the *same perfect degree* in which he received, and would have possessed it. But however it might be as to this, it is, since the lapse, a real fact, and has all along been so, that mankind come into being *less perfect* in degree, than their first father came out of the creating hand

of God. The *essential* characteristics of human nature, it is true, have, in all ages from the beginning, been transmitted from parents to children; but not in the same degree of perfection. This has ever been various, and ever will be so, in virtue of those intermediate secondary causes, with which the transmission of existence is universally connected. And as these causes have their operation since the lapse, it is impossible but that existence should be communicated with comparative *disadvantage*. No son of Adam comes into being but with *less perfection* of nature than he might, and would have done, had it not been for the introduction of sin into the world, and the numerous evils that are, by the establishment of heaven, connected with it: and as to multitudes, existence being communicated to them through progenitors, who have sunk their natures by their follies and vices, it is possessed by them in lamentably sad circumstances; and the more so, as their trial for the future state has hereby been rendered greatly difficult, and peculiarly hazardous.

Another difference between Adam and his posterity is this: he was created a *MAN* at once; that is, with implanted powers, in such a state as that they were immediately fit for use and exercise. We are born *INFANTS*, in regard of our minds as well as bodies. Whatever natural powers we are endowed with, they are at first in a weak, low, feeble state; and it is in a leisurely gradual

gradual way, that they rise to a degree of maturity tolerably fitting them for exercise. The advantage here will readily be perceived to be much in favour of the one man Adam. It is true, his powers, at first, were naked capacities as ours are; but then, they were the powers of a *full-made man*, and not of a mere *babe* or *infant* for which reason he might, with great ease and quickness, have arrived at that perfection, especially in moral qualities, which he was made capable of attaining to, and in the attainment of which he would best answer the ends of his creation. It is true, likewise, he must, his powers being at first nothing more than mere naked ones, have stood in need of foreign guidance and help in his present unexperienced and unimproved state. And he was accordingly favoured with it *immediately* from God. His Maker was his guide, tutor, and guardian; and had he not disobeyed his voice, by hearkening to his own counsel, he would have trained him up to a confirmed state in every thing that was valuable. In this, the advantage was unspeakably on the side of Adam. For we, his posterity, instead of having God for our *immediate* instructor, are placed under the tutelage of parents, or others who may happen to have the care of us, while in our non-age. And as we are, from the day of our birth to the time of our growth to a state of maturity, under the guidance of those who are too generally ignorant, not knowing how to cultivate

cultivate our powers; or negligent, taking little or no care upon this head; or so in love with vanity and sin, as to educate us in folly and vice: I say, as we are for years too commonly the guardianship of those who are thus weak, or negligent, or grossly wicked, it must be obvious at first sight, that we are under great *disadvantage* as to the good culture of our minds, in comparison with our first father. And, in truth, it is very much owing to this disadvantage, as our powers are in growth, that so many contract, in their early days, such habits of vice as denominate them the slaves of corruption; though, if they continue so in after-life, as, God knows, is too generally the case, to the utter ruin of thousands and ten thousands, the fault will be their own; for deliverance from the bondage of sin, however great it has been, or however early contracted, is obtainable upon the foot of grace through Jesus Christ.

Further, Adam, upon his being brought into existence, was placed by his Creator in paradise, where he was in want of nothing to make him as happy as a creature of his rank could be, in a world, with reference to which it is said, "God saw that it was good." The earth, without any toilful labour of his, brought forth every thing that was "pleasant to the sight, and good for food:" nor was he subjected to the suffering of evil in any kind. He might, from the make of his body, and the manner of its being supported, be

be naturally capable of undergoing pain in various ways; but his Maker was his protection and guard; inasmuch that, while innocent, he would have preserved him from whatever might have occasioned the sensation of anxiety and grief in any shape or form. Such, in a word, were his circumstances, in regard of soul and body, and the world he was placed in, that he might, without interruption, have enjoyed life as perfectly as it was fit he should do. We, his posterity since the lapse, come into being in a world, the "ground" of which has been "curled," so as that it is "in sorrow," by the "sweat of our faces," and the toil of our hands, we must "eat of its produce all our days:" besides which, we are "born to trouble," in innumerable instances, "as the sparks fly upwards." It is on those accounts, that mankind "groan and travail in pain;" and they are herefrom subjected to many and great disadvantages respecting their attainment to a state of moral rectitude. It is acknowledged, a vast variety of those inconveniencies, difficulties, sorrows, and sufferings, we are subjected to, are not so *directly* owing to Adam, as to immediate predecessors, and the wickedness of the world we live in: but then, it ought to be remembered, whatever disorders there are in this lower creation, whether of a natural or moral kind, they took rise from the "one offence of the one man, Adam." This gave occasion for their introduction into the world;

world; and by means of them we are under circumstances greatly disadvantageous, in comparison with the state Adam was in while innocent.

Another difference between innocent Adam and his posterity is this: he, though formed of corruptible materials, in consequence of which he was *naturally* a corruptible mortal creature, might, in virtue of "the tree of life," have lived for ever, had he not eat of "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," concerning which his Maker had said, "thou shalt not eat of it, for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." We, his posterity, come into being not only corruptible mortal creatures by nature, as he was, but under such circumstances that death must inevitably pass upon us. That grace which would have made our first father immortal, by keeping his corruptible from ever seeing corruption, was, upon his one offence, withdrawn; in consequence of which, he not only died himself, but his posterity also will universally and certainly undergo death. But then it must be added here, they, as well as he, shall be delivered from the power of death. In Christ "all shall be made alive," and with as much certainty as that "in Adam all die." And all come into existence under the possibility of "reigning in life;" completely happy life, and this for ever, through our Lord Jesus Christ, "the gift of God," by whom is "eternal life."

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There is another difference still between innocent Adam and his posterity: according to the rule of trial under which our first father was placed in innocency, there was no room for repentance, in case of transgression; but, upon one offence only, he would be subjected to the threatened penalty; as was the truth of fact. For having transgressed in the one article wherein he was tried, he was doomed to die. We, his posterity, upon the foot of the new dispensation we are under, may, if we are wrought upon to repent, be admitted to mercy, though our offences should have been ever so numerous. Herein, as the apostle Paul speaks, the advantage by Christ, exceeds, goes beyond the damage by Adam. The condemnatory sentence was pronounced upon him, and consequentially takes place upon us, by reason of "one act of disobedience" only; but "the free gift is of MANY OFFENCES unto justification." However many, or however heinously aggravated our sins have been, we may, in opposition to them all, upon the gospel-plan, obtain the pardoning mercy of God. In this respect, we are in better circumstances than Adam was, while under trial in his innocent state.

Finally, The reward promised to Adam, in case of persevering obedience to his Maker, was PERPETUAL LIFE, though naturally a mortal creature: only, he was to enjoy this life here on earth; which he would have done with as much happiness,

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happiness, as one of his rank in the creation was fitted for in such a world as this. It has been often said, he would in time have passed through some alteration as to the mode of his existence, and been placed in some other world, better adapted to his making still higher advances in blessedness. But this is mere conjecture. The Bible speaks of no promised life, or happiness, beyond that he would have enjoyed in the earthly paradise. We, his posterity, notwithstanding the lapse, and any consequences of it, come into existence absolutely sure, in virtue of the promise of God, of a resurrection to life after death; and, if we behave well in the state of trial we are placed under, we are in like manner sure, upon the word of the same faithful and true witness, not only that our "corruptible shall put on incorruption, and our mortal put on immortality, but that we shall exist incorruptible immortal creatures in that kingdom that is above, where the infinite God himself dwells," in whose presence is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore. In this respect also, Adam's posterity are, perhaps, in better circumstances, than he would have been in had he continued innocent.

It is easy, upon what has been now offered, to answer justly and properly the question some have proposed; namely, are the posterity of Adam in worse circumstances than he was placed under while in innocency? Without all doubt,

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they are many ways, both naturally and morally speaking; though it may, at the same time, be true, that they have the advantage of him in some special articles, as has been hinted.

I shall not think it a needless digression, if I add here with particularity, that our very existence, as the posterity of Adam, and all our hopes as to its being an happy one, are grounded on the mediatory interposition of that GREAT PERSONAGE, whose birth into our world, with the merciful design of it, was signified to our first father, when it was told him, "that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head." Had it not been for this "only begotten Son of God," who, "in the fulness of time" was to be "born of a woman," and the display of grace through him, Adam would have been turned out of life INSTANTLY upon his eating of the tree concerning which God had said to him, "thou shalt not eat of it, for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die;" in which case he could have had no posterity. The POSSIBILITY therefore of their existence, through him as their father, was the effect of the grace that came by Jesus Christ. It was owing to this, and to this solely, that a way was opened for the existence of those millions who have already descended and may yet descend, from the one man, Adam after it had been shut up by his lapse, which exposed him to immediate death: otherwise, their coming into being would have been an impossibility.

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bility in nature. This is the first instance of the operation of the plea of mercy through Christ; and an admirably glorious one it is, as it laid the foundation for carrying into effect the whole design of God's goodness, with reference to the human kind.

The same grace through Christ which continued Adam in being after his lapse; so as that innumerable multitudes might descend from him, provided also for his and their deliverance from the *death* to which they were subjected by the righteous judgment of God; which deliverance was no way connected with any thing to be performed by them, but is an absolute unconditional grant of favour; inasmuch, that it is as certain "all shall be made alive in Christ," be their character as it may, as that they "all die in Adam." This is another instance of the riches of God's grace; and an highly important one it is. For had we come into existence subjected to death, without this provision for deliverance from it, we could not have been put under trial for "an eternal reign in happy life." Such a trial, without such redemption, could no more have taken place, than upon the supposition of non-existence itself. And, let me add here, the connection of this deliverance from death, with our being under trial for an after eternal life of happiness, is that which constitutes it a manifestation of the great goodness of God, be the event as it may. Should any of Adam's

posterity behave, in the state of trial, as too many of them will, so as that their deliverance from death will be followed with misery, instead of happiness, in the resurrection-world, it ought, notwithstanding, to be considered as it is in itself, and in the design and view of God, a rich gift of grace. For it is to be remembered, and should be heedfully minded; this, like most of the other gifts of God, is capable of being misimproved to disadvantage: but, surely, its misimprovement, so as to turn out an occasion of unhappiness, is far from destroying it as an instance of divine goodness in its original bestowment; because it proves the occasion of this unhappiness, not from itself in its own proper nature, but from our sin and folly in perverting its design, and what it was fitted for, and tended to. If, instead of being redeemed from death, that we may be crowned with immortality, glory, and honour, in God's everlasting kingdom, we are redeemed from it so as to be the more miserable for this very redemption, the fault will be our own, we can cast the blame no where but upon our own guilty heads. We may, in this case, complain of our own folly; but cannot, with the least face of reason, pretend, that God has not been admirably good and gracious.

It will further enhance our idea of the greatness of God's grace, in restoring that possibility of existence which had been forfeited by Adam's lapse, and in granting us redemption from the death

death all die in Adam, so as that we shall live again after death, and MAY live in the enjoyment of perfect blessedness for ever, if we consider how this was brought about: not by an act of mere sovereignty, but through the obedience of Jesus, the only begotten Son of the Father, to death, the cursed death of the cross. By thus submitting to die, he made ATONEMENT, not only for the original lapse, but for all the sins this would be introductory to, and might be the occasion of being committed by any of the sons of men, in any part or age of the world. We are accordingly told by the inspired Paul, that "we have redemption through the blood of Christ, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of God's grace." And he likewise expressly assures us, that "eternal life is the gift of God through our Lord Jesus Christ." Nor is there the least inconsistency in affirming, that we are "redeemed by grace," while, at the same time, it is said also, the communication of this grace is made through the MERIT, or WORTHINESS, of Christ, founded on the perfection of his obedience, which eminently discovered itself in his ready submission to die, that he might be "the propitiation for the sins of the world." For it should always be remembered, the appointment of Christ to be the Saviour of men, took rise from the grace of God. The Scripture is particularly clear, and emphatically expresses, upon this point. Says the apostle John, 1 Epist. iv. 9.

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"In this was manifested the love of God towards us, because that God sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him." To the like purpose are those words of his, in the third chapter of his Gospel, and the 16th verse, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life." The words in both these texts are very emphatical, and do in the strongest manner assure us, that the gift of Christ to be the Saviour, took rise solely from the grace of God. And, in truth, had not the Father of mercies been moved by the infinite benevolence of his own nature, he never would have parted with his own Son to come into our world, in fashion as a man, to accomplish its salvation. The motive hereto was absolutely from himself, his own essential, internal grace and pity. Some, perhaps, may be ready to think, Christ's coming into the world to suffer and die, was designed to pacify God's wrath, and influence him to have mercy upon the sinful sons of men. But this is to entertain quite wrong conceptions of the matter, and such as tend to reflect great dishonour upon the infinitely good God; who was as much inclined to mercy *before* as *after* the sufferings of Christ: nor was the death of this Son of his love at all intended to move compassion in him towards sinners. His heart was full of mercy even from eternity; and it was from this mercy

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of his, that Christ was sent into the world, and the great design he was sent upon was, to make way for the wise, just, and holy exercise of that mercy, which the good God was essentially, infinitely, and eternally inclined to exercise towards the sinful sons of men. And, in this view of the matter, how amiable does the great and good God appear, as well as his Son Jesus Christ? How wonderful is the display of his grace? If he had saved the posterity of Adam by an act of pleasure, in a mere sovereign way, this would have argued grace. But how much greater is the grace, how much more gloriously does it shine forth, in the method he has pitched upon for its conveyance, the mission of his own Son into our world, to become incarnate, and suffer, and die, that way might be made for the wise and just exercise of the divine mercy towards the human race! Herein is then the richest display of God's grace. He could not have made a more illustrious manifestation of it. Here is love, to be admired and adored by all angels as well as men.

Besides what has been hitherto said, all suitable provision is revealed, in the scheme of grace through Christ, for our being made "the workmanship of God created again," by being formed to an actual likeness to the Deity in those moral qualities, wherein consists that MEETNESS for the glories of the resurrection-world, without which we cannot be crowned with them; or, if we

could, it would rather enhance our misery, than be the occasion of happiness to us. This is sometimes effected, under the blessing of God upon parental tuition, BEFORE the introduction of those habits of sin, which denominate men "the servants of corruption." But more commonly it is CONSEQUENT upon their having been led aside, and enticed by their animal appetites, so as to become "children of disobedience," and as such "the children of wrath." The chief agent in this matter is the SPIRIT OF CHRIST; and he is the producer of the "new-birth," the "new-creation," not by the infusion or formation of any new faculty, either in the souls or bodies of men, but by superintending, directing, and animating moral means, so as that the introduction of habitual, reigning corruption shall be prevented, or afterwards eradicated, as to its predominating influence, if it has taken place: nor are men passive in this work, but co-operators with the good spirit. Whatever the Holy Ghost does, he effects by men themselves in the use of their implanted powers, and the moral means God has instituted, and he accompanies with his efficacious blessing. This is the Scripture account, and so plainly as not to admit of any reasonable dispute.

Need I now say that the gospel-scheme of man's salvation is grafted on the original lapse, and closely connected with what that naturally led

led to? Or, that we are infinitely beholden to the good God, and his Son Jesus Christ, for the prospects we have upon the foot of redeeming grace? The RICH GRACE of God through the WORTHINESS of Christ, as manifested in the gospel-plan of man's salvation, notwithstanding the lapse, and all its consequences, is often the delightful theme the sacred penmen employ their thoughts upon. This ravished the heart of the great Apostle of the Gentiles. He is scarce able to speak of it but in the highest strains of admiring, adoring gratitude.

And that is the hymn of praise, in which the redeemed should unite as one, in singing, upon this great occasion, "unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings, and priests unto God and his Father; to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever! Amen."

DISSEMINATION

~~led to? Of that we are infinitely indebted to the~~
~~and his own great merit for the~~
~~highest we have upon the foot of redeeming~~
~~grace? The rich grace of God through the~~
~~worthiness of Christ, as manifested in the~~

SUPPLEMENTAL DISSERTATION

~~the topic, and all its consequences, is often the~~
~~delightful theme the sacred penman employs~~

ROMANS, Chap. V. from the 12th to the 20th Verse, more especially those Words, "For that all have sinned," and "by one man's disobedience many were made sinners."

~~the heart of the~~
~~great Apostle of the Gentiles. He is twice cited~~
~~of it in the power of his~~
~~redeemed should unite as one, in singing~~

THESE words, whether in themselves hard to be understood, or not, have greatly embarrassed interpreters, and been the occasion of very uncomfortable disputes in the Christian world; some having uncharitably contended for this sense, and others, with as little candor, for that. And after all they have said on either side, to ascertain their true meaning, they appear to me very evidently to have missed it.

Mr. Locke says, "for that all have sinned," means, that all, by reason of the lapse of the one man, Adam, "are become mortal." The metonymy he relies on, in support of this interpretation, I should not object to, however apparently harsh, provided a recurrence to it was necessary; which is far from being the truth

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of the case. His paraphrase of the 12th verse, in which these words are found, runs thus: "Wherefore, to give you a state of the whole matter from the beginning, you must know, that as by the act of one man, Adam, the father of us all, sin entered into the world, and death, which was the punishment annexed to the offence of eating the forbidden fruit, entered by that sin, for that all Adam's posterity thereby became mortal." It is obvious, at first sight, that the words, *εφ ω*, translated in the text, and retained in this paraphrase FOR THAT, are brought in as the reason of what is affirmed in the foregoing part of the sentence. "Death, which was the punishment annexed to the offence of eating the forbidden fruit, entered by that sin, FOR THAT Adam's posterity thereby became mortal." In this way of interpretation, *εφ ω* is construed to signify precisely the same thing with *eo quod*, *for that*, *because*. But I will venture to affirm, there is not another place, in the whole New Testament, in which this is its sense; nor can it, as I imagine, be thus translated, according to any rule of grammar, unless it is taken adverbially; which is so uncommon a use of this phrase (if indeed it ever was so used), that it ought not to be admitted, unless absolute necessity should call for it. Besides, it is not true that Adam's posterity, by his lapse, became mortal. Adam himself, in innocence, was naturally mortal. "The tree of life," or, in other

other words, the special favour of God, was that, and that only, which could have made his mortal immortal, had he not fell by transgression. Adam's posterity come into existence, as he was originally made, with corruptible mortal bodies. The lapse had this effect. The all-wise, righteous Governor of the world was pleased to take occasion from it to shut up all access to "the tree of life," and ordain, that that which was naturally mortal, as being of the dust, should actually die, and return to dust. The reason of death, therefore, by means of the lapse, was not that we were thereby made mortal, but that the grace is withdrawn, which would have continued us in being for ever, though we were naturally corruptible mortal creatures. Moreover, it may be worth observing, those words, in this 12th verse, "and so death hath passed upon all men," are capable of being understood in two senses only; either as meaning that all men, by means of Adam's offence, are subjected to death, or that death has actually, and in event, passed upon them. And, in whichever of these senses we interpret the words, the following ones, "for that all have sinned," cannot be explained, with the least propriety, as Mr. Locke explains them, "for that all are become mortal."

If by the words, "and so death passed upon all men," the Apostle is supposed to mean, according to the first of these senses, that all men, by means of the one offence of Adam, are unavoidably

voidably subjected to death; what follows, in the next clause, "for that all have sinned," cannot be explained, "for that all thereby became mortal," without making the Apostle argue very weakly. His reasoning upon this interpretation will run thus: All men, by means of the one offence of their first father, are subjected to death, because they were thereby brought under this subjection. For being subjected to death by this offence, and being thereby made mortal, mean precisely one and the same thing. It would be a great dishonour to the Apostle to make him reason after this manner; and yet it is obvious, he must reason thus upon the sense of the above explication.

Nor would the matter be much mended, should we take the other mentioned sense of the words, "and so death passed upon all men;" understanding by them the actual death of all men; its having eventually passed upon them; which, perhaps, is their true sense, that being spoken of as already brought into effect, which certainly will be, a mode of diction sometimes made use of in Scripture. The reasoning of the Apostle upon this interpretation will stand thus: All men have died, by means of Adam's lapse, because they were thereby made mortal: which manner of arguing is not so satisfactory as might have been expected from a philosopher, much more from an apostle, when purposely treating of death

death in a moral view. And, in this view of death, the ground, cause, or reason, of its having "passed upon all men," is not because they were mortal, but because this was the will, appointment, or constitution of God, taking rise from the lapse of the one man, Adam. If, therefore, the Apostle had it in design, as Mr. Locke's interpretation supposes, to assign, in the last clause of this 12th verse, the reason of the foregoing clause, he would doubtless have given the true one, namely, the constitution of God, grounded on the offence of Adam; for to this it is owing, and to this only, that "death has passed upon all men."

Dr. Taylor interprets the words, "have sinned," in the like harsh metonymical sense with Mr. Locke; but has taken care to guard against his fault, by making the relative *ο* to agree with *θανατος*, the next substantive that goes before, and the preposition *ἐν* to signify "as far as." His paraphrase of the verse accordingly runs thus: "By one man, Adam, sin entered into the world. He began transgression, and through his own sin, death also entered into the world; and so, in this way, through his own sin, death came upon all mankind AS FAR AS WHICH, ALL MEN ARE SUFFERERS, through his one offence." Conformably to this interpretation, in his note upon *ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἥμαρτον*, he says, "I strongly suspect, *ἐφ' ὃ* stands here under a particular emphasis, as denoting

" denoting the *terminus ad quem*, or the utmost
 " length of the consequence of Adam's sin.
 " UNTO WHICH, AS FAR EVEN AS WHICH, all
 " [*ἡμάρτον*, or *ἐν αμαρτία ἐσθι*] ate under sin, or in
 " a state of suffering. As if he had said, so FAR
 " have the consequences of Adam's sin extended,
 " and spread their influence among mankind,
 " introducing not only a curse upon the earth,
 " and sorrow and toil upon its inhabitants, but
 " even death, universal death, in every part, and
 " in all ages, of the world." In support of this
 criticism, he particularly mentions two texts, in
 which he supposes this is the sense in which *ἐφ' ὃ*
 is to be understood. I have carefully attended
 to what he has offered upon these texts, but am
 clearly and fully satisfied, for reasons we may
 have occasion to mention by and bye, that this is
 not the meaning of *ἐφ' ὃ* in either of them: nor
 is this phrase ever used in this sense, in the
 New Testament writings. And so far is it from
 standing under a particular emphasis, by being
 translated, "as far even as which," that such a
 construction exhibits a sense that is comparatively
 low and lean. For, according to this construc-
 tion, the whole meaning of the Apostle in the
 important words, *ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἡμάρτον*, is only this,
 that the utmost we suffer, in consequence of the
 one offence of our original progenitor, is death;
 an observation, as I imagine, of little weight:
 to be sure, there is nothing *emphatically* weighty
 in it, unless we should suppose, the Apostle

was apprehensive his readers would take more into his meaning when he spake of Adam's sin, as that by means of which "death had passed upon all men," than he intended, and so added the words, *ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἥμαρτον*, to prevent such a mistake, by declaring, that the consequence of this sin extended, at farthest, no farther than death. But there is no perceivable ground, either in the words themselves, or any thing they are related to, for such a supposition. The short of the matter is, the Apostle, having said, in a very concise manner, that "sin entered into the world by one man, Adam," and death by this sin of his, and that death had accordingly "passed upon all men," adds thereupon those emphatically significant words, *ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἥμαρτον*; which, if they mean no more than an affirmation, importing that this death is the utmost mankind suffer in consequence of the lapse of Adam, they convey a thought not sufficiently important to be crowded into a short sentence, summarily containing an account of the *greatest disadvantages* that ever befell the human race.

Another sense still is given to the words, "for that all have sinned," by the excellent Mr. Grove. Having cited Rom. v. 12. he goes on*, "The meaning of this place, which hath occasioned so much angry dispute, seems to be no more than this, that "there is no man liveth,

* Posthumous Sermons, vol. iii. page 403.

“ and shall not see death,” because “ there is no
 “ man liveth and sinneth not.” So that, though
 “ it was by “ one man” that sin came into the
 “ world, and death by sin, yet should not death
 “ have actually “ passed upon all men,” if all,
 “ as they grew up to reason, had not actually
 “ sinned; the *Jew*, “ after the similitude of A-
 “ dam’s transgression,” against a positive law;
 “ the *Gentile*, not after the same similitude, but
 “ only against the law of nature.” Dr. Shuck-
 ford seems to have been in much the same way of
 thinking upon this matter. Says he*, “ The
 “ Scriptures conclude “ all men under sin,”
 “ Gal. iii. 21.; affirm, that there is “ no man on
 “ earth that sinneth not,” 1 Kings, viii. 46.
 “ This, therefore, being an allowed truth, that
 “ sin was in the world until the law; that from
 “ Adam to Moses, not Adam and Eve only, but
 “ every individual of their descendants, had ac-
 “ tual sins of their own; the apostle reasons, that
 “ there can be no injustice pretended, that *εν τω*
 “ *Αδαμ* παντες αποθνησκουσιν, that “ in Adam all
 “ die,” 1 Cor. xv. 22.; *εφ ω* παντες ημαρτον, Rom.
 “ v. 12.: not “ in whom all sinned,” as our
 “ marginal reference would correct our version;
 “ for had this been intended, it would have been
 “ *εν ω*, like *εν τω Αδαμ* παντες αποθνησκουσιν. *Εφ ω*
 “ is, *eó quod*, in that, or because. “ As by one
 “ man,” says the apostle, “ sin entered into the
 “ world, and death by sin,” even so [*και ουτως*],

* Preface to the Creation and Fall of Man, page 126.

“ in like manner, *i. e.* as deservedly ” death
“ hath passed upon all men.” The foundation
“ of which reasoning is plain; for death being
“ the wages of sin,” and all men having done
“ the works of our first parents, having actually
“ sinned as well as they, we not only receive in
“ dying, but by our sins deserve the same
“ wages.”

According to both these valuable writers, the reason why Adam's posterity die is, because they have sinned themselves. Death passes upon them because they have, in their own persons, transgressed: whereas, it is as plain as it can well be made, not only from the Apostle's words in this paragraph, but from the whole scope of his reasoning in it, that the rise of death is to be fetched, not from the sins which men have committed in their own persons, but from the “ one offence of the one man,” Adam. The reader, if he pleases, may turn back to the 152d, 153d, and 154th pages, where he may see, as I imagine, abundant proof of this. Now, it is impossible to be true, that men's subjection to death should be owing to their own *personal* sins, if their subjection hereto is grounded on the lapse of the one man, Adam. And that this is the true rise of that mortality we come into existence unavoidably liable to, is so often, and so peremptorily affirmed, and argued from, by the apostle Paul, as a certain truth in this portion of Scripture, that I cannot but wonder any, who have
been

been at the pains attentively to read what he has wrote, should not perceive that they directly contradict him, while they ascribe it to the sins men have been actually guilty of in their own persons, that "death passeth upon them." And it is matter of still greater wonder, that such sensible and learned men as those, whose words I have quoted, should not have had it in remembrance, that a very great part (some think the greatest) of those who are born into the world, die out of it before they become capable of *moral* action. Surely, it will not be said of any of these, that their dying was owing to any *actual* sins they had themselves *personally* committed. It must be ascribed to some other cause. And if we may believe the apostle Paul, it was in consequence of a Divine constitution, occasioned by the "one offence" of their first father.

As to the common interpretation, which says, we all sinned in Adam, by being chargeable with his fault, and would represent the apostle as intending to affirm, that his sin was as truly ours as his, and that we are justly punishable for it: this interpretation, I say, cannot possibly be true; and for this very good reason; because it is a moral inconsistency to affirm that the sin of one moral agent can be the sin of another, unless he has been, in one way or another, voluntarily accessory to it. Adam and his posterity being distinct moral agents, his sinning could not be their sinning. This would imply falsehood, and a contradiction

to the nature of things; as hereby they would be viewed and treated as ONE, who were not ONE.

In answer to this, it has been said by a late writer, and a truly great one*, "This objection, however specious, is really founded on a false hypothesis, and wrong notion of what we call SAMENESS, or ONENESS, among created things; and the seeming force of the objection arises from ignorance, or inconsideration of the degree, in which created *identity*, or *oneness*, with part existence, in general depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the Supreme Author, and Disposer of the universe." Having observed this, he proceeds to a metaphysical consideration of *identity*, or *oneness*, chiefly with a view to show, that *oneness* in different respects and degrees, and to various purposes, "depends on the sovereign constitution of God," according to which it is "ordered, regulated, and limited, in every respect;" some things, "existing in different times and places, being treated by their Creator as *one* in *one respect*, and others in *another*; some united for this communication, others for that; but all, according to the sovereign pleasure of the Fountain of all being and operation." Upon which he says†, "I am persuaded no solid reason can be given, why God, who constitutes all other created *union*, or *oneness*, according to his pleasure, and for what purposes, communi-

* Mr. Edwards, on "Original Sin," page 337.

† Ibid. page 347.

" cations, and effects, he pleases, may not esta-
 " blish a constitution, whereby the *natural poster-*
 " *ity of Adam*, proceeding from him, much as
 " the buds and branches from the stock or root of
 " a tree, should be treated as *ONE* with him for
 " the derivation, either of righteousness and
 " communion in reward, or of the loss of righte-
 " ousness and consequent corruption and guilt."
 From this constitution of God, making and treat-
 ing Adam and his posterity as *ONE*, he* supposes,
 " it will follow, that both guilt and exposedness
 " to punishment, and also depravity of heart,
 " came upon Adam's posterity just as they came
 " upon him, as much as if he and they had all
 " co-existed, like a tree with many branches;
 " allowing only for the difference necessarily re-
 " sulting from the place Adam stood in, as the
 " head or root of the whole, and being first and
 " most immediately dealt with, and most imme-
 " diately acting and suffering." To prevent
 being misunderstood, or to explain himself more
 fully, he says, in a marginal note, page 329.
 " My meaning may be illustrated thus: let us
 " suppose that Adam and all his posterity had co-
 " existed, and that his posterity had been,
 " through a law of nature established by the
 " Creator, united to him, something as the
 " branches of a tree are united to the root, or
 " the members of the body to the head, so as to
 " constitute, as it were, *ONE COMPLEX PERSON*, or

* Mr. Edwards, on "Original Sin," page 327.

“ ONE MORAL WHOLE; so that, by the law of
“ union, there should have been a *communion* and
“ *co-existence* in acts and affections, all jointly par-
“ ticipating, and all concurring, as ONE WHOLE,
“ in the disposition and action of the head; as
“ we see in the body natural, the whole body is
“ affected as the head is affected, and the whole
“ body concurs when the head acts. Now, in
“ this case, the hearts of all the branches of man-
“ kind, by the constitution of nature, and law of
“ union, would have been affected just as the
“ heart of Adam, their common root, was af-
“ fected. When the heart of the root, by a full
“ disposition, committed the first sin, the hearts
“ of all the branches would have concurred; and
“ when the heart of the root, as a punishment of
“ the sin committed, was forsaken of God, in like
“ manner would it have fared with all the
“ branches; and when the heart of the root, in
“ consequence of this, was confirmed in perma-
“ nent depravity, the case would have been the
“ same with all the branches.” In another note,
page 347. he has these words: “ I appeal to such
“ as are not wont to content themselves with
“ judging by a superficial appearance and view of
“ things, but are habituated to examine things
“ strictly and closely, whether, on supposition
“ that all mankind had *co-existed* in the manner
“ mentioned before, any good reason can be
“ given, why their Creator might not, if he had
“ pleased, have established such an *union* between
“ Adam

" Adam and the rest of mankind, as was in that
 " case supposed? Particularly, if it had been the
 " case, that Adam's posterity had actually, ac-
 " cording to a law of nature somehow *grown*
 " *out of him*, and yet remained *contiguous* and
 " literally united to him, as the branches to a
 " tree, or the members of the body to the head;
 " and had all, before the fall, existed together at
 " the *same time*, though in *different places*, as the
 " head and members are in different places: in
 " this case, who can determine that the Author
 " of nature might not, if it had pleased him,
 " have established such an *union* between the
 " root and branches of this complex being, as
 " that all should constitute *ONE* moral whole; so
 " that, by the law of union, there should be a
 " *communion* in each *MORAL ALTERATION*, and
 " that the heart of every branch should, at the
 " same moment, participate with the heart of the
 " *root*, be conformed to it, and concurring with
 " it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly
 " partaking in its state, as a part of the *same thing*?
 " Why might not God, if he had pleased, have
 " fixed such a kind of union as this, an union of
 " the various parts of such a *moral whole*, as well
 " as many other unions which he has actually
 " fixed, according to his sovereign pleasure?
 " And if he might, by his sovereign constitution,
 " have established such an union of the various
 " branches of mankind, when existing in *differ-*
 " *ent places*, I do not see why he might not also

“ do the same, though they exist in *different times*;
 “ I know not why succession, or *diversity of time*,
 “ should make any such constituted union more
 “ unreasonable than *diversity of place*.”

I have transcribed thus largely what has been said by the above-mentioned writer, in justification of our having sinned when Adam fell by transgression, lest it should be imagined I had carelessly, or wilfully, misrepresented his meaning, so as to make him speak absurdly, in order to reflect an odium on him. It is to me exceeding strange, that a gentleman of his understanding should so impose on himself, as, in sober seriousness, to offer that for the truth of God which is not only a direct contradiction to the Scripture, but to that *moral discernment* mankind are naturally endowed with.

Nothing is more evident, than that the apostle Paul, in the paragraph containing the words, from whence it is pretended, that we sinned when Adam sinned, is so far from considering Adam and his posterity as ONE, ONE COMPLEX PERSON, that he particularly and abundantly distinguishes between *him* and *them*; representing *him* as DISTINCT from *them* as they are from one another. In the 12th verse, the “one man,” Adam, by *whose* sin death, it is said, entered into the world, is directly pointed out as a *person distinct* from the “all men,” upon *whom* death, by this sin of *his*, has passed. In the 15th verse, where the “offence of one,” and “death to many,” is spoken of, the

one and the *many* are represented as *severally distinct* from each other. In the 17th verse, the "one man," through whose offence "death reigned," is viewed as a *distinct person* from the "they which receive the gift of righteousness by Jesus Christ." In the 18th verse, the "one," by whom the offence was committed, is as certainly distinguished from the "all men" upon whom "judgment came to condemnation." And in the 19th verse, the "one man" is again distinguished from the "many," who, "by *his* disobedience, were made sinners." How, or in what sense they were made sinners, we shall explain afterwards. But, in whatever sense this is understood, the "one man," and "the many," that is, Adam and his posterity, are not considered as *one* and the *same person*, but as so many *distinct individuals* of the same species.

Besides, it could not be the sin of "one man," namely, Adam, that brought death into the world, if his eating the forbidden fruit was the sin of *all his posterity* together with himself, made *one complex person* by a Divine constitution. Upon this supposition, it was for their *own* sin, not the sin of Adam, merely or only, that "judgment came upon them to condemnation." And yet the apostle Paul, as has been more than once observed, has been particular in his care to ascertain it as a truth, that "the many," the "all men," are subjected to death, not for any sin of their *own*, but in consequence of the sin of "one man,"

man," specified and distinguished by his name, Adam.

It may be further said, as worthy of special notice, that the Apostle, in the 14th verse, expressly affirms, that "death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression." This cannot be true, if they, in common with the rest of mankind, were so *ONE* with Adam, as that the sin committed by him was not the sin of a *single individual*, but of the *whole human race*, constituted by God *one* and the *same complex person*. In this view of the case, all the posterity of Adam, as truly as he himself, must sin by the *same will*, by the *same act*, and in the *same person*, against the *same law*. And, certainly, if they sinned thus, they sinned "after the similitude of Adam's transgression." For *dissimilitude* there cannot be in sin committed by the *same act*, and the *same will* of *one* and the *same person*, against the *same law*. But the apostle peremptorily declares, that "death did not reign over" Adam's posterity for any sin they had committed that bore a "likeness to Adam's transgression." And it would, indeed, be the most mysterious, unaccountable thing in all nature, if Adam's posterity were so *ONE PERSON* with him, as that when he sinned in taking and eating of the forbidden fruit, it was as true that they sinned also, and by that very act of his; for, upon this supposition, they must have been actually sinners from the beginning of the world, that

is,

is, myriads of them, thousands of years before they had a being. A more shocking absurdity never entered into the heart of man! This leads to say—

That the notion of a divine establishment, making Adam and his posterity *one complex person* for the communication of sin and guilt, is as contrary to the principle of moral discernment, common to all, as it is to Scripture. We feel its falsehood, whenever we attend to the perception of our minds. No man is more certain, that he is not *one person* with his next father, or with the rest of the human species, than that he is not *one person* with the original progenitor. We are, each one, conscious to ourselves that we exist personally distinct from Adam, as well as the other individuals of the same kind; that it was *he*, not *we*, that eat of the forbidden tree; and that it neither was, or possibly could be, an act of *ours*, in a moral sense, any more than in a natural one, so as that it could be chargeable on us as *our* fault. Who, among the sons of Adam, ever felt the reproaches of an accusing condemning conscience for the sin of their first father, ages before they were born? It may be peremptorily pronounced, no one of them ever did. They may have been affected with grief, when in contemplation of the "one offence" of the first man; especially, as it has been the occasion of the introduction of so much evil into the world: but they are so formed by the God of nature, as not to be capable of condemning

condemning themselves, and feeling the uneasiness of guilty remorse, for what they are not conscious to themselves they were any ways accessory to. And nothing is more certain, than that we have no consciousness of having had any hand, in any shape or form whatever, in the sin of the one man, Adam. And this, could nothing else be said upon the matter, is a demonstration that no establishment was ever made by God, in virtue of which Adam and his posterity were *so* constituted *one complex person*, as that they all voluntarily concurred in the one act of disobedience, which brought death into the world. Can it be supposed, without the grossest absurdity, that the all-wise God should make an *identical complex one* of Adam and his posterity, so as that they should be looked upon as having sinned when he eat of the forbidden fruit, and, at the same time, leave them all, throughout all generations, without the least *consciousness* that they had thus sinned; especially as this sin of theirs, as is pretended, stood connected with the tremendous wrath of the Almighty throughout eternity? Such a constitution, while, at the same time, no member of this *complex one*, but Adam only, could be conscious of sin, or guilt arising from it, is a downright inconsistency with the whole system of moral government; a mere metaphysical invention, contrived for no other purpose than to serve a previously imbibed hypothesis. This writer allows, that "consciousness in intelligent beings is essential to personal identity."

identity." How then could Adam and his posterity be the *same complex one*, to the purposes of sin and wrath, without the *same* principle of consciousness? In order to their being *one*, his consciousness must have been *theirs*, and theirs *his*; or, in other words, one and the same consciousness must have flowed from the *head* to the *united members*, as a *common* principle, in which they were all partakers. Is this now the truth of fact? So far from it, that Adam's posterity are as distinct existences from him, as they are from one another, or from any of the inferior creatures. He is no otherwise the head, or root, of his posterity, the "tree out of which they grow as so many branches;" than as God was pleased, through him, according to an established order in nature, to give them a being in the world. When brought into being, they are so many individual persons, identical ones, of the same kind. Instead of being branches that "every moment participate with the heart of the root" [Adam], and that are "conformed to it, and concurring with it in all its affections and acts," they are *themselves* so many essentially distinct trees, the branches of which grow out of their own root, with which, not with the root Adam, they have vital communion. Their volitions, affections, and all the acts and exercises of their powers, as moral agents, are from *themselves*, not from *Adam*, in virtue of any constituted union whatever. To what purpose is it then to "appeal to those who are habituated to

"examine

“ examine things closely, whether God might
 “ not have made Adam’s posterity grow out of
 “ him, and be contiguous, and literally united
 “ to him, so as that they should exist together at
 “ the same time, and, by an established union,
 “ constitute *one moral whole*?” Whether God
 might, or might not, have made this the establish-
 ment of nature, is neither proof or illustration in
 the present case: for it is a stubborn fact, that
 Adam’s posterity are made essentially otherwise.
 God constituted him, as has been said, the second-
 ary cause, through which he would communicate
 existence to the human kind; but, being brought
 into existence, they are no more *one* with Adam,
 or united to him, or dependent on him, for any of
 their exertions, natural or moral, than they are
 united to, and dependent on, their immediate pre-
 decessors, nor are they at all more FAULTY for any
 sin of *his*, than for any of the sins of any of their
 forefathers.

The plain truth is, a Divine constitution, mak-
 ing Adam and his posterity *one complex person, one*
moral whole, so as that there should be a “ com-
 “ munion and co-existence in acts and affections,
 “ all participating, and all concurring as *one*
 “ *whole* in the disposition and actions of the head,
 “ as we see in the body natural, the whole body
 “ is affected as the head is affected, and the
 “ whole body concurs when the head acts.”
 Such a constitution, I say, with respect to such
 moral beings as men are, is not only an absurdity

in speculation, but an impossibility in nature. No establishment by God or man, can make the volitions and acts of any moral agent what they are not. And we are as sure as we can be of any thing, that the volition and act of Adam, with reference to the forbidden tree, was not the volition and act of any of his posterity. No pretended law of *union* could make them so; and for this decisive reason, because Adam and his posterity are *severally* distinct moral agents, having a distinct power of willing, chusing, and acting. Had Adam's posterity been made, by a law of nature, to "grow out of him as their root, and been contiguous to him as branches of the same tree," having, at the same time, one common consciousness, and power of volition and acting, so as that when he willed and acted, it would have been the conscious will and act of the branches together with him, there might be some pretence for their being *one complex person, one moral whole*: but as the establishment of God, in consequence of which Adam is the father of his posterity, is essentially different, they being, notwithstanding their derivation from him, so many distinct persons, or identical ones, furnished with powers of their *own*, for the use of which only they are accountable. I say, this being the establishment of nature, the considering Adam and his posterity *so one*, as that they all acted, when he took and eat of the forbidden fruit, is as wild a conceit of a vain imagination as was ever published

published to the world. It cannot be paralleled with any thing, unless the doctrine of *transubstantiation*. There is, in truth, a conspicuous analogy between them. Catholics first interpret the words, "this is my body—this is my blood," in the strict literal sense. When they are told, this sense is a contradiction to our sight, touch, and taste, and that it is impossible to be true, as the body of Christ cannot be in heaven and upon earth, and in ten thousand different places too, at one and the same time: I say, when they are thus urged, their only refuge is, the almighty power of God. To this, therefore, they profanely recur; endeavouring, by all the methods of metaphysical subtilty, to make that true, by the help of this power, which is certainly false, and not within the reach of Omnipotence to make otherwise. In like manner, our author, and those who have adopted his sentiments, first suppose it literally and strictly true, that the "one offence of Adam was the offence of all," that "all by his one act of disobedience became, properly speaking, sinners," as well as he. When they are minded, that Adam and his posterity are distinct moral agents, and that the sin of one moral agent cannot be the sin of another, recourse is had to the Deity for a *law of union*; in consequence of which it is pretended, that Adam and his natural descendants were so constituted **ONE PERSON**, as that it is a real truth, that they transgressed, as well as he, when he eat of the forbidden fruit; which

which is a direct contradiction to the perceptions of all mankind, arrived to a capacity of moral discernment; for they all intuitively perceive, that they are severally IDENTICAL ONES, as distinct in their existence, consciousness, and all their powers of acting, from him, as they are from one another: on which account it is impossible, *his* will, or act, in the first transgression, should be *theirs*. No power, however great, no will, however arbitrary, could make this true, because it is, in nature, a falsehood, and as certainly known to be so, as that two and two are not equal to five, and cannot be made to be so.

Having rejected these interpretations, it may reasonably be expected I should substitute another in their room, which can better be supported. And this I shall do, by exhibiting a version of the 12th verse, which, though not hit upon before that I know of, may yet truly convey the sentiment intended; as it is easy and natural, and offers a sense that is intelligible, important, and, perhaps, the best connected of any with the Apostle's whole discourse.

I would read the verse (dropping its comparative form, at present, that I may be the more readily understood) after the following manner—
 “By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and thus, in this way, death passed upon all men, UPON WHICH, they have all sinned.”
 As if the Apostle had said, By the one man, Adam, sin entered into the world, and death by his sin, in
 T eating

eating of the forbidden fruit; and thus, by this one offence of this one man, death hath come upon all men, UPON WHICH, IN CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH, they have all sinned.

I take it to have been the Apostle's design, in this text, to lead our thoughts up to our first father, Adam, as the original source, or *occasional cause*, of *sin* as well as *death*: only, it should be particularly minded, as *sin* and *death* are essentially different, the one being a *natural*, the other a *moral* evil, it is not possible he should be the source of them both in the same way. The sentence of God, taking rise from Adam's lapse, may well enough be considered as *that*, by means of which all men are subjected to death: but they cannot, in virtue of any judicial sentence, either of God, or man, be made sinners, without their their own wicked choice; because the idea of sin is, in the nature of things, absolutely founded on this. It is therefore observable, the Apostle does not say, "and thus," "in this way," that is, by the judicial sentence of God, occasioned by the lapse of the one man, Adam, DEATH and SIN "have passed upon all men;" but death, in this way, "hath passed upon all men," UPON WHICH, IN CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH, they have sinned themselves; as they must do, if they are sinners at all.

And it is easy to see, how all become sinners UPON, OR IN CONSEQUENCE OF, their subjection to *death*, through the lapse of their first father, Adam.

Adam. For, by this death, which should be critically minded, we are to understand, not death considered simply, or nakedly, in itself; but as connected, in the appointment of God, with that vanity, toil, sorrow, and suffering, by which it is occasioned, and with which it is accompanied, invariably, in a less or greater degree, with respect to all mankind. This is the apostle Paul's notion of the *death* which comes upon the posterity of Adam universally, through his lapse. He uses this word in a complex sense, conformably to the idea Moses has given us of it, in his account of the original sentence, dooming man to death; meaning by it, the appendages of death, as well as death itself; including in his idea of it, not merely the destruction of life, but the *whole disadvantage* under which we hold life since the fall, which has brought a curse upon the earth, and subjected us to a state of labour and sorrow, which, at last, will end in the dissolution of our present mortal frame. Now, the excitements to sin, or the temptations by which we are overcome to commit it, do principally FOLLOW UPON our being thus, in this sense, subjected to death; that is, they are, in a great measure, owing to the situation and circumstances of our *mortal bodies*, in this state of toil and sorrow, which ends in the destruction of life. From hence arise those fears, with respect to the loss of life, which are so great an occasion of sin, in all its various kinds: from

hence arise that impatience and discontent, that anxious solicitude and perplexing concern, which render life far more burdensome, than it is derived to us from the simple constitution of God: From hence arise the earnest pursuits of men, in every unlawful way, in all the various methods of unrighteousness, to avoid the evil things, and come to the possession of the good things of this present state: and from hence, in a word, arise those numerous lusts which "war against the law of our mind," or reason, and "bring us in captivity to the law of sin." It is the real truth of fact (however we understand the words of the Apostle we are upon), that, IN CONSEQUENCE of our present *suffering mortal state*, we are often induced to do that, which, upon sober reflection, we cannot but condemn ourselves for; insomuch that we must all own, from what we know of ourselves, that it is impossible such *mortal creatures* as we are, living in a world so surrounded with temptation, should ever attain to such *moral rectitude* as will avail to our justification, unless placed under a more favourable dispensation than that of *rigid law*. And this, I could observe here, is the very thought the apostle Paul enlarges upon, in the 7th chapter of this Epistle to the Romans; where he has it professedly in his view to show, that *sanctification*, or, what means the same thing, *moral rectitude*, is, upon the foot of *mere law*, utterly unattainable. And why? Because, IN CONSEQUENCE of the operation of
appetites

appetites and inclinations, seated in our mortal bodies, we certainly shall, without the interposition of grace, or gospel, be unhappily urged on to do that which our *mind* tells us we ought not to do; and the doing of which will denominate us the captives of sin, the servants of corruption. The illustration and proof of this is what he labours in this 7th chapter; in order whereunto he gives us to understand, that there are two different principles of action in men: One he calls "the flesh," verse 18; "the law in our members," or the propensities of our bodies, which are, as it were, a rule or law to us, verse 23. The other, he characterises "the inward man," verse 22; "the law of the mind," verse 23; "the mind," verse 25, meaning that faculty, or power, of the soul or spirit, in virtue of which we are denominated rational intelligent beings. These two principles, residing in the human constitution, he represents as *opposites*, contesting with, and counteracting each other. And it is observable, he particularly ascribes it to "the flesh," by means of the overbearing influence of its propensities in this our present mortal state; that, on the one hand, we do that which our *minds* disapprove; and, on the other, that we do not that which we would do, though convinced, from our own perceptions, that it is what we ought to do. Says he, verse 15. "that which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I."

As if he had said, that which I do, in contradiction to the law of God, as influenced thereto by *the flesh*, I allow not with my *mind*: for what, with my *mind*, I would do in conformity to the law, that, through the prevalence of the *flesh*, I do not; but what, with my *mind*, I even abominate, that I do as urged to it by my *flesh*. To the like purpose are those words in the 18th and 19th verses, "To will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good, I find not. For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do;" i. e. the power of willing to do that which is good is actually in me; but to perform that which is good, though I should so will, I find no strength, so great is the influence of my fleshly propensities. For I perceive it, from my experience, to be the truth of fact, that the good which, with my mind, I would do, I do not; but the evil, which, with my mind, I would not, that I do, through the prevalence of my animal mortal part. It follows, in the 21st verse, "I find then a law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me;" i. e. I experience therefore, as by a law settled, and ruling in me, that when I would, with my mind, do that which is good, evil is present with me, by fleshly appetites, to hinder and restrain me. And again, verse 23d, "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members;"

members;" that is, I am sadly sensible of a principle of action, a law, as it were, in my bodily members, which opposes the law of my mind, my reason, my power of moral discernment, and makes me a captive to that law of sin which is in my members; or, in other words, to my fleshly or bodily appetites. In consideration of this prevalence of appetite in his mortal part, over his reason and judgment, he bitterly exclaims, as in the 24th verse, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" As if he had said, from a sense of the miserable condition I am in, I cannot but cry out, O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from THIS MORTAL BODY*, which, by

* I have rendered *ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*, from THIS MORTAL BODY; and, as I judge, with strict propriety, by giving *θανάτου*, a substantive of the genitive case, the force of an adjective. An observable instance of this mode of diction we have in Col. i. 22. where the Apostle speaks of "our reconciliation to God," as effected, *ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου*; "by his [Christ's] fleshly body, through death;" that is, by the death of his body, which was made of flesh. The same thought precisely is intended to be conveyed here, as when it is said, by another Apostle, 1 Pet. iv. 1. "having suffered for us in the flesh;" that is, in that *fleshly body* God had prepared for them. But instances of this use of a substantive of the genitive case are so common, especially in the New Testament, that it would be an affront to those acquainted with the language in which it was wrote, to point them out. And its use in this sense here may the rather be admitted, because the construction formed upon it admirably falls in with the main drift of the foregoing and following discourse; and it is, perhaps, the only one that does so. For, mind well,

by its appetites and propensities, thus makes me the slave of sin! He adds, for his own, and

the *character* the Apostle had been describing, was that of a man so *captivated* by the appetites of his *flesh*, or *mortal body*, as that, instead of doing what his *mind*, or reason, approved, he was urged on to that which his *mind*, or reason, even "hated." There was a strife, or contest, between the propensities of his *fleshy body*, and his *mind*, or spirit, in which his *mind* was mastered, and he "led into captivity" by his bodily appetites. And now he cries out, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me?" From what? "From **THIS MORTAL BODY**;" that is, from the enticing power, which *this body*, subjected to a *frail mortal suffering* condition, has over me by means of its propensities and appetites. To this sense the whole preceding argument points our view. For it was the influence, which his *mortal body*, by its appetites, had over him, that was the *ground*, or *reason*, of the "wretchedness" he so passionately complains of. This *mortal body*, therefore, as to this sway over him, is the thing he enquires how he shall be delivered from? Nor will there be any reasonable room left for doubt upon the matter, if we attend to the **ANSWER** to this enquiry, in the words that next follow, "I thank God," this deliverance is to be had, "through our Lord Jesus Christ." For what is the idea the Apostle gives us of this deliverance? We may readily collect it from the next chapter, where he has particularly, and clearly, explained himself upon it. Thus he assures us, verse 2. that "the law of the spirit of life, in Jesus Christ, hath made me free [me who am in Christ] from the law of sin and death." And again, he acquaints us, verses 3, 4. that "what the law could not do, in that it was weak through [the propensities of the] flesh, [hath yet been done after the following manner] God, by sending his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and [by sending him] for sin [*πρὸς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, about, or concerning the affair of sin, that he might deliver from it] hath condemned sin [destroyed, put it to death with respect to its influence as seated] in the flesh; [and to this end] "that the righteousness of the law might [through the sanctifying Spirit] be fulfilled by us, who walk, not after the flesh, but

and the consolation of others, the admiring, adoring words, in the 25th verse, "I thank God, through

but after the spirit." These words, thus construed according to their true intent, exhibit an easy and intelligible meaning and such an one as, at once, explains, and answers, the above inquiry after deliverance. The Apostle having thus directed our view to the true and only source of deliverance from the dominion, which our MORTAL BODIES, by their appetites, have over us, makes the observable remark in the 10th verse, "If Christ be in you, the body is dead [*δι' αμαρτίας*] with reference to sin; but the Spirit is life [*διὰ δικαιοσύνης*] with reference to righteousness." As if he had said, if Christ be in you by his sanctifying Spirit, the *body* is dead, as to its power or dominion with respect to sin; sin shall not reign in you by means of your *mortal bodies*. But, on the other hand, the mind, or spirit, is life as to righteousness; it is now alive and vigorous in employing your bodily members as instruments unto holiness. He pursues the same thought in the next verse; "But if the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." The meaning is, if the Spirit of God dwelleth in you, God, through his sanctifying Spirit thus dwelling in you, will quicken, make alive, your *mortal bodies*, by making them active and vigorous to the purposes of holiness, instead of sin. This interpretation, which I have borrowed from Mr. Locke, Dr. Doddridge (*in loc.*) is pleased to call "his unnatural gloss;" at which I cannot but wonder, as this metaphorical way of speaking concerning sanctification, or deliverance from the power of fleshly or bodily lust, is so common with this Apostle. Hence he speaks of men, while under the rule and sway of their *mortal bodies*, as "dead in trespasses and sin," Eph. ii. 1. Col. ii. 13. And when delivered from this dominion of their mortal bodies, through the influence of their propensities, by "the Spirit that raised up Christ from the dead," he speaks of them as "quicken'd," or "raised together with Christ," Eph. ii. 5, 6. Col. ii. 13. He uses the like figure of speech in

through Jesus our Lord;" that is, I acknowledge it with gratitude to God, that this deliverance

in Rom. vi. 6. "He that is *dead* is freed from sin;" that is, he, in whom the power of fleshly propensities is destroyed, is delivered from the dominion of sin. So, in the 13th verse, "Yield yourselves up to God as those who are *alive* from the *dead*;" that is, as those who, having a principle of spiritual life, in opposition to the influence of *fleshly lust*, are no longer spiritually *dead*. And in the 11th verse, "reckon ye yourselves to be *dead* indeed to sin, but *alive* to God, through Jesus Christ our Lord;" that is, to be no longer under the power of fleshly propensities, but to be spiritually *alive*, as having the opposite power of living to God through Jesus Christ. I would yet say, the Apostle, all along in this 7th chapter, and in all the above-mentioned texts, must obviously consider our MORTAL BODIES, by means of their appetites, as the true SOURCE, or ROOT of the dominion which sin has over us. And he elsewhere discovers this to have been his thought upon the matter. Hence he exhorts, Rom. vi. 12. "Let not sin reign in YOUR MORTAL BODIES;" that is, by means of your appetites and propensities. Hence that language of his, in the 6th verse, "that the BODY OF SIN [*το σωμα της αμαρτίας*] might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin;" that is, that the power which sin has by means of the BODY, may be so destroyed as that we may no longer be the servants of sin. Hence he speaks, Col. ii. 11. of our "putting off the body of the sin of the flesh [*το σωμα της σαρκος*] by the circumcision of Christ;" that is, the sins we are influenced to commit by means of OUR FLESHLY BODIES, with their propensities. Hence he declares, Rom. viii. 13. that we shall "die if we walk after the flesh;" but that we shall "live, if, through the spirit, we mortify the deeds of the body;" that is, the deeds done under the influence of animal propensities.—But enough, it may be, too much, has been said to make it evident, that, by "the body of this death," the Apostle means, "this mortal body," as to its influence, by its appetites, to lead us into sin. If this note is duly weighed, and

ance may be obtained, upon the plan of grace, through Jesus Christ, the constituted Lord of all.

I have no need to concern myself here with the dispute, whether the Apostle speaks in his *own person*, or in an *assumed* one; or, upon either supposition, whether he speaks as a *regenerate*, or *unregenerate* man. For should it be even allowed, according to the more commonly received exposition, that he speaks in the character, not of an *unregenerate*, but *regenerate* person, which, as I apprehend, is far from the truth, his arguing will still prove, that the propensities, seated in our mortal bodies, are the OCCASIONAL CAUSE of our being urged on; or that IN CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH we are urged on to "do the evil we would not." This is true of unregenerate as well as regenerate men. Whether we are saints or sinners, we are "tempted;" and are tempted so as to be "drawn away," it is of "our own lusts;" that is, the enticing influence of animal propensities, in this our mortal state.

It may be worthy of special notice, the account we have given of the Apostle's discourse,

and compared with the phrase, *ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἡμεῖς*, in the 5th chapter and 12th verse, it will, perhaps, appear in a strong point of light, that I have given the very idea the Apostle intended to convey by it. And I have been thus long, and, I fear, tedious upon it, principally with a view to bring light, and afford strength, to the construction I judged there was abundant reason to put upon it.

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in this 7th chapter, not only agrees with the whole foregoing Epistle, but exhibits an emphatically striking illustration of his meaning in those words, *ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἥμαρτον*. He had *before* proved, that we could not be *justified* upon the foot of law, because we were *all sinners*: he *here* proves, that our being *sinners* cannot be prevented by mere law, which is as insufficient for *sanctification*, as for *justification*. He had *before* carried our thoughts up to Adam, the first father of men, declaring that we were "sinners" in consequence of his lapse: he *here* explains this matter, acquainting us how we became "sinners" in consequence of his lapse, not by having "sinned when he sinned," but by having sinned in our own proper persons, and as influenced so to do by the propensities of a fleshly mortal nature, which will certainly make us the slaves of sin, unless restrained, and governed, by the grace that is communicated from God, and from him alone, through Jesus the Saviour.

It is therefore evident, from the Apostle's own explanation of the way, or manner, in which we are influenced to become sinners, that we have truly interpreted his words, by construing them, "and so death passed upon all men; UPON WHICH, IN CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH, all have sinned themselves." And it is, as I imagine, with great accuracy and propriety, the Apostle has expressed himself in these words. For he carries

our view to Adam as the true original *source* of SIN, as well as DEATH; but gives us to understand, at the same time, that he is the *source* of those different evils in a quite different way; of DEATH, by the sentence of God, taking rise from the "one offence" of this "one man;" and of SIN, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THIS, by means of the temptations of our MORTAL STATE, which without grace, or gospel, will certainly entice and draw us aside.

It cannot justly be objected against this interpretation, that it gives the preposition *ἐπὶ* a wrong sense. For it is the very sense in which it is most commonly used throughout the New Testament, when construed with a dative case, as it is here. The following texts may be thought an ample illustration of this.

Matthew, vii. 28. *And it came to pass, when Jesus had ended these sayings, the people were astonished [ἐπὶ τῇ διδασκῇ αὐτοῦ] at his doctrine.* The particle *at*, well answers the meaning of *ἐπὶ* in this text. But then it is plain to the most vulgar understanding, that it signifies exactly the same thing with *upon*, or *in consequence of*.

Matt. xiii. 4. *And in them [ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, in consequence of the temper they discovered] is fulfilled the prophecy of Esaias, which saith, &c.*

Matt. xix. 9. *And I say unto you, whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, [ἐκ μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ, unless it be on account of, in consequence*

consequence of, fornication] *and shall marry and ther, committeth adultery.*

Mark, iii. 5. *And when he had looked round about on them with anger, being grieved for the hardness of their hearts* [ἐπὶ τῇ πορώσει τῆς καρδίας αὐτῶν, on account of, in consequence of, the hardness of their hearts] *he saith unto the man.*

Mark, x, 22. *And he was sad at that saying,* [ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, in consequence of what he had said] *and went away grieved, for he had great possessions.*

Mark, xii. 17. *And Jesus answering, said unto them, render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's: and they marvelled* [ἐπ' αὐτῷ] *at him; that is, on account of what he had just said. His having so spoken was the occasion of this wonder.*

Instead of taking up any more room in citing the words of texts, I shall refer the reader to the following ones, among others he may find in the New Testament, illustrating the sense we have put upon the word ἐπὶ. Matt. iv. 4. Matt. xviii. 5. Matt. x. 24. Mark, xi. 18. Luke, i. 14. 29. 59. Luke, ii. 20. 33. 47. Luke, iii. 19, 20. Luke, iv. 22. 32. Luke, v. 5. 9. Luke, ix. 43. 48, 49. Luke, xiii. 7. Luke, xv. 7. 10. Luke, xix. 41. Luke, xx. 26. Luke, xxiv. 25. Acts, iii. 10, 16. Acts, iv. 9. 21. Acts, v. 35. Acts, viii. 2. Acts, xi. 19. Acts, xiii. 12. Acts, xv. 30, 31. Acts, xx. 38. Acts,

Acts, xxvi. 6. Rom. v. 2. Rom. vi. 20.
 Rom. viii. 20. 1 Cor. i. 4. 1 Cor. viii. 2.
 1 Cor. ix. 10. 1 Cor. xiii. 6. 1 Cor. xiv. 16.
 1 Cor. xvi. 17. 2 Cor. i. 4. 2 Cor. vii. 4. 7.
cum multis aliis.

The above examples are full to our present purpose. The preposition *ἐπι*, in all of them, is joined with the dative case, and has exactly the same force I have given it in the text under consideration; that is to say, it stands to denote the *occasional cause* of the things spoken of, or that *by which, through which, upon which, in consequence of which*, they are as they are there represented to be.

It is true, I do not make the relative *ω*, in my way of construction, to agree with either *ανθρωπος*, or *θανατος*, the only foregoing substantives. But this is an objection of no weight; because it may as well have for antecedent the immediately *preceding sentence*. It may be worthy of special notice here, the phrase, *εφ ω*, is used by the apostle *Paul* in three places besides this we are illustrating; and, in all of them, the preposition, *εφ*, has the same meaning I have given it here: and, in like manner, the relative, *ω*, grammatically agrees, not with a preceding *substantive*, but *sentence*.

The first instance to this purpose we have in 2 Cor. v. 4. "For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burthened; not for that we would

would [$\epsilon\phi\ \omega\ \sigma\upsilon\ \theta\epsilon\lambda\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$] be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life." The passage may, I think, more consistently with the true force of $\epsilon\phi\ \omega$, be rendered thus: "For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened: not that we would UPON THIS [upon being thus burdened] be unclothed, but clothed upon."—As if the Apostle had said, We who are in the body do groan, being pressed under the weight of many infirmities and trials: not that we desire UPON THIS, UPON THE ACCOUNT OF OUR BEING THUS BURDENED, to be unclothed by putting off our bodies; but our desire rather is, that we may be clothed from above, may put on celestial bodies, that so what is mortal, and therefore liable to these burdens and sorrows, may be swallowed up of life that is immortal, and not obnoxious to any of these infelicities *. If we thus make the words, "being burdened," antecedent to ω , and construe $\epsilon\phi$, the preposition joined with it, UPON, an easy and intelligible sense is given to this whole sentence; which, as it lies in the common translation, is certainly difficult and perplexed. And, in this way of construction, the preposition, $\epsilon\phi$, has precisely

* The following words of *Clement of Alexandria* are an evident allusion to this text, and perhaps clearly shew, that he took it in the sense we have put upon it; " $\eta\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \epsilon\pi\omicron\theta\omicron\lambda\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\ \epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\delta\upsilon\sigma\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \pi\omicron\theta\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \tau\alpha\ \alpha\phi\theta\alpha\rho\tau\alpha,\ \pi\rho\iota\nu\ \epsilon\kappa\delta\upsilon\sigma\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \tau\eta\nu\ \phi\theta\omicron\rho\alpha\nu$. For we do groan, being desirous to be clothed upon with incorruptible things, before we put off corruption."

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the same meaning as in the above numerous places.

Dr. Taylor says, [*Script. Doct. of Original Sin*, page 52.] “*εφ ω* sometimes seems to be “used absolutely, without an antecedent; and “then it may be understood conditionally:” in proof of which he brings *this text*, and renders it thus: “For we that are in this tabernacle do “groan, being burdened: *εφ ω ου θελωμεν*, with “*this restriction*, or *so far*, that we would not be “unclothed [no, that is not the only, or ultimate object of our desire], but clothed “upon.” In answer whereto it may be observed, the phrase, *εφ ω*, is never used in the New Testament without an *antecedent*, either expressed, or understood. It may look as though *Matt. xxvi. 20.* was an example to the contrary. Our Saviour there says to Judas, “*εταρει, εφ ω παρεις*? Friend, wherefore art thou come?” *Εφ ω* is here well rendered “wherefore:” but then it means the same thing with *in quo*, *ad quid*; as the Latin versions have it, *for what, to what purpose?* The relative *ω* agrees here with *πρηνυατι* understood. This construction, therefore, is without a precedent in the New Testament writings, unless in *Philip. iii. 12*, or *iv. 10*. which we shall have occasion to consider presently. And it has this farther objection lying against it, that it does not seem easy and natural. One must attend pretty closely, now Dr. Taylor has given this construction, to understand

the precise thought he would make the Apostle convey; and, perhaps, it will require still greater attention to understand the *grammatical reason* he grounds it upon. The meaning of the Apostle, as I apprehend, is very obviously this; the burdens with which he, and the Christians *he* wrote to, were pressed, excited in him and them a desire of death: not that they desired death UPON ACCOUNT OF THESE BURDENS merely as it would be an unclothing them, a putting off their bodies; but their desire rather was, that they might be clothed upon with heavenly and immortal bodies.

Another instance we meet with in *Philip. iii. 12.* "Not as though we had already attained, either were already perfect: But I follow after, if that I may apprehend *that* for which also I am apprehended [*ει και καταλαβω, εφ ω κατεληφθην,*] of Jesus Christ." This translation, you observe, supplies the demonstrative pronoun *τουτο*, *that*, and makes it *antecedent* to the relative *ω*. The sense it conveys is just; and it gives the preposition, *εφ*, the same force I have all along been contending for. But still, as I imagine, the more proper *antecedent* to *ω* is the immediately *preceding sentence*. Accordingly, I would render the passage thus: "I follow on, if so be I also may apprehend: FOR WHICH, ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH, I also was apprehended of Jesus Christ." As if the Apostle had said, like a racer, in one of the

the exercises you are well acquainted with, I press on towards the mark, if so be I may lay hold of the prize *, FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH † ON ACCOUNT OF MY LAYING HOLD OF WHICH, I also was suddenly and marvellously caught, laid hold of by Jesus Christ, when on my journey towards *Damascus*.

What Dr. Taylor has offered upon this text does not appear to me to be wrote with that accu-

* Instead of *apprehend*, a derivative from the *Latin*, I have rather, in the above paraphrase, made use of the words *lay hold of*, which are more plain to common readers; and, to make the sense still more easy, I have supplied the English word *prize*: though it should be remembered here, there was no need of adding in the Greek the word *βραβειον*, which answers to it; because the verb *καταλαβω*, being used here in allusion to one of the known *Grecian* exercises, evidently implied it. The Apostle, in this, and the two following verses, compares himself to a *racer* that had not already obtained the *prize*, but was *running* that he might, in the end, lay hold of it. It is observable, the words *διωκει καταλαβω*, in this 12th verse, mean the same thing with *κατα σκοπον διωκει εις βραβειον*, in the 14th verse: and though in the one, the Apostle leaves out *βραβειον*; and in the other, *καταλαβω*; yet he is as readily understood as if these words had been inserted. Compare the use of *λαμβανω* and *καταλαβω* in this 12th verse, with the use of them, 1 Cor. ix. 24, and it will be seen that they are used in the *agonistical* sense.

† Since the writing the above, I find, that *Beza* and *Erasmus Schmidius*, have given the like construction to *εφ' ω* in this place; rendering it, "cujus rei causa." *Wolffius* follows them herein. His translation of the passage is this; "Sed persequor, ut etiam ipse apprehendam: ejus rei causa etiam apprehensus sum à Jesu Christo." But I follow after, that I also may apprehend: FOR WHICH THING'S SAKE [that is, that I might thus apprehend] I also was apprehended by Jesus Christ.

racy of judgment which he has often discovered upon other occasions. He translates it thus, "that I may apprehend *as far as that for which* I also am apprehended;" very evidently applying two different meanings to the proposition, *εφ*, at one and the same time, namely, *as far as*, and *for*. He has done the same in the paraphrase he has added explanatory of his translation. It runs thus; "that I may lay hold of happiness in that high and excellent sense, that furthest reach and extent, for the attaining of which Jesus Christ hath laid hold of me." Had he only said, "that I may lay hold of happiness, for the attaining of which Jesus Christ hath laid hold of me," he would have construed *εφ ω* just as I do: whereas, according to his paraphrase, and translation also, he has so construed it as to give the preposition, *εφ*, two very different meanings. But, without saying any thing further, I leave it with the intelligent reader to judge, whose translation of these words is most easy and natural, his or mine.

The last instance we have in *Philip. iv. 10.* Εχαρην δε εν Κυριω πεγαλως, οτι ηδη ποτε ανιθαλτε το υπερ εμου φρονειν, εφ ω και εφρονειτε, ηκαιρεισθε δε. "But I rejoiced in the Lord greatly, that now, at the last, your care of me hath flourished again, wherein ye were also careful, but ye lacked opportunity." So our translators have given the sense, making the relative *ω* to agree with *πραγματι* understood; whereas, it ought rather, as I imagine,

imagine, to have for *antecedent* the immediately preceding sentence.

I cannot give you a clearer idea of the true meaning of this text, than in the words of an ingenious friend, particularly well versed in the Greek, who, upon reading my construction of *εφ ω*, was pleased to approve of it, and send me his thought upon *Philip. iv. 10.* as an observable illustration of it: Says he, "The *English translation* have made sad work with this text, and so, "indeed, has the *old Latin translation*, and *Beza* "too, as well as *Erasmus* [though this last comes "much the nearest to the Apostle's meaning], by "not attending to the full force of the metaphor "in *ανεθαλετε*, and to the *το φρονειν*. They have "translated it as though the text was *ανεθαλετε* "τω φρονειν, and not *το φρονειν*: the former of "which implies the revival of their care and "concern; the latter, their receiving fresh vi- "gour and life in order to shew forth their care "and concern, like a tree that had for some time "been without fruit, and, as it were, dry and bar- "ren, but now puts forth buds and leaves in or- "der for fruit. UPON WHICH, says the Apostle, "Ye did really concern yourselves for me." The "*Philippians* had been the first in their bounties "to him, ver. 15.; and had several times, while "he was at *Thessalonica*, administered to his wants: "but it had been now some time since he had "heard from them in this way, and rejoiced by "finding from what he had received from the

“ hands of *Epaphroditus*, that it was only a want
 “ of opportunity which prevented their sending
 “ before. A metaphor is a simile in one word,
 “ and, I think, this is, therefore, the honest
 “ meaning of the text, “ I rejoiced greatly in
 “ God, that, at length, like a tree which had,
 “ for some time, appeared to be dry and lifeless,
 “ but had shot out anew in order for fruit, ye
 “ have again put forth the buds of love and af-
 “ fection for me; nor was it a fair shew of bluf-
 “ soms only, but from them have proceeded
 “ those fruits which I have now received, and
 “ must attribute my not receiving them sooner to
 “ your want of opportunity.” The translation of
 “ the text, from whence you may judge whether
 “ the above is not the fair sense of it, is word for
 “ word thus: “ I rejoiced greatly in the Lord,
 “ that, at length, ye budded anew to concern
 “ yourselves for me; UPON WHICH ye did concern
 “ yourselves, but wanted an opportunity.”

I shall not think it improper to add here a
 couple of passages from *Clement of Alexandria*,
 in which the phrase, *ἐφ' ᾧ*, or *οἷς*, is used exactly
 as I have construed it in the above citations from
 the apostle *Paul*.

The first is to be met with, *Paidag.* lib. 2. in
 these words, *Ἀλλ' ὅταν ποιῇς δόχην, καλεῖ τοὺς*
πτωχοὺς, ἐφ' ᾧ μάλιστα δεῖπνον ποιῆτεον. But when
 you make an entertainment, invite the poor, ON
 WHICH ACCOUNT [that is, on account of the
 poor's being invited], chiefly a supper is to be made.

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The *εφ* here, as in the above places, has the force of an *occasional cause*; and the *ω* agrees with the whole preceding member of the sentence.

The other we have in *Strom.* 2. and runs thus, Τα μεν αισχρα ουτος (Αδαμ) προθυμως ειλετο, επομενος τη γυναικι, των δε αληθων και καλων ημελησεν; εφ οis θνητον αθανατου βιον, αλλ' ουχ εις τελος, ανθυπηλλαζατο. *For he (Adam) following his wife, willingly chose things that were base, and disregarded those that were true and fair; IN CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH [of which choice and disregard] he exchanged an immortal life for one that was mortal, though not finally.* I need not say, that the construction of *εφ οis* is precisely the same as in the above text, this is so obvious upon the smallest attention.

It would be easy to fill a great number of pages with instances, from other authors besides the sacred ones, in which the preposition *εφ*, especially as joined with *ω*, or a like relative, is used in the very sense I have taken it. A few only shall suffice for a specimen: Τοis μεν λαμβανουσιν αργυριον αναγκαι ον εστιν απεργαζεσθαι τουτο, εφ ωμισθον λαμβανωσιν. *It is necessary those who receive money, should perform the thing FOR WHICH, ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH, they are rewarded.* XENOPHON. Πυθομενοι επ οis ηλθον. *Being asked FOR WHAT CAUSE they came?* HERODOTUS. Ουδεν εστιν εφ οτω αν οiμωζωμαι ευπλωων. *There is nothing FOR WHICH, ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH, I will howl, while I am so pleasantly sailing.* LUCIAN. Ω επι

πολλ' ημογησα. ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH I have
toiled much. HOMER. Εφ οἷς τρισιν ἀνδρῶν ἄλλων
 παίδων τοῦ Ἀδάμ εἰρηται. ON OCCASION OF WHICH
three, without the other children of Adam, it is said.
 CLEMENT of Alexandria. Ο δε μετανων οὐκ ἐτι τῶν
 αὐτῶν ἀπτεται πραγμάτων, εφ οἷς μετανῶσι. *He that*
repenteth, meddleth no more with those things
 WHICH WERE THE OCCASION of his repentance.
 CHRYSOSTOM.

It is, perhaps, by this time, sufficiently evident, that the construction we have given to the words, εφ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, is well authorised by a like use of the preposition εφ, and of the phrase εφ ᾧ. Nor is the sense that this construction offers, intricate or trifling; but easily intelligible, and vastly important. Those words, "all have sinned," mean precisely the same thing here, as when the Apostle says, chap. iii. 9. "all are under sin;" and again, ver. 19. "all the world are become guilty before God;" and yet again, ver. 23. "all have sinned:" only, in the text we are upon, according to the sense I have put upon it, the Apostle lets us into the true *original source*, or *occasional cause*, of this universal defection; namely, the lapse of the one man, *Adam*, through which, *death*, with its fore-runners and appendages, is *come upon all men*, UPON WHICH, IN CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH, they "have all sinned" in their own persons; as they must do, if they are justly, or even intelligibly, chargeable with having sinned at all.

It

It may, perhaps, seem strange to some, if the Apostle is here speaking of men's having sinned in their *own persons* (as my interpretation supposes), that he should say "all have sinned," meaning mankind universally, the whole human race; when vast numbers of them had not then come into existence, and multitudes that had, were incapable of thus sinning, as they had not arrived to a capacity of *moral action*. But the difficulty upon this head will all vanish, if it be remembered, that it is no unusual thing to find that spoken of in Scripture, *as already come into fact, which in time certainly will do so*. So it is said of our Saviour, *Heb. ii. 8*. "Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet;" though it is added in the latter part of the same verse, "we see not yet all things put under him." So, in the verse we are upon, it is said of "all men," that "death hath passed upon them;" and it is thus said of them, because this, in time, will be the real truth of fact with reference to them. In like manner, it is said of "all men," that "they have sinned;" and it is thus said of them, because, as they become capable of moral action, they will certainly be guilty of *sin*, at least so far as not to be able to claim *justification* upon the foot of *law*. The truth is, mankind, the whole human race, by reason of the lapse of the one man, *Adam*, are in such a state, as that they may be spoken of, in the virtual and constructive sense, both as *dead men* and *sinners*: and they are accordingly

cordingly thus spoken of by the apostle *Paul*. He not only speaks of "death's having passed upon them," of their being "all dead," but of their "having all sinned." And he thus speaks of them, and with propriety and justice too, because it is as certain, in consequence of the lapse, that they will *all* turn out *sinners* in the eye of *strict law*, as that they will fall by the stroke of *death*.

The sense we have given those important words, in the 12th verse, *εφ ω παντες ημαρτον*, namely, *WHEREUPON, UPON WHICH, all have sinned*, will readily lead us into a just conception of those parallel ones, in the 19th verse, *δια της παρακκης του ενος ανθρωπου αμαρτολοι καταστησαν πολλοι*. *By one man's disobedience, many* [the many, or all men] *were made sinners.*" They "were made sinners." How? By their own wicked choice, *IN CONSEQUENCE* of that constitution of God, which took rise from "the disobedience of the one man, *Adam*," and subjected them to a life of *toil* and *sorrow*, ending in *death*. The Apostle certainly means the same thing in this 19th verse, when he says, "by the disobedience of one, the many are made sinners," as when he says, in the 12th verse, "and thus, in this way, death hath passed upon all men, *WHEREUPON, UPON WHICH, IN CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH, all have sinned.*" If therefore the interpretation we have given of the 12th verse be just, so also is this of the 19th verse. And, in truth, this
first

first clause in the 19th verse, is nothing more than a *repetition* of the latter part of the comparison begun, but left unfinished, in the 12th verse; in like manner as the first clause of the foregoing 18th verse, is a *repetition* of the former part of that same comparison: for which reason, the former part of this 19th verse, and the latter part of the 12th, must mean precisely the same thing; as I have made them to do. And it is observable, in this way of interpretation, I not only make out a clear and strong connection between the 12th and the 18th and 19th verses, which answer to it, and resume and complete the comparison that was there begun; but give the phrases, "all have sinned," and "the many are made sinners," their full natural force, and cannot be complained of for making *sin*, by an harsh metonymy, to signify *mortality*.

I have yet further to say in support of the interpretation I have put upon *ἐν ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*, and the parallel passage *διὰ τῆς παρακῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀμαρτελοὶ κατεστάθησαν πολλοί*, that it well connects the several parts of the paragraph in which these words are found, not only with one another, but with the foregoing discourse.

It makes out a good connection between this paragraph and the foregoing context. For, let it be observed, this 12th verse, together with the 18th and 19th, are introduced with *διὰ τοῦτο*, and *ἀρα οὖν*, to signify their being brought in as a proof or illustration of the preceding 11th verse,

where

where the Apostle had said, "by whom [Jesus Christ] we have now received the reconciliation *," the reconciliation before spoken of in the 10th verse; that is, a reconciliation "when we were enemies," and enemies by being "ungodly," and "sinners," verse 6. 8. as if the Apostle had said, I just now observed, that by JESUS CHRIST we have RECONCILIATION with God; and it is *for this reason* † that "the free gift by the righteousness of one is come upon all men to justification;" namely, because it was in such a way, *viz.* "by the offence of one, that judgment came upon all men to condemnation." The view of the Apostle, in these connecting particles, is to introduce a proof of the credibility, the fitness, the reasonableness, of what he had said in the 11th verse, namely, that "we have received

* Dr. Doddridge justly observes, "The word *καταλλαγή* here, has so apparent a reference to *καταλλαγῆναι* and *καταλάλῃ* in the preceding verse, that it is surprising it should have been rendered by so different a word in our version; especially as it is so improper to speak of *our receiving an atonement*, which God receives as made for our sins."

† The *English* phrase that most exactly answers the true import of the *Greek* one *διὰ τοῦτο*, is, as I apprehend, *for this cause* or *reason*. There is always an *argumentative connection* between the discourse that goes before, and that follows after, this demonstrative pronoun; and its proper use is, to point out the *reason, cause, or ground* of this connection. Only, it ought to be well minded, the *cause* or *reason* of this connection is sometimes to be found in what goes before *διὰ τοῦτο*, and sometimes in what follows after it. It is used here in the latter sense.

man, *Adam*? Merely our being "thus sufferers," is a thought noways adapted, either to explain or confirm a reconciliation that is grounded on our being "enemies," and enemies by being "ungodly," and "sinners?:" whereas the interpretation

I am sensible Dr. Taylor supposes, as Mr. Locke did before him, that the epithets, *without strength, ungodly, sinners, and enemies*, in the 6th, 8th, and 10th verses, are used with respect to the *Gentiles* only; and that the reconciliation treated of relates also to their redemption from their *beastly* state: But this I esteem a certain mistake, and a mistake too that quite spoils the connection of the Apostle's words, both with the preceding and subsequent parts of his discourse.

We have already seen, that, according to the true intent of the Apostle's reasoning, for three chapters together, *Jews* as well as *Gentiles* were "all under sin;" that "the whole world were guilty before God;" that "all," that is, mankind universally, "have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." Why then should the characters, *without strength, ungodly, sinners, and enemies*, be restrained to the *Gentiles* only? What reason is there for such a limitation? Is there any thing more affirmed in these epithets, if applied to mankind universally, than the Apostle had before affirmed concerning them, and largely proved too? And when he had been at the pains to prove, by a long thread of laboured argument, that *Jews* as well as *Gentiles*, yea, that *the whole world, all men, were become guilty before God*, why should we break the continuity of his discourse by confining the characters *ungodly, sinners, and enemies*, to the *Gentiles* only? Surely, we ought rather to understand them in an extensive sense, so as to take in mankind universally.

And by this confined interpretation of these characters, and the reconciliation that relates to them, their connection with the following, as well as foregoing context, will be greatly hurt; for it is observable the Apostle, in this 12th and following verses to the end of the chapter, is not treating of any thing peculiar to the *Gentiles*, but of that which concerns mankind in common; acquainting

the *law* by Adam, and the *gift* through Christ; and gives the advantage to the latter, for that it *succeeds, overflows, stretches beyond* the former, ver. 15, 16, 17. And having interposed this thought, he returns, in the 18th verse, to the comparison he had begun, but left unfinished in the 12th: "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so, by the righteousness of one, the free-gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by the disobedience of one, many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one, many shall be made righteous." As if the Apostle had said, "By the *offence of one*," it must be affirmed the judicial act, "in sorrow shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground," is come upon all. But then, as a counter-part to this damage, it must be affirmed also, that the free-gift by the righteousness of one is come upon all; so come upon all, as that they are made capable of attaining to the *justification of life*. And this is highly credible; for as, by the disobedience of one, the many, or all men, in consequence of a divine constitution, occasioned by this disobedience, and subjecting them to a frail mortal state, are *become sinners*; even so, by the obedience of one, the same many, or all men, in consequence of an opposite constitution grounded on this obedience, are capable of *becoming righteous persons*; and as such subjectively qualified for the justification of life.

Conformably

Conformably to this account of the Apostle's words, the *two disadvantages* which were pointed out in the 12th verse, as taking rise from the one offence of the one man *Adam*, namely, *death* and *sin*, are again distinctly and separately mentioned in the 18th and 19th verses, as they ought to be in the repetition of a begun but unfinished comparison. And the *two opposite advantages*, through the one man Jesus Christ, which complete the comparison, are, in like manner, *life* and *righteousness*, as indeed they should be, being counterparts to the *death* and *sin* to which they are opposed.

In this view of the paragraph, its several parts perfectly harmonize with each other; and, what may be worth observing, the connecting particle *γὰρ*, *for*, which introduces the 19th verse, has its proper force and emphasis, and makes this verse, as it ought to do, a *reason*, and a very good one too, of that which immediately preceded: whereas, if the phrases *αμαρτωλοι κατασταθησαν*, and *δικαιοι κατασταθσονται*, are interpreted, as Mr. *Locke* and *Taylor* interpret them, in the metonymical sense, this 19th verse will exhibit no *reason* at all of the foregoing 18th verse, though inseparably joined with it by the particle *γὰρ*, or *for*, but will be a mere tautology. For if, by all men being "made sinners," through the disobedience of *Adam*, and their being "made righteous" through the obedience of Christ, nothing more is meant than

than their being "made mortal," or "sufferers as far as death," and "being restored back again to life;" this 19th verse containing these words, cannot be a *reason* of the 18th. According to this sense of those phrases, the same thing is only repeated in the 19th verse, which had been affirmed in the 18th; and the 19th verse, instead of being a *reason*, or *argument*, illustrating and confirming the 18th (as it ought to be, to give the connecting *γὰρ* its just force), is a needless repetition of one and the same thing; as it is really made to be in the paraphrases of both the above-named expositors: nor, as I imagine, could it have been otherwise, according to their construction of the words.

In short, it should seem indisputably evident, that these verses (the 18th and 19th) are brought in to complete the comparison between *Adam* and *Christ*, which was begun, but left unfinished in the 12th; consequently, as *sin* and *death* are the two grand disadvantages on *Adam's* side of the comparison in the 12th verse, the same disadvantages must be meant in the repetition of the comparison in the 18th and 19th verses; which being so, the advantages on *Christ's* side of the comparison, as they are counter-parts to the disadvantages on *Adam's* side, must mean *life* and *righteousness* answering to *death* and *sin*, to which they are opposed. In this view of the paragraph, its several parts are not only beautifully and strongly connected

connected with each other, and with the immediately foregoing context, which considers the objects of the "reconciliation by Jesus Christ" as "ungodly, sinners, and enemies;" but with the main design of the whole preceding epistle, the tendency of which is to shew, that *Jews* as well as *Gentiles*, the *whole world*, *all men*, are *sinners*, and *guilty before God*; and, upon that account, incapable of *justification* upon the foot of mere law.

I shall only add what ought to be heedfully observed; namely, that DEATH and SIN, the disadvantages, in the Apostle's comparison, by means of Adam's lapse, being in their nature essentially different, come upon mankind in a quite different way; and the same may be said, with equal truth, of the opposite advantages, by means of the obedience of Christ, LIFE, and RIGHTEOUSNESS: being in their nature quite different, they are brought into effect in a quite different way.

Death, being a natural disadvantage, may come upon mankind by the appointment or constitution of God, without the intervening consideration of their own misused agency. In like manner, *simple deliverance from death* being a natural advantage, may, by a like constitution of God, be secured to the same mankind without any regard had to their own well-used agency: and accordingly this is the real truth of the case, if we may depend upon the scripture as a revelation from God. The human race come into the world un-

der the *disadvantage* of being subjected to *death*, in virtue of a divine constitution, occasioned SOLELY by the "one offence" of the "one man" Adam: and they come into existence likewise under the *advantage* of an absolute assurance that they shall be *delivered from death*, in virtue of a divine constitution, occasioned SOLELY by the obedience of the one man Jesus Christ. Deliverance from the power of the grave is as ABSOLUTELY and CERTAINLY the *advantage* even all men are under through Christ, as subjection to death is the *disadvantage* that has come upon them through Adam.

But the case is quite different with respect to the other disadvantage through Adam, namely SIN; and its opposite advantage through Christ, namely RIGHTEOUSNESS. Adam's lapse became a disadvantage to all men with respect to SIN; but how, in what way, did it become a disadvantage? Evidently as, in consequence of his lapse, they were subjected to mortality in a world of toil, labour, and sorrow; UPON WHICH, FROM WHENCE, they would take occasion to become sinners themselves. The obedience of Christ, on the other hand, is their advantage with respect to the becoming RIGHTEOUS persons. But how? Evidently as, in consequence of this obedience of his, and the constitution of God grounded thereon, they are rendered capable, in a *moral way* (such an one as is adjusted to *moral agents*), of becoming

RIGHTEOUS

RIGHTEOUS persons; for it ought always to be kept in mind, that RIGHTEOUSNESS is as truly a moral good quality, as SIN is a morally evil one: they are both connected with *personal agency*, and absolutely dependent on it. We can no more be made *personally* righteous by the righteousness of another transferred to us, than we can be made sinners by the sin of another, transferred in like manner: they are both *moral impossibilities*, and equally so. That part, therefore, of the advantage through Christ, which consists in our being *made righteous*, and in this way qualified, not simply for life, but for an happy reign in life after we are delivered from death, essentially supposes the use of MEANS, and such too as are proper to be used with *moral agents*, in order to their being formed, agreeably to their natures, into RIGHTEOUS persons; or, what means the same thing, a *meetness* for an eternal reign in happy life: and this at once lets into the true reason of the erection of the gospel-kingdom, with all its means, privileges, blessings, and motives; which, in any other view, would perhaps be quite unintelligible.

I may have been long and tedious in illustrating the above scripture-passages; but if it should appear that they have been set in a just and true light, an easy forgiveness might reasonably be expected; especially as the subject of them is in itself highly important, and there is no such thing

as fully understanding the apostle *Paul* in this, or indeed in any of his epistles, without knowing his meaning with respect to our *state* and *circumstances* in consequence of the lapse of our first father *Adam*; for the gospel-salvation, as preached by him, is essentially connected herewith.

THE END.





